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Introduction 
Different legal systems regulate the post-separation parent-child 
relationship differently. This can be observed, for example, in differing 
regulations of parental authority or custody following the separation or 
divorce of the parents (whether a legal system stipulates joint parental 
authority or custody, and so forth), but also in the way a legal system 
regulates post-separation contact between a child and a non-residential 
parent. This thesis is concerned with how different legal systems (more 
particularly, those of Germany and Japan) view and regulate the 
relationship between a child and a parent who is not residing with the child 
as a result of the separation (including legal divorce) of the parents, in the 
context of post-separation contact between the child and the parent. 
The statutory and case law of Germany and Japan have adopted a very 
different approach to contact between a non-residential parent and the child. 
One easy-to-spot difference between the two legal systems is that German 
statutory law stipulates a clear (and legally enforceable) right to contact of a 
parent, and of a child. Japanese law, on the other hand, does not stipulate a 
statutory right of contact of either. A common denominator for German and 
Japanese law (and indeed for many jurisdictions) is that “the best interests 
of the child” are applied as a standard when deciding whether and to what 
extent contact between a child and a parent should be allowed. On closer 
inspection, it appears, that in spite of this common standard, German courts 
tend to be more generous with allowing contact, including in the scenario I 
have chosen to focus on in this paper, namely the scenario where the 
residential parent has remarried and the child is living in a step-family. 
 Why are German courts more generous with contact? Is it because contact 
is clearly stipulated as a statutory right? But the standard for deciding 
whether contact is appropriate, is the same, namely “the best interests of the 
child”. Are then the specific contents of the “best interests of the child” 
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understood differently? Indeed, “the best interests of the child” is a 
notoriously vague standard. So what is in the best interests of a child in the 
context of contact with the non-residential parent, how is this determined? 
Are there any hints in statutory law as to how to interpret what is in the best 
interests of the child in the context of post-separation contact? How have the 
courts in Japan and Germany applied this standard in specific cases? 
 In order to answer the above question, and to understand better how these 
two legal systems view the post-separation parent-child relationship, I have 
chosen the example of contact between a non-residential parent and a child 
living in a step-family. I have chosen this particular scenario for several 
reasons. First, it is simply a good general example, as it highlights all the 
potential sources of conflict, and all the conflicting interests, in a contact 
dispute. In addition, it presents a particularly good “test” for finding out the 
extent to which a particular legal system “values” a continued relationship 
between a child and its non-residential parent. After all, in the 
remarriage/step-family scenario, a potential “substitute” for the 
non-residential parent has appeared in the form of the step-parent, evoking 
questions such as which relationships of the child to the various adults 
should be considered as significant for the child (and hence merit the 
protection by the law and the courts), and which relationships might, in the 
case of a conflict of interests, possibly be “sacrificed”. Furthermore, the 
remarriage/step-family scenario allows a look at the question of the 
relevance of post-separation/divorce contact between parent and child from 
the point of view of how a particular legal system has regulated adoption, or 
more specifically step-child adoption. What sort of a message are these two 
legal systems, that of Japan and of Germany, sending concerning 
parent-child relationships, especially the relationship with a parent that no 
longer lives in the same household as the child? 
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Chapter 1 Contact in German Law 
I General Principles 
1 Introduction – Statutory Basis of Contact between Parent and Child 
In Germany, contact between a child and its parents is regulated in § 1684 
of the Civil Code (BGB)1. § 1684 I stipulates that the child has a right to 
contact with each parent (Hs. 1), and that each parent has an obligation and 
a right to contact with the child (Hs. 2). By intentionally placing the right of 
the child before that of the parents, and by stressing the obligation of the 
parents before their rights, the Civil Code highlights the understanding that 
the child and its interests are in the foreground of any regulation of or 
judgment concerning contact (in detail below). Furthermore, § 1626 III 
sentence 1 of the Civil Code clarifies the general stance of the Civil Code 
towards the importance of contact to the child, by stating that the best 
interests of the child as a general rule include contact with both parents. 
§ 1684 II obliges the parents to “refrain from everything that renders more 
difficult the relationship of the child to the other parent or the upbringing of 
the child”. § 1684 III 1 BGB grants the Family Court the right to rule on the 
scope of the right to contact and to make more detailed provisions on its 
exercise (including ordering custodianship for the implementation of 
                                                   
1 A considerable amount has been written in Japanese concerning contact in German 
law. In addition to the papers and works cited in appropriate places in this thesis, there 
are for exampe the following: 鈴木博人「ドイツ法における交流権」比較法研究６７，164
頁（2006 年）; (concerning procedural law and support for the exercise of contact, as well 
as substantive law) 岩志和一郎「子どもの権利の確保のための諸力の連携―ドイツ親権法
の展開」早法 85 巻 2 号 23 頁、高橋由紀子「ドイツの交流権行使と支援制度」帝京法学 26
巻 2 号 81 頁以下（2010 年）、稲垣朋子「面会交流援助の意義と発展的課題――ドイツ法の
運用を視座として（１）・（２完）」国際公共政策研究 17 巻 1 号 101 頁、同 17 巻 2 号 47 頁; 
遠藤隆幸「ドイツにおける面会交流の第三者関与」比較法研究 ７５号３０６頁（2013 年）
も参照されたい、佐々木健「ドイツ法における手続上の子どもの代理人」比較 73 号 126 頁、
岩志和一郎「ドイツにおける『子どもの代弁人』」判タ 1208 号 40 頁などがある；(concerning 
the assertions of PA(S) in contact disputes and German law and practice) 佐々木健「ド
イツ法における親子の交流と子の意思―ＰＡＳ（片親疎外症候群）と子の福祉の観点から」
立命館法学 ３２７・３２８（上）３４７頁；(concerning the wishes, especially the refusal 
of the child) ローツ・マイア「面会交流の立場―ドイツでの子供の交流拒否をめぐる議論を
中心に―」 法学第 77 巻第 3 号 150 頁（2013 年）, and more. 
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contact). 
§ 1684 IV stipulates that the family court may restrict or exclude the right to 
contact (or the enforcement of earlier decisions on the right to contact) to the 
extent that this is necessary for the best interests of the child (sentence 1). A 
higher bar is set for restricting the right to contact “for a long period or 
permanently”. This is only allowable “if otherwise the best interests of the 
child would be endangered”. The Family Court may also order that contact 
may take place only if a third party is present (sentence 3). 
 In addition, § 1686 stipulates that a parent may, in case of justified 
interests, demand information from the other parent on the personal 
circumstances of the child, to the extent that this is not inconsistent with the 
best interests of the child 
 As a new development, since 2013, § 1686a2 stipulates that a “biological but 
not legal” father can apply for contact with their child. Whereas § 1684 
presupposes a legal father-child relationship, § 1686a I states that “as long 
as the paternity of another man exists, the biological father who has 
demonstrated a serious interest in the child has (1) a right of contact with 
the child if such contact is in the best interests of the child, and (2) a right to 
be provided with information from each parent regarding the personal 
circumstances of the child where he has a justified interest and this is not 
inconsistent with the best interests of the child”. 
 
2 The (Legal) Nature of Contact 
2.1 Constitutional Basis 
As already stated above, German statutory law grants the child a right to 
contact and stipulates that each parent has an obligation and a right to 
contact with their child (§ 1684 I). The generally accepted understanding 
                                                   
2 Introduced into the BGB with the Act to Strengthen the Rights of the Biological, not 
Legal Father (das Gesetz zur Stärkung der Rechte des leiblichen, nicht rechtlichen 
Vaters) of 4 July 2013 (BGBl. I S. 2176), in force since 13 July 2013. 
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today is that the right to contact (of a parent as well as the child) is 
guaranteed by § 6 II of the Basic Law3 (Grundgesetz or GG, hereafter 
referred to as GG). 
 Concerning the right to contact of a parent, the understanding that this 
right is derived from the parental rights (Elternrecht) stipulated in § 6 II GG, 
goes back to the October 21st 1964 ruling of the German Federal Supreme 
Court (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH, hereafter referred to as BGH)4. In this 
ruling the court stated that a parent`s right to contact with their child was a 
right independent from the right to excercise custody for the person of the 
child (Personensorgerecht), and added that the right to contact with one`s 
child was based on § 6 II, the same as a parent`s right to exercise custody for 
the person of the child. 
It has long been established through rulings of the Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht or BVerfG, hereafter referred to as 
BVerfG) that the parental rights stipulated in § 6 II GG are by nature rights 
entailing duties. As the Court has stated, in § 6 II sentence 1 GG rights are 
from the outset inextricably linked with obligations, these obligations being 
an essential part of parental rights (as stipulated in § 6 II), which could in 
this respect also be characterized as “parental responsibilities” 
(Elternverantwortung)5. 
Concerning the right of the child, the BVerfG in its ruling of 1 April 20086 
(a ruling concerning the enforceability of the parental duty of contact in § 
1684 I BGB) established that the right of a child to contact with each parent 
is also based on § 6 II GG. The court stated: ”The legal obligation of a parent 
                                                   
3 Art. 6 II of the Basic Law states that “the care and upbringing of children is the 
natural right of parents and a duty primarily incumbent upon them.” (sentence 1) it 
goes on to state that “the state shall watch over them in the performance of this duty” 
(sentence 2). 
4 BGHZ 42, 364. 
5 Vgl. BVerfGE 10, 59; BVerfGE 24, 119; BVerfGE 31, 194. 
6 FamRZ 2008, S. 845. 
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to contact with their child as stipulated in § 1684 I of the Civil Code 
substantiates the parental responsibilities of § 6 II sentence 1 of the Basic 
Law in a manner that is constitutionally unobjectionable. Corresponding 
with the parental responsibilities, the child has a right to care and 
upbringing by his or her parents under § 6 II sentence 1 of the Basic Law, 
which likewise finds its concretization by the legislator in the right of the 
child to contact with each parent under § 1684 I of the Civil Code.”7 
 
2.2 The Child, Its Rights and Interests in the Foreground 
2.2.1 § 1626 III Sentence 1 - the basic stance of the Civil Code towards 
contact between parent and child 
 § 1626, the very first article of the subsection of the German Civil Code 
concerned with parental custody, which lays out the general principles of 
parental custody, stipulates, among other things, that “the best interests of 
the child as a general rule include contact with both parents” (§ 1626 III 
sentence 1). Although this provision does not form a basis for a legally 
enforceable right to contact for the child8, it makes clear the basic stance of 
the Civil Code towards parent-child contact. 
Among German legal scholars and practitioners the understanding that 
having continued contact with the parent not living in the same household as 
the child is beneficial to the child and its development, has long had strong 
support9, and this principle was introduced into the Civil Code with the 1997 
                                                   
7 A. a. O. S. 848. 
8 Vgl. BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 1, 93. 
9 Already the Bill of the Federal Government for the Reform of Parental Rights Law 
(Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Rechts der elterlichen Sorge, BT-Drucks. 
7/2060) from 1974 stated that „the right to have personal contact with one`s child is not 
only part of parental rights and does not only serve the interests of the parent who [no 
longer has parental custody]; the right to contact is at the same time as a rule also in 
the interest of the child (BT-Drucks. 7/2060, S. 1, similarly S. 23. See also BT-Drucks. 
8/2788, S. 41 (contact described as “important for the development of the child”)). The 
BVerfG has also long expressed similar views on the importance of contact for the child, 
for example in the 15 June 1971 decision (FamRZ 1971, S. 421, 425): “There can be no 
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Act on the Reform of Parent and Child Law (Gesetz zur Reform des 
Kindschaftsrechts, hereafter referred to as KindRG)10, as the legislators 
found that in order to promote the rights and best interest of children, “it 
should be highlighted in statutory law that contact with persons who are 
significant to the development of the child” such as parents and important 
persons to whom the child relates (Bezugspersonen) “forms part of the 
welfare of the child”11. 
2.2.2 Contact as the Right of the Child 
As is evident from the wording of § 1684 I, contact is first and foremost the 
right of the child. Until the 1997 KindRG, the Civil Code stipulated only the 
right to contact of the non-custodial parent. Although the right to contact of 
the non-custodial parent was not construed as an absolute right, as it could 
be restricted when this was necessary from the point of view of the best 
interests of the child (old § 1634 II sentence 2)12, the critics still argued that 
the old § 1634 was too adult-centered. The fact that the law made no clear 
mention of the fact that contact also served the interests and development of 
                                                                                                                                                     
objections based on the Basic Law, when statutory law is interpreted to mean that 
despite the abovementioned problems [that the child will be caught between two 
fighting parents when contact is exercised], it is in principle in the interest of the child 
to foster a relationship to the non-custodial parent through personal access (Verkehr)…” 
and that “conversely, obstructing the relationship of the child to the non-custodial 
parent can have a damaging effect on the development of the child.” 
10 BGBl. I S. 2942. 
11 BT-Drucks 13/4899, S. 1, 93. The Bundesregierung (Federal Government) and the 
Judiciary Committee of the Bundestag repeatedly stressed that contact with both 
parents was beneficial or even necessary for the development and the wellbeing of the 
child, see for example BT-Drucks. 13/8511, S. 68, 74. BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 46, 68, and 
so forth. Interestingly, the importance of contact to the child was used as the main 
justification for most of the regulatory changes concerning contact during the 1997 
reform (as introduced in more detail further below), for example, for implementing a 
higher threshold for the restriction or exclusion of contact (BT-Drucks. 13/8511, S. 68), 
and stipulating a (statutory) obligation of the parents to contact (a. a. O.). 
12 And furthermore, it was generally accepted by the end of the 1990s among scholars 
and confirmed by the higher courts that the parental rights stipulated in § 6 II GG, 
including the right to contact, were by nature rights entailing duties, bestowed upon the 
parents to further the wellbeing of their child (as explained earlier). 
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the child was also criticized13. 
2.2.2.1 KindRG of 1997 
 The general aim of the 1997 reform14 was to improve the protection of the 
rights of the child (including the elimination of the remaining differential 
treatment of children born to parents who were married to each other, and 
those whose parents were not, as far as possible) and ensure that the best 
interests of the child were promoted in the best possible manner15. Contact 
was one of the main points of focus of the 1997 reform, and, in view of the 
above general aims, the legislator also aspired to strengthen the position of 
the child in contact disputes and in statutory law concerning contact16. 
 As already mentioned above, in answer to the above-mentioned criticism 
that the law made no clear mention of the fact that contact also served the 
interests and development of the child, 1626 III sentence 1, which stipulates 
that the best interests of the child as a general rule include contact with both 
parents, was introduced into the BGB with the 1997 KindRG. 
 There was considerable debate at the time whether a statutory right of the 
child to contact should also be stipulated in the BGB, as opinions were 
divided. While the Bundestag, as well as for example the Deutsche 
Juristentag argued that contact should be construed as a right of the child 
(as well as the parent(s)) 17 , the Bundesregierung argued against such 
suggestions, pointing to the various practical problems relating to the actual 
exercise of the child`s right to contact, as well as problems with the 
enforceability of such a right18, and arguing that rather than construe 
                                                   
13 BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 46-47. 
14 1997 年改正に関する日本語の解説として、岩志和一郎「ドイツの新親子法（上）（中）（下）」
戸時 493 号 2 頁、495 号 17 頁、496 号 26 頁がある。 
15 A. a. O., S. 1-2, 46-47. 
16 BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 68-69; BT-Drucks. 13/8511, S. 2. 
17 BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 68, 153 (the Bundesrat referring to the UN Convention of the 
Rights of the Child). 
18 A. a. O., S. 68-69, 153. 
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contact as a statutory right of the child, it was important to urge the parents 
to reach an agreement by explaining to them the significance of contact for 
the child (and stressing the role of the Jugendamt (the Youth Welfare Office) 
in such endeavors)19. Hence, the initial draft bill20 of the KindRG, did not 
stipulate a right of the child to contact, although it included the new 
statutory stipulation that the best interests of the child as a general rule 
include contact with both parents (§ 1626 III sentence 1 of the draft bill), and 
a stipulation concerning support by the Jugendamt for the child in 
connection with the exercise of the right to contact of the adults (§ 18 III SGB 
VIII of the draft bill21). 
 The Judiciary Committee of the Bundestag found the above regulation 
insufficient, and argued that it was necessary to emphasize even stronger 
that the child was “not a mere object” of contact but that contact with the 
parents “fundamentally serves the need of the child to be able to build up 
and maintain relationships to both parents”22. Consequently, the Judiciary 
Committee argued that it was necessary to stipulate a child`s own right to 
contact, as well as clarify in statutory law that each parent not only had a 
right to contact, but also an obligation 23 . In addition, the Judiciary 
Committee stated that the importance of contact for the child should be 
highlighted in statutory law by clearly stating in statutory law that contact 
“can only be restricted or excluded by the courts for a long time or 
permanently, if otherwise the best interests of the child would be 
endangered”24. 
 Therefore, according to the current § 1684 I the child has a right to contact 
                                                   
19 A. a. O., S. 168-169. 
20 BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 5-28. 
21 The current § 18 III SGB VIII (Book VIII of the Social Code – Child and Youth 
Services Act) stipulates that children and young persons can request advice and support 
(from the Jugendamt) with the exercise of the right contact. 
22 BT-Drucks. 13/8511, S. 67-68. 
23 A. a. O., S. 68. 
24 A. a. O. 
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with both parents, and the child`s right to contact comes before the 
obligation and right of the parents, stressing that it is the child and it`s 
interests that is in the center of any regulations of contact. Concerning the 
stricter two-tier standard for the restriction or exclusion of contact, I have 
explained in more detail further below. 
2.2.2.2 The significance of the child`s own right to contact in practice 
At the time of the 1997 KindRG, the Judiciary Committee expected the 
principal practical effect of stipulating a statutory right of the child to 
contact to be a change in the perception of the parents regarding contact. 
That is to say, constituting contact as first and foremost the right of the child 
was meant to send a message to the parents (both the residential parent 
obstructing contact, and the non-residential parent avoiding contact with the 
child), to remind them that even after the separation or divorce of the 
parents, both parents remain responsible for the child, to make the parents 
more aware that maintaining a personal relationship to both parents is in 
the best interests of the child, and consequently to persuade them to 
cooperate in the exercise of contact25. 
Following the reform, some authors were skeptical as to the 
above-mentioned expected change in the attitude of the parents as a result of 
stipulating contact as a right of the child26. However, stipulating the child`s 
own statutory (and legally enforceable) right to contact had a somewhat 
surprising consequence in the form of a row of applications by children, 
requesting contact with an unwilling parent, and asserting their right to 
contact as stipulated in § 1684 1 Hs. 1, as well as the obligation to contact of 
                                                   
25 BT-Drucks. 13/8511, S. 68; vgl. auch Schwab, Dieter / Wagenitz, Thomas, Einführung 
in das neue Kindschaftsrecht, FamRZ 1997, S. 1377, 1381. 
26 Rauscher, Thomas, Das Umgangsrecht im Kindschaftsrechtsreformgesetz, FamRZ 
1998, S. 329, 332; vgl. auch Völker, Mallory / Clausius, Monika, Sorge und 
Umgangsrecht in der Praxis, 4. Aufl., Bonn 2011, § 2 Rn. 7. 
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the parent as stipulated in § 1684 1 Hs. 2, following the 1997 KindRG27. Most 
of the courts have confirmed the child`s right to contact in such cases, and 
stressed that the corresponding obligation of the parent has its basis in § 6 II 
GG28. However, the courts as well as scholars argue that the imposition of 
administrative means of coercion in such cases is as a rule not appropriate 
from the point of view of the best interests of the child (although a theoretical 
possibility, see also below) 29. 
 
2.3 § 1684 II and the Obligations of the Parents towards Each Other 
As already mentioned, § 1684 II obliges the parents to “refrain from 
everything that renders more difficult the relationship of the child to the 
other parent or the upbringing of the child”. This obligation not only includes 
a passive obligation to “refrain”, but also an obligation to actively promote 
meaningful contact for a child30. In the case of the residential parent, this 
means, for example, an obligation to convey to the child that contact with the 
other parent is something positive, in order to help the child overcome 
possible psychological barriers against contact, to prepare the child (clothes 
etc) for contact, to bring the child to a contact meeting, and so forth31. The 
non-residential parent is understood to be obliged to keep to the agreed-upon 
                                                   
27 OLG Celle MDR 2001, S. 395; OLG Köln FamRZ 2001, S. 1023; OLG Köln FamRZ 
2004, S. 52；OLG Nürnberg FamRZ 2002, S. 413; BGH FamRZ 2008, S. 1334 u.s.w. 
28 Vgl. OLG Celle MDR 2001, 395; OLG Köln FamRZ 2001, 1023. Also the BVerfG has 
stated, in just such a scenario, that “the legal obligation of a parent to contact with their 
child stipulated in § 1684 I BGB concretizes the parental responsibility of § 6 II 
sentence 1 in a way that cannot be constitutionally challenged. Corresponding with the 
parental responsibility, § 6 II sentence 1 grants the child a right to care and up-bringing 
by its parents, that has also found concretization by the legislator in § 1684 I BGB” 
(BVerfG a. a. O. (6), S. 849. 本判決の紹介として高橋大輔「子どもの交流権の強制執行―ド
イツ連邦憲法裁判所 2008 年 4 月 1 日判決とその後―」筑波法政第 47 号 79 頁以下). 
29 BverfG a. a. O. (6), S. 855 ff. Staudinger/Rauscher 2014, § 1684 Rn. 59 ff (“an 
extremely questionable option“); FamRefK (Familienrechtsreformkommentar, bearb. 
von D. Bäumel et al, Bielefeld 1998)/ Rogner, § 1684 BGB, Rn 4; Völker / Clausius, a. a. 
O. (26), § 2 Rn 7 ff; OLG Köln FamRZ 2004, S. 52. But differently OLG Celle MDR 2001, 
S. 395. 
30 Staudinger / Rauscher (2014), § 1684 Rn. 93. 
31 A. a. O., Rn. 94 ff. 
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rules of contact (starting and finishing time and so forth) etc32. 
 
2.4 The Right to Contact as a Legally Enforceable Right 
The right of the child to contact, as well as that of the parent(s), is legally 
enforceable. During the reform discussion preceding the 1997 KindRG, the 
question of whether legal enforceability of the right to contact was justified 
from the point of view of the best interests of the child, was rather heavily 
debated33. At present, it is generally accepted that the right of the parent as 
well as that of the child is legally enforceable (§ 89 I FamFG). 
 
3 Restriction or Exclusion of the Right to Contact (§ 1684 IV S. 1, 2) 
3.1 Changing Standards for the Restriction or Exclusion of Contact 
The old § 1634 II (in effect until June 30 1998) had stated that the court 
could restrict or exclude the (non-residential parent`s) right to contact “when 
this is necessary for the best interests of the child” (sentence 2). The 1997 
KindRG created a two-tier standard for the restriction or exclusion of contact, 
with the current § 1684 IV stipulating first that the family court may restrict 
or exclude the right to contact (or the enforcement of earlier decisions on the 
right to contact) “to the extent that this is necessary for the best interests of 
the child” (sentence 1), adding that “a decision that restricts or excludes the 
right to contact or its enforcement for a long period or permanently may only 
be made if otherwise the best interests of the child would be endangered.” 
Below, I will introduce how this two-tier standard came to be. In the next 
section, I will show how the standard has been applied in practice, in the 
scenario of contact between a child living in a step-family and the external 
parent. 
3.1.1 The KindRG and the Creation of the Two-Tier Standard 
                                                   
32 A. a. O., Rn. 96 ff. 
33 Vgl. BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 69; BT-Drucks. 13/8511, S. 67-69 u.s.w. 
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The KindRG raised the legal threshold for the exclusion and restriction of 
the right to contact for a longer period of time or permanently. The Judiciary 
Committee of the Bundestag (Rechtsausschuß) pointed out that, although 
the Civil Code at the time permitted the restriction or exclusion of the right 
to contact when “this is necessary for the best interests of the child” (old § 
1634 II S 2), the Federal Supreme Court and Federal Constitutional Court 
had long set stricter conditions for the exclusion of the right to contact34.  
The Committee referred specifically to three decisions: the 15 June 1971 
decision of the BVerfG35, and the 12 July 1984 and 23 March 1988 decision of 
the BGH36. In its abovementioned 15 June 1971 decision, the BVerfG, after 
pointing out that the right of the non-custodial parent is under the protection 
of § 6 II GG37, and also stressing the importance of contact to the child (that 
in spite of the inherent problems of contact regulations (i.e. the child being 
caught between the two fighting parents), “it is in general in the interest of 
the child to foster bonds to the non-custodial parent through personal access 
(Verkehr)38”), went on to remark that “a restriction or exclusion of access is 
only called for when, based on the circumstances of an individual case, a 
restriction or exclusion of access is required for the protection of the child, in 
order to avert a threat to the child`s physical or mental development”39. The 
BGH, in its abovementioned 12 July 1984 decision, built on this 
understanding and added, concerning a complete exclusion of contact: “The 
complete exclusion of contact, being the most drastic measure, can only be 
ordered, when a threat to the child cannot be sufficiently averted by means 
                                                   
34 BT-Drucks. 13/8511, S. 74. 
35 A. a. O. (9) (after the divorce of the parents, the parent with parental custody 
(mother) remarried and thereafter refused contact, claiming that there was no place for 
the non-residential father in the new family). 
36 FamRZ 1984, S. 1084 (incarcerated father), and FamRZ 1988, S. 711 (contact with 
father who contested the legitimacy of the child in question) respectively. 
37 A. a. O. (9), S. 424. 
38 What is now termed “contact” (Umgang), was then called “access” (Verkehr). 
39 A. a. O. (9), S. 425. 
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of a mere restriction and proper arrangement of the right to contact.”40 The 
BGH again reiterated this understanding and elaborated it further in its 
abovementioned 23 March 1988 decision by stating: “It is generally in the 
interest of the child to foster the bonds to the non-custodial parent through 
personal contact. A complete or temporary exclusion of contact, which deeply 
encroaches upon the personal relationship of a child to the parent (whose 
right to contact has been excluded), which is protected by the Basic Law, can 
therefore only be ordered when this is absolutely necessary in order to avert 
a threat to the physical or mental development of the child, and when this 
threat cannot be sufficiently averted through other means.”41 The higher 
courts had therefore already laid the foundations for a higher threshold for 
the restriction and especially the exclusion of contact, referring to the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the (non-custodial) parent, as well as 
the importance of a continued relationship to both parents for the child 
concerned. Especially the exclusion of the right to contact, the courts stated, 
could therefore only be ordered as a last resort, when other milder means to 
avert a threat to the best interests of the child were insufficient. 
Referring to these decisions, the Judiciary Committee of the Bundestag 
argued that it should also be stated more clearly in statutory law that an 
exclusion of the right to contact is only justified “when, based on the 
circumstances of an individual case [an exclusion of the right to contact] is 
necessary for the protection of the child, to avert a threat to the child`s 
physical and mental development42. 
As already stated above, the Civil Code presently stipulates a two-tier 
standard for the restriction or exclusion of the right to contact. The 
conditions for a restriction (or exclusion) of the right to contact in the case of 
a temporary or slight threat to the best interests of the child according to § 
                                                   
40 A. a. O. (36), S. 1084. 
41 A. a. O. (36), S. 711. 
42 BT-Drucks. 13/8511, S. 74. 
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1684 IV sentence 1 are presumably less strict compared to the conditions set 
in § 1684 IV sentence 2. However, even the threshold in § 1684 IV sentence 1 
is by no means low43. For a short-term restriction of the right to contact, 
“concrete, sound and currently existing grounds, which affect the best 
interests of the child in a lasting manner”, should exist44. These grounds 
must be “of such gravity that they would make a restriction of the right to 
contact appear necessary (even) when giving just consideration to the basic 
significance of the right to contact for the child”45. 
Furthermore, the border between the two standards is, not necessarily clear. 
The BVerfG has stated that a “threat to the mental or physical development 
of the child” was a condition already for the (mere) restriction (presumably of 
any length or type) of the right to contact46. Also, for example Rauscher 
argues that the stricter standard (that of § 1684 IV sentence 2) should apply 
for an exclusion of any duration47. 
There is also the question of how long exactly is “a long period” in the sense 
of § 1684 IV sentence 2. Legal scholars and judges seem to agree that what is 
to be considered “a long period” of time, depends on the individual child and 
its sense of time48. 
                                                   
43 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 264. 
44 Johannsen/Henrich/Jaeger, Familienrecht: Scheidung, Unterhalt, Verfahren: 
Kommentar (2010), § 1684 Rn. 34; OLG Brandenburg, FamRZ 2000, S. 1106, 1106 (Case 
6 in section II of this Chapter); OLG Karlsruhe, FamRZ 1999, S. 184, 184 (Case 5 in 
section II of this Chapter). 
45 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 269. Rauscher also argues that it 
should be kept in mind that the restriction of contact itself is not without an effect to the 
child. Rauscher argues that in cases where the unwillingness of the parent living with 
the child to allow contact between the other parent and the child, is the main reason for 
a possible restriction of the right to contact, even a short-term restriction of contact 
could in effect mean investing the reluctant parent with power to decide whether 
contact is (ever) to take place, possibly resulting in the child losing a parent (something 
that Rauscher deems to be a highly undesirable result for the child and its best 
interests) (A. a. O., Rn. 270). 
46 BVerfG, FamRZ 2008, S. 494, 494; BVerfG, FuR 2008, S. 338, para. 24. 
47 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 265. 
48 Johannsen/Henrich/Jaeger (2010), § 1684 Rn. 34. Some disagreement among 
scholars: Johannsen/Henrich/Jaeger (2010), § 1684 Rn. 34 suggest half a year for 
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As to when exactly “the best interests of the child” are “endangered” (1684 
IV 2), the courts have stated that “only in exceptional cases, i.e. when 
conditions exist that deviate considerably from difficulties that typically 
arise [in connection with contact], can, according to the law currently in force, 
contact between a non-custodial parent and a child be understood as 
endangering the best interests of the child. Difficulties that appear time and 
again, such as the unwillingness of the custodial parent, the wish of that 
parent that the child would accept the parent`s new partner as a substitute 
of the absent parent, and difficulties on the side of the child by readapting [to 
contact] after a longer separation, do not suffice, according to current law, to 
exclude contact. The above are difficulties that are encountered frequently, 
and the legislator, who was fully aware of this, nevertheless embedded in the 
law that contact with the non-custodial parent as a rule promoted the best 
interests of the child”49. 
 
3.2 Other Basic Principles Concerning the Restriction and Exclusion of Contact 
3.2.1 The Balancing of the Various Interests of the Parents and the Child 
It is commonly accepted in German today that any restriction of contact 
(including its exclusion) constitutes a very serious encroachment upon the 
parental rights guaranteed by § 6 II GG of the parent who is entitled to 
contact 50 . However, as the legislator and the higher courts have also 
repeatedly pointed out, it is important to keep in mind that contact also 
                                                                                                                                                     
children between the ages of 7 and 12, and 1 year for children over 1 as constitution “a 
long period” in the sense of § 1684 IV, Rauscher argues that already a shorter period of 
time should be considered as “a long period” in the sense of § 1684 IV sentence 2 
(Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 266). 
49 OLG Bamberg, FamRZ 2000, S. 46, 46 (Case 6 in section II of this Chapter); ähnlich z. 
B. OLG Köln, FamRZ 2003, S. 952, 952 (Case 8 in section II of this Chapter). 
50 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 265 („The exclusion of contact 
constitutes the most serious encroachment upon the right to contact, and is permissible 
as a last resort only when there is a threat to the best interests of the child”); Völker / 
Clausius, a. a. O. (26), § 2 Rn. 108. 
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touches upon the interests of the parent residing with the child (equally 
protected by § 6 II GG), as well as the interests of the child. Therefore, the 
interests of both parents as well as the interests of the child are to be taken 
into consideration and weighed against each other51. As the BVerfG has 
stated, when the courts are making a decision concerning contact, they are to 
make “a decision which takes into consideration the constitutional positions 
of both parents as well as the best interests of the child and its identity as a 
subject of basic rights. The courts shall endeavor to seek a concordance 
between the various basic rights in an individual case.”52 
That said, “the best interests of the child” is to be the central standard when 
deciding whether a restriction or an exclusion of contact is called for, as is 
apparent already from the text of § 1684 IV. This is also clear from § 1697a of 
the Civil Code, which stipulates that in proceedings concerning contact the 
courts shall make “a decision which, taking into account the actual 
circumstances and possibilities and the justified interests of those involved, 
is most conducive to the best interests of the child”. 
Here, naturally, the question of what exactly is “conducive to the best 
interests of the child”, arises. The notion of “the best interest of the child” is 
an abstract one, but, as already stated above, in German law, § 1626 III 
sentence 1 gives a definitive clue as to what the starting-point of any 
deliberation concerning contact should be, namely that “the best interests of 
the child as a general rule include contact with both parents”. 
 
3.2.2 The Principle of Proportionality 
Already the pre-KindRG case law introduced above made clear that under 
the principle of proportionality the right to contact could only be restricted or 
excluded, when other milder means to avert a threat to the best interests of 
                                                   
51 Völker / Clausius a. a. O. 
52 BverfG B. v. 8.3.2005, FamRZ 2005, 1057, 1057; BverfG B. v. 29.11.2007, FamRZ 
2008, 494, 494. 
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the child (“a mere restriction” or “proper arrangement”53 of the right to 
contact as opposed to an exclusion of contact) were insufficient. For example, 
in a case where the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht or OLG、
hereafter OLG) excluded the right to contact of a father presumably on the 
grounds that the child (at the time 8 years old) refused contact with the 
father, the BVerfG ruled that the OLG “had failed to understand correctly 
the constitutional requirements arising from § 6 II GG, as it had not 
considered, under the principle of proportionality, whether supervised 
contact (begleiteter Umgang)54 between the child and [the father] would be 
possible, especially as such contact had already stood the test, as determined 
by the AmtsG55.”56 
Summary 
From the reasoning of the Judiciary Committee and the case law of the 
BVerfG and the BGH, it is clear that the high standard for the exclusion and 
restriction of the right to contact is justified not only by the fundamental 
understanding that the right to contact is protected under the Basic Law, but 
also the understanding that contact is in the best interests of the child and 
should therefore be carried out for the benefit of the child, except if there are 
exceptional circumstances that create a concrete threat to the welfare of the 
child. Importantly, the (constitutional) position/standing of the parent 
residing with the child, and the interests of this parent are not to be overlook, 
but are also to be weighed against the position and interests of the other 
                                                   
53 BVerfG a. a. O. (36), S. 1084. 
54 According to § 1684 IV sentence 3, the court may “order that contact may take place 
only if a third party who is prepared to cooperate is present”. This is the so-called 
supervised contact (begleiteter Umgang). (§ 1684 IV sentence 4 goes on to state that 
“the third party may also be an agency of the youth welfare service or an association; 
the latter then determines in each case which individual carries out the task”.) 
55 Amtsgericht or Local Court, abbreviated as AmtsG or AG, this paper will use the 
abbreviation “AmtsG” unless the source has used “AG”. 
56 BVerfG FamRZ 2005, S. 1057, 1058. Vgl. auch BVerfG (decision of 23 Jan. 2008) FuR 
2008, S. 338 (para 24 ff) (possibility of supervised contact with currently incarcerated 
father). 
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parent and the child. In addition, the principle of proportionality is to be 
strictly followed. 
The best interests of the child are to be in the center, but at the same time, 
the rights and interests of the parents are to be given due consideration and 
protection. 
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II Contact with Child Living in a Step-Family 
Introduction 
Below I will show how the standard for the restriction or complete exclusion 
of contact has been applied in practice, in the scenario of contact between a 
child living in a step-family and the external parent. This scenario highlights 
all the conflicting interests and potential sources of conflict in a contact 
dispute on the one hand, serving as a good example for contact in general. 
The scenario of contact with a child living in a step-family also poses some 
additional difficulties, as the best interests of the child also call for the 
protection of the new household and the relationship between the child and 
the new spouse of the residential parent, as well as the stability of the new 
household in general. The case law introduced below will illustrate how 
German courts have assessed the potential harm to the child from contact 
with the non-residential parent, as well as how the interests of the 
residential parent (including the stability of the new-household) and the 
interests of the non-residential parent, have been assessed and weighed 
against the above-mentioned interests of the child. 
 
1 Case Law 
   Case Law from the 1980s 
Case 1  OLG Stuttgart, decision of 24. 10. 198057 
Facts of the case: AS58 (the father) and AG59 (the mother) separated shortly 
before the birth of their son T (2 years old at the time of the OLG Stuttgart 
ruling), and divorced shortly after T`s birth. Parental custody was 
transferred to the AG. Contact between the AS and the child was carried out 
following the separation of AG and AS, and agreed upon at the time of 
divorce (visitation (Besuchsrecht) every second Saturday between 10:00 and 
                                                   
57 NJW 1981, S. 404. 
58 Short for Antragssteller (petitioner). 
59 Short for Antragsgegner (oponent). 
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18:00). Approximately half a year after the divorce, the AG married M and 
began to refuse contact between the AG and T. The AS requested that he be 
granted more extensive rights to visitation. 
Court of the first instance (AmtsG) excluded the AS’s right to visitation for a 
period of one year. 
OLG Stuttgart points out that “[t]he right to contact with the child of the 
parent without parental custody exists without restrictions also in relation 
to a toddler the age of T“, and that the AS exercised his right to contact after 
the birth of T in a way that led to the building up of a sound relationship 
between father and son60. The AG (as well as the expert involved) also 
accepts that the exercise of the AS’s right to contact in the past did not lead 
to any disturbances or strain on the part of T. “This development essentially 
solely indicates that contact between father and son should be resumed. It is 
precisely the successful integration of T into the family M, that makes it 
necessary for T to be able to form, through the exercise of the right to contact, 
even a child’s image of his father, and to keep this image alive.”61 
 The OLG expressed the opinion that „[i]t is not that the AG is afraid, 
because she fears some negative effect to the welfare of the child during the 
time T is absent on account of contact.“ Rather, what the AG wants to 
achieve by refusing visitation contact (Besuchskontakte) between father and 
son, is that T would see the AG’s third husband as his father, and that the 
family-life of the family M would proceed undisturbed by any consequences 
of contact between the AS and T“ (this is also clear from previous statements 
made by the AG).62 
“It is therefore clear that the AG objects to contact between the AS and T 
not because of fear for T, but because of the reasons described above. The 
legislator foresaw the possibility of such an attitude on the side of a divorced 
                                                   
60 A. a. O. (57), S. 404. 
61 A. a. O. (57), S. 404. 
62 A. a. O. (57), S. 404. 
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parent, with all the consequences to the child involved, and gave the 
following assessment to the revised version of § 1634 BGB (BT-Dr 8/2788, S. 
53):  
 “ . . . This draft bill will not follow proposals that call for an 
exclusion of the right to contact already in cases where this serves 
the best interests of the child63. This would lead to inappropriate 
outcome in cases where a divorced parent, to whom parental custody 
was transferred, enters into a new marriage, and the undisturbed 
integration of a child [into the new family] is seen as taking 
precedence over the right to contact of the other parent. An exclusion 
of the right to contact in such cases would constitute an inadmissible 
hardship to the parent without parental custody, and would, as a 
result, also not serve the interests of the child, especially if parental 
custody were, under certain circumstances, to be transferred to the 
other parent. For the above reasons this draft bill will also not 
include a provision that would make it contingent on the 
circumstances and the best interest of the child in each case whether 
there is a right to contact. Such a provision would not give due 
consideration to parental rights (Elternrecht)64 from which the right 
to contact is derived.” 
The court stated that it was clear “that the intention of the legislator, as 
objectified in the wording of § 1634 BGB, is to preclude any arbitrary 
influence by the parent with custody on the exercise of the right to contact, 
and to make the exclusion of the right to contact dependent strictly on a 
concrete threat to the interests of the child.” 
The OLG also pointed out that “the conduct of the AG has led, over time, to 
the AS becoming ‘a stranger’ to T“, and added that the expert involved 
                                                   
63 The italics are mine. 
64 Referring to the rights under § 6 II GG. 
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suggested that there might be disturbances for the child in the future, due to 
the fears of the mother and her refusing contact between the AS and T. The 
OLG, however, found that this should be construed as nothing more than a 
mere possibility. As the AG herself also allows, her fears might be expected to 
lessen as time goes by (she has also told the court that she would allow 
contact when T becomes 3 years old). Thereby, even the mere possibility of a 
threat to T would disappear. It is therefore clear, the OLG stated, that the AS 
has a right to contact.65 
Case 2  AG Kamen, decision of 2. 11. 198266 
Facts of the Case: M (the mother) and V (the father) of D (5 years old at the 
time of the ruling) and J (4 years old at the time of the ruling) divorce when 
the children are 2 and 1 years old, respectively (parental custody is 
transferred to M). There are fierce disputes between M and V. Two years 
later, M marries Y, her former brother-in-law (V remarries as well.) 
Reportedly there has been no contact between V and the children since the 
remarriage of M, or possible since as early as the divorce of M and V. V 
applied to the AmtsG for the court to make provisions about contact between 
him and the children. The AmtsG excluded V`s right to contact for two years, 
pursuant to § 1634 II S. 2 BGB. 
AG Kamen: “Having heard the children, and in conjunction with the 
uncontested assertions of both parents, the judge of the AG is convinced that 
[D] and [J] no longer have a relationship to their father. This is, on the one 
hand, evident from the record of the hearing, which shows that the two 
children could no longer count their father among people familiar to them; on 
the other hand, this outcome results from an age-appropriate connection to 
their step-father as a father-figure.” 
                                                   
65 A. a. O. (57), S. 405. 
66 DAVorm 1983, S. 228 (the wording in DAVorm leaves room for speculation that what 
is published is a summary of the decision. Same applies for Case 3 below). 
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“The judge of the AG therefore proceeds on the assumption that a legally 
substantial father-child-relationship exists [between the children and the 
stepfather]. Hence, from the point of view of the children there is no 
necessity to establish a connection to their father; all their needs for 
identification and attachment will be fulfilled through their factual 
father-relationship. From the perspective of the best interests of the children, 
who are at this time 5 and 4 years old, contact cannot be granted to the 
biological father.” 
“On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that particularly the difference in 
the [family] names of the children67 could lead to certain ill effects in the 
children`s lives at present, especially in the case of the eldest of the children, 
[D], when she is enrolled in a school under her birth name next year. 
However, neither this point, nor considerations concerning a biological 
(blood-) relationship justify a right to contact for the father. Difficulties 
concerning the family name can be solved through the application of § 3 of 
the Change of Surnames Act68.” 
“To be sure, the allusion of the father that the children should be told about 
their actual parentage is correct; this truth belongs to the lives of the 
children and should not be concealed from them. However, this point cannot 
lead to the confirmation of the father`s right to contact either, as contact 
between father and children is only meaningful, when the latter also find the 
visits of the father agreeable. This is however not the case here, first and 
foremost because there are strong feelings of complete exclusion and hostility 
on the side of both of the parents and they have not yet built a neutral 
relationship between themselves. [D] and [J] would in turn sense this 
emotional antagonism and contradiction, and this must be expected – 
considering the age of the children – to lead to intense loyalty conflicts, that 
                                                   
67 Following the divorce of M and V, a child was born to M and her new spouse Y, who 
(the child) supposedly has a different family name from D and J. 
68 Namensänderungsgesetz. 
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would be unbearable in the end. This should not be forced on the children – 
irrespective of their otherwise stable mental state –, at least not during their 
development during the pre-school years, during which period they still need 
care that is consistent and as unambiguous as possible. The judge of the AG 
therefore deemed it appropriate to exclude the right to contact of the father 
for a period of two years.”69 
Case 3  LG70 Paderborn, decision of 29. 5. 198471 
Facts of the case: The daughter (9 months old at the time of the decision of 
LG Paderborn) was born to V (the father) and M (the mother) who were not 
married to each other. The child lives with M who exercises custody for the 
person of the child (Personensorge). V applied for the court to determine his 
right to visitation (Besuchsrecht). (M is in a relationship with K, they intend 
to get engaged in the near future). 
Court of the first instance (AG Paderborn, B. v. 26. 3. 1984) granted V a right 
to visitation. M appealed the decision. 
LG Paderborn pointed out that the Jugendamt (both at the time of the 
decisions of the AG and the LG) is of the opinion that granting visitation to 
the father would not serve the best interests of the child. The court referred 
to (the old) § 1711 (which at the time regulated contact between a father who 
had not been married to the mother, and the child), stating that it was in 
principal up to the parent who has custody whether she will allow contact or 
not, but the court can decide that the father has a right to contact with the 
child, “if this serves the best interests of the child”72. LG Paderborn found 
                                                   
69 A. a. O. (66), S. 229. 
70 Landesgericht or Regional Court. 
71 DAVorm 1984, S. 1030. 
72 § 1711 (version of 24 March 1981 - 1 July 1998, abolished by the KindRG as of 1 July 
1998): (1) The person who has custody for the person of the child, makes determinations 
concerning contact of the child with its father. § 1634 I sentence 2 applies with the 
necessary modifications. (2) If personal contact with the father serves the best interests 
of the child, the Guardianship Court can decide that the father has a right to personal 
contact. § 1634 II applies with the necessary modifications. [3] The Guardianship Court 
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that this condition was not filled in the current case. “The court is of the 
opinion that contact with the father in principle regularly serves the best 
interests of the child, as such contact enables him – as far as this is even 
possible under the circumstances of the case – to develop in a way that is as 
normal as possible, and facilitates the child`s self-image concerning its 
person and origin. This court is also convinced, that [V] seeks contact due to 
the affection he feels for the child and not due to inappropriate 
considerations, such as the wish to approach [M].”73 74 
“In spite of the not insignificant facts listed above, the court, having 
weighed all the circumstances against each other as is required, has reached 
the conclusion that personal contact between [V] and the child would, at any 
rate at present, not serve the best interests of the child.”75 
The court states that in reaching this conclusion, the following two points 
are of particular weight: 
1) “Considerable tensions“ that exist between V and M. The court argues 
that it is „not to be ignored that the [nature of the] relationship between the 
parents can inevitably have an indirect effect on the welfare of the child, 
when the disagreement between the parents has reached an extent where 
regular contact between them would put the mother, with whom the child 
resides, under psychological pressure. Such tension on the side of the mother 
will regularly have a negative effect on the entire psychological equilibrium 
of the family in which the child resides, and will therefore be harmful for the 
welfare of the child. It can be expected that such a situation exists in the case 
                                                                                                                                                     
can amend its decisions at any time. (3) § 1634 II stipulates concerning the right to 
demand information on the personal circumstances of the child. (4) In suitable cases, 
the Jugendamt must mediate between the father and the person who has custody of the 
person of the child. 
73 Based on the personal hearing of V as well as the fact that he had acknowledged 
paternity of the child from the beginning, regularly pays maintenance etc. 
74 A. a. O. (71), S. 1031. 
75 A. a. O. (71), S. 1031. 
29 
 
at hand“.76 The court also pointed out that M expresses her opposition to 
contact between V and the child “in a fierce and emotionally accentuated 
manner”, and that it was to be assumed that she will not be able to view the 
past from a distance, which would otherwise make it possible for contact 
between V and the child to take place without psychological harm being 
caused, and contact would as a result have a negative impact for the family 
atmosphere and consequently also for the child. The court stated that it was 
not important whether there were justified reasons to M`s attitude or who 
was to be blamed for the past. 
“Rather, it is of crucial importance, whether contact between [V] and the 
child would trigger tensions on the side of [M] to the extent that negative 
impact for the family and especially for the child could be expected, and 
without it being possible to prevent such impact through reasonable effort on 
the side of [M]. As stated above, the court is convinced that such is the 
situation in the present case.”77 
2) In the meantime, M has developed a new relationship with K. The current 
state of the relationship “appears stable and shows promise to last”. M and K 
intend to get engaged in the foreseeable future and eventually also to marry. 
“At the same time . . . [K] has built up a good relationship to the child, and 
when he is with [M], he shares in the tasks of providing and caring for the 
child. Subsequently, there is reason to hope that the child will obtain an 
opportunity to grow into an intact family that would offer her social 
relationships which would be more secure and undisturbed than what 
contact with [V] would be able to offer the child under the present 
circumstances. This is all the more so, considering that if the relationship 
between [M] and [K] proceeds on the same track, an adoption of the child by 
[K] is on the table . . . . Regular contact between [V] and the child would not 
                                                   
76 A. a. O. (71), S. 1031. 
77 A. a. O. (71), S. 1032. 
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be beneficial to such integration of the child into a new family; rather it is to 
be expected that such contact would, even with the good intentions of all 
persons involved, obstruct such integration.”78 
„In light of the foregoing, the contested decision (of the AG) must be 
changed and the application of [V] for personal contact with the child is to be 
dismissed. In doing so, this court does not fail to see that this decision will 
burden [V] unilaterally and not insignificantly, as this court, as already 
stated, is convinced of [V]´s sincere affection towards the child. This fact can, 
however, not change anything in the decision at hand, since the legislator – 
as was decided in a permissible manner under constitutional law in the 
decision of the BverfG DAVorm 1981/351 = NJW 1981, 1201 – set the best 
interests of the child as the sole determining factor and let the interests of 
the other persons involved step back before the best interests of the child.”79 
 
    Case Law from 1998 to the present 
Case 4  OLG Köln, decision of 1. 9. 199880 
Facts of the case: The AS (the father, Moroccan) has applied for contact with 
his 5-year-old daughter. The AG (the mother) desires a complete exclusion of 
contact. 
Court of the first instance (Family Court from March 1998) allowed that the 
AS had a restricted right to contact with his daughter (once a month (the 
first Friday of the month) in the rooms of the Kinderschutzbund (Child 
Protection League) in B. between 14:00 and 17:00. The Family Court also 
ordered that during the first three contact visits a representative of the 
Jugendamt be present. The AG appealed. 
OLG Köln judges that the arrangement proposed by the court of the first 
                                                   
78 A. a. O. (71), S. 1032. 
79 A. a. O. (71), S. 1033. 
80 4 UF 87/98 (OLGR 1999, S. 178), retrieved from http://openjur.de/u/153897.html (last 
accessed 20 Nov. 2014). 
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instance is appropriate. The court refers to §1684 I and the right of the child 
to contact, the obligation and right of parents, and the grounds for restricting 
or excluding the right of contact, reconfirming the intent of the legislator 
that the right to contact may be excluded completely or for a long period only 
if ““it is inevitable in the given circumstances, in order to avert a threat to 
the physical or psychological development of the child, and when this threat 
cannot be averted via other means in a sufficiently secure manner” 
(BT-Drucksache 13/8511 Seite 74 . . . 81).“82 
“The AG could not in her appeal bring forward grounds that could justify a 
complete exclusion of the right to contact. Such grounds are also not evident 
from the report of the JA [Jugendamt] of B city of 05.08.1998.83 
Notably, the exclusion of the right to contact cannot be justified by claiming 
that the child is very well integrated in the new civil partnership of the AG 
and regards the AG`s current common law spouse as her “father”. It might 
seem to the mother that leaving the child under such a misconception would 
be the easier way out. However, by doing this, the necessity of making the 
growing child one day acquainted with the actual facts will only be 
postponed to the future, and will at that point – the later it happens – 
probably lead to far more serious annoyances and problems on the side of the 
child. It is known to the Senat from expert consultations in numerous other 
cases, that it is in principle not in the child`s best interest to shift 
confronting the child with the facts of its origin into the (far) future. . . .“84 
(the court also stated, that although the mother claimed that making contact 
with the father would unsettle the child in a way that could harm the child’s 
health, the mother had not provided further proof for this. The court stated 
                                                   
81 Literature reference omitted (in this paper, reference by the rulings introduced to 
other rulings will be retained, but literature references (textbooks, Kommentars) will be 
omitted). 
82 Para. 5. 
83 Para. 6. 
84 Para. 7. 
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that “a mere reference to the “particular sensitivity” of the child was not 
sufficient85.) 
“Neither can, in light of the prevailing legal norms as described above, an 
exclusion of the right to contact be justified by the evident anxiety of the 
mother (which are also highlighted in the report of the JA [Jugendamt]) 
concerning the establishing of contact. It was already acknowledged under 
the old statutes, that lasting conflicts or even enmity between the parents do 
not justify an exclusion (of contact).“86 
Case 5  OLG Karlsruhe, decision of 23. 9. 199887 
Facts of the case: The child M (2 or 3 years old at the time of the OLG ruling) 
was born to the parents AS (the father) and AG (the mother), who separated 
when the child was 1 year old. AS had (irregular) contact with the child for 
approximately the first half a year following the separation of the parents. 
After the separation, the AG entered into a new relationship and is now 
living with the new partner. AS seeks that the court determine his right to 
contact with M. 
The court of the first instance decided that the father has the right to have 
contact with M every 14 days for one and a half hours in the premises of the 
Association for Family Help (Verein für Familienhilfe) in K. The AG 
appealed the decision. She argues that at present contact would be harmful 
to M. She argues that a father-son relationship is being built up between M. 
and her current partner, and that M. is still too little to understand that the 
new partner of the mother is not his biological father. If a right to contact 
would be granted and thereby “another” father would surface, M. would be 
confused and unsettled, which would lead to endangering the welfare of the 
child. 
                                                   
85 Para. 7. 
86 Para. 8. 
87 FamRZ 1999, S. 184. 
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OLG Karlsruhe decided that the court of the first instance was right in 
acknowledging the father’s right to contact with M. “According to § 1684 I S. 
1 BGB effective since January 7th 1998, every child (both marital and 
non-marital) has the right to contact with each parent; each parent has a 
duty and a right of contact with the child. The legal provisions indicate that 
it is in principle also in the best interest of a non-marital child to have 
personal contact with their father. Exclusion of the right to contact is only 
permissible to the extent that this is necessary for the best interest of the 
child (§ 1684 IV S. 1 BGB), or in case of an exclusion for a long period or 
permanently, this is only permissible if otherwise the best interest of the 
child would be endangered (§ 1684 IV S. 2 BGB). For an exclusion of the 
right to contact for a shorter period of time, in accordance with § 1684 IV S.1 
BGB, it is already sufficient when convincing reasons that affect the best 
interest of the child in a lasting manner, exist, which give cause for concern 
that not excluding the right to contact would lead to a disadvantageous 
development of the child . . . .” In this case the court finds no such 
circumstances that would justify an exclusion of the right to contact already 
according to § 1684 IV S.1 BGB.88 
Neither “the young age of M. alone” nor the fact that contact between father 
and son has been disrupted since the middle of 1997, preclude a right to 
contact. “The argument of the mother, that a father-son-relationship is being 
built between M. and the mother`s new partner, so that the appearing of 
“another” father in the course of the exercise of the right to contact would 
lead to unsettlement on the side of the child, is also not applicable for 
excluding the [father`s] right to contact. The exercise of the right to contact 
by the natural father takes precedence over an “undisturbed“ integration of 
the child into a new family unit, as intended by the mother (OLG Stuttgart,  
                                                   
88 A. a. O. (87), S. 184. 
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NJW 1981, 405 . . .).”89 
In respect to M.`s age, the court stated: “In the face of possible burdens [to 
the child], which, in the opinion of this court, could, considering the child`s 
stage of development, by no means be of a serious nature, these [burdens] 
are heavily outweighed by disadvantages which the child would suffer 
through a further disruption of contact with his natural father. The 
alienation of father and son will become more pronounced. It will be 
increasingly difficult to resume and deepen a personal relationship between 
them. It is of significance for the development of a child`s personality to get 
to know their biological father as early on as possible, and to maintain and 
develop the relationship to him by fostering contact, the more so since it is by 
no means possible to foresee in the long run if and how the child`s 
relationship to the new partner of the mother will be formed and 
maintained.”90 
Case 6  OLG Bamberg, decision of 24. 3. 199991 
Facts of the case: The child P (9 years old at the time of the OLG ruling) was 
born to the unmarried parents AG (the mother) and AS (the father, Italian). 
The AS lived together with the AG for the first 5 years of P`s life. 
The court of the first instance granted the AS a right to contact with P. 
The AG seeks the exclusion of any rights to contact by the father, giving as 
reasons (among other things) the refusal of the child to have contact with the 
father. She claims contact with the AS would hurt the best interests of P, 
which could already be witnessed in P`s falling grades at school and P having 
started stammering again. Also, the escort designated by the court – Mr. Z – 
is not prepared to fulfill the task assigned to him. The mother is strongly 
against contact between the AS and P and believes that the AS’s sole object 
                                                   
89 A. a. O. (87), S. 184. 
90 A. a. O. (87), S. 184. 
91 FamRZ 2000, S. 46. 
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in seeking contact is to harass her and to demonstrate his own paternal 
power. The AG claims that the AS does not care about P, which (in her 
opinion) is evident from him showing no interest in the child for years. 
OLG Bamberg: The appeal of the AG is unsuccessful. The court states the 
following: “As the judge of the court of the first instance has already stated, it 
is usually in the interest of a child’s self-identification and psychologically 
stable development to know both parents. For this reason, a right of the child 
to contact, together with a corresponding obligation of the respective parent, 
has been incorporated into current legislation. Only by way of exception, that 
is, if conditions exist that considerably deviate from difficulties that typically 
arise in such cases, can thus, according to the law currently in force, the 
right to contact of a parent, who does not have parental custody, with their 
child, be understood as endangering the child’s best interests. The 
unwillingness of the custodial parent, appearing time and time again, the 
wish of that parent that the child would embrace the present partner of the 
parent as the missing parent, and the difficulties on the side of the child to 
readapt after a separation of some length, do not suffice, according to the 
current law, for excluding the other parent from having contact to with the 
child. The aforementioned circumstances fall under difficulties that appear 
frequently (in this type of cases), and the legislator, who was fully aware of 
this, embodied into the law, that a child having contact also with the parent 
who does not have custody, as a rule promotes the best interests of the child 
(ähnlich OLG Karlsruhe, FamRZ 1999, 184 f; OLG Braunschweig, FamRZ 
1999, 185 f., jeweils m.w.N.).“92 
“For the case at hand, this means the following: The current opposition of P, 
which has been depicted [by the AS] as adamant – neither the JA 
[Jugendamt] nor the judge of the first instance detected that clear of a 
rejection on the side of P – can only be regarded as significant, if the child’s 
                                                   
92 A. a. O. (91), S. 46. 
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refusal to meet with his natural father could, when taking into consideration 
the criteria described above, be considered as, at the very least, compatible 
with the wellbeing of the child.” That is however not the case. “The 
difficulties of P., as described . . . should be understood as transition 
difficulties after a longer separation. It could not be said that the AS cares 
only about himself and not about P, as the AG claims.” (eg the AS had in the 
past tried to gain access to the child etc.)93 
 . . . 
“Also P´s wish to regard the current partner of his mother as his father 
cannot be considered as serving his best interests. Indeed, it might be 
beneficial to P to broaden his horizons through Mr. Z concerning the 
European-Christian cultural sphere. However, this can also occur without 
the boy, having a biological Italian father and a typical Italian first name, 
having to suspend his relationship to his father for the benefit of fatherly 
sentiments towards a man from a different cultural sphere, with whom his 
mother is (possibly only temporarily) living together. The wishes of P – which 
in the opinion of the Senat are merely passing – are consequently not 
compatible with his best interest and therefore not substantial.“94 
Case 7  OLG Brandenburg, decision of 21. 6. 199995 
Facts of the case: The child M (14 years old at the time of the OLG ruling) 
was born to AS (the father) and AG (the mother) who were not married to 
each other. There was contact between M and AS until M was 8 years old. 
Court of the first instance (AmtsG) granted the AS a right to contact with M. 
The AG appealed. 
OLG Brandenburg: “According to § 1684 I S. 1 BGB effective since January 
7th 1998, every child (both marital and non-marital) has the right to contact 
                                                   
93 A. a. O. (91), S. 46-47. 
94 A. a. O. (91), S. 47. 
95 FamRZ 2000, S. 1106. 
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with each parent; each parent has a duty and a right of contact with the child. 
The legal provisions indicate that it is in principle also in the best interest of 
a non-marital child to have personal contact with their father. Exclusion of 
the right to contact is only permissible, to the extent that this is necessary 
for the best interest of the child (§ 1684 IV S. 1 BGB), or in case of an 
exclusion for a long period or permanently, this is only permissible if 
otherwise the best interest of the child would be endangered (§ 1684 IV S. 2 
BGB). For an exclusion of the right to contact for a shorter period of time, in 
accordance with § 1684 IV S.1 BGB, it is already sufficient when convincing 
reasons that affect the best interest of the child in a lasting manner, exist, 
which give cause for concern that not excluding the right to contact would 
lead to a disadvantageous development of the child . . . .” This court finds no 
such circumstances that would justify an exclusion of the right to contact 
already according to § 1684 IV S.1 BGB.96 
  The court considered whether M could offer justified reasons for refusing 
contact with his father, finding that the only complaint of M concerning 
contact was that it was not varied enough. “Neither are the reasons given by 
M, namely that he regards the new partner of the mother as his father, that 
he has in addition to this got a little brother and feels that he has been 
integrated very well and completely in the new family of the mother, 
applicable suitable for excluding the [father`s] right to contact. The exercise 
of the right to contact by the biological father takes precedence over 
an ”undisturbed“ integration of the child into a new family unit, as intended 
by the mother (OLG Stuttgart, NJW 1981, 404, OLG Karlsruhe 1999, 
184).”97 
The OLG pointed out that the AmtsG had given due consideration to the 
child´s age and the fact that contact had been cut off over an extended period 
                                                   
96 A. a. O. (95), S. 1106. 
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of time, when deciding in what form contact is to take place. The OLG also 
stressed that the mother was obliged to prepare the child for contact and to 
communicate a positive image of the AG (as someone who is sincerely 
interested in the child) to the child.98 
Case 8  OLG Köln, decision of 5. 12. 200299 
Facts of the case: Not clear from FamRZ (The AG (the mother) has parental 
custody. The AG has remarried. The age of the child is not given.) 
OLG Köln: “The Family Court was right in saying that excluding the AS`s 
right to contact for the time being would not be compatible with the best 
interests of the child. Exclusion of the right to contact of a parent constitutes 
the most serious intervention into the parental rights (Elternrecht) of that 
parent. Exclusion of the right to contact is called for, when the best interests 
of the child are endangered in a lasting manner, that is, there is a concrete 
imminent danger that the development of the child might enter an 
unfavourable track. Due to reasons of legal clarity, in such cases, a time 
frame must be set for such an exclusion. At the same time, according to § 
1684 IV S. 2 BGB the right to contact can be restricted or excluded “for a long 
period” or “permanently”. However, one must bear in mind that even a 
temporary exclusion of the right to contact already constitutes a serious 
intervention into parental rights which are under the protection of § 6 II GG. 
                                                   
98 A. a. O. (95), S. 1107. The court also stated that in addition to granting the 
AS the right for direct personal contact, there was no reason to deny the AS a 
right to demand information from the other parent on the personal 
circumstances of the child (§ 1686 BGB), arguing that this right can be 
granted as an alternative to direct contact, in cases where direct contact is 
not appropriate. However, the OLG stated that in addition to being an 
alternative option, the right to demand information about the child can 
supplement the right to direct contact (for example, in the current case, 
providing the father with the child’s football schedule would not only allow 
the father to visit the games, but would also inform him about his child’s 
interests and help make personal contact more meaningful) (a. a. O). 
99 FamRZ 2003, S. 952. 
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Furthermore, it is generally in the best interests of, and serves the welfare of 
a child, to foster a relationship to a parent through personal contact. 
Therefore, the exclusion of personal contact with a parent can only be 
ordered by the court to avert a concrete, currently existing danger to the 
physical and mental development of the child (OLG Köln B. v. 26. 6. 2002 – 4 
UF 22/02 . . . 100). It is usually in the interest of a child’s self-identification 
and its psychological and stable development to know both parents. For this 
reason, a right of the child to contact, together with a corresponding 
obligation of the respective parent, has been incorporated into current 
legislation. Only by way of exception, that is, if conditions exist that 
considerably deviate from difficulties that typically arise in such cases, can 
thus, according to the law currently in force, the right to contact of a parent, 
who does not have parental custody, with their child, be understood as 
endangering the child’s best interests. The unwillingness of the custodial 
parent to allow contact, appearing time and time again, and the wish of that 
parent that the child would embrace the present partner of the parent as the 
missing parent, and the difficulties on the side of the child to (re)adapt 
during initial contact meetings or after a separation of some length, do not 
suffice, according to the current law, for excluding the other parent from 
having contact with the child. The aforementioned circumstances fall under 
difficulties that appear frequently (in this type of cases), and the legislator, 
who was fully aware of this, embodied into the law, that a child having 
contact also with the parent who does not have custody, as a rule promotes 
the best interests of the child (OLG Bamberg, FamRZ 2000, 46, m. w. N.)“. 
Based on these principles not even a temporary exclusion of contact between 
the AS and his daughter is justifiable.”101 
“Rather, the evidence accumulated by the AmtsG leaves no doubt that it 
                                                   
100 Refers to Oelkers, FuR 2002, 492, 494 for further case law references. 
101 A. a. O. (99), S. 952. 
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would in fact serve the best interests of the child, if provisions concerning 
contact between K. and her biological father were made as soon as possible. 
The expert report also clearly indicates, that it is of great importance to K.’s 
emotional and intellectual development (as would be commonly accepted in 
the usual case scenario) to get to know her natural father and to discover 
over a natural development process that she has the AS as a natural father 
in addition to the present spouse of the AG, the latter of whom definitely can 
and should be the closest person to whom the child relates (Bezugsperson) 
after the AG. . . .”102 
“The best interests of the child cannot be weighed against what is 
reasonable for the parent with custody. Animosity between parents and the 
negative attitude [towards contact between father and child] of the custodial 
parent, which results from this animosity, these alone do not justify the 
exclusion of the right to contact, even when there is a possibility that the 
tensions between the parents are transferred to the child”. The OLG argued 
that current law does not allow the parent exercising parental custody alone 
to obstruct contact between the other parent and the child merely by 
adamantly refusing such contact (vgl OLG Bamberg, a. a. O., S. 47).103 
Case 9  OLG Brandenburg, decision of 28. 9. 2006104 
Facts of the case: The maternal grandmother (AG) has parental custody as 
guardian of the child V (approximately 6 years old at the time of the OLG 
ruling). The AS (the father) and the mother of the child lived together in the 
same household as V for approximately the first 2 years of the child`s life. 
The parents separate and soon afterwards the child is taken into the 
household of the AG to whom parental custody as guardian is transferred 
after parental custody has been withdrawn from the mother. Since the 
                                                   
102 A. a. O. (99), S. 953. 
103 A. a. O. (99), S. 953. 
104 9 UF 133/06, retrieved from http://openjur.de/u/273728.html (last accessed 20 Nov. 
2014). 
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moving of the child to the household of the grandmother, no contact between 
the father and the child has taken place. V considers the AG and the AG´s 
husband to be her parents; she is not aware of the existence of her natural 
parents. 
The AS argues that it should be explained to V that the AS is her father, 
and he seeks contact with his child. The AG is of the opinion that V could not, 
at the present time, cope with the truth about her parents. She argues that 
telling V the truth about her parents would threaten the results of the 
therapy the child has been receiving due to mental problems. The AG refers 
to the supposed violence of the AS towards (at least) V’s mother in the past. 
Court of the first instance (AmtsG Oranienburg B. v. 14.7.2006) ruled that 
starting from January 2007 supervised contact should take place (in the 
beginning 2 hours per month, then 2 hours every 14 days), arguing that V 
should be told about her natural parents. The initial transitional period 
foreseen by the court was meant to protect the child from psychological 
harm. 
The AG appealed the decision of the AmtsG. She continues to refuse contact 
and stresses even more that it is not yet the right time for explanations 
concerning the child’s parentage. 
OLG Brandenburg argues that the AmtsG was right to grant the AS a right 
to contact with his daughter. The OLG argues that the grounds for extensive 
restriction or exclusion of contact as stipulated in § 1684 Abs 4 are not 
present (no obvious concrete danger to the welfare of the child). “Neither 
does the AG’s argument that it is not yet the right time to inform V about her 
natural parents help her succeed in her appeal. In this respect, it could be 
asked: when is it ever a really good time to inform children about such 
important things. On the other hand, there is no evident or substantial 
evidence that V could not cope with the information at present. Rather, V has 
completed formal therapy by now and it is to be assumed that V is 
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developing normally, which is also evidenced by her starting school this year. 
The responsible JA [Jugendamt] is also in favor of informing the child 
[concerning her biological parents].105 And finally, considering that contact 
between father and child will start in January of 2007, as chosen by the 
AmtsG, sufficient consideration has been given to the sensibilities of V. The 
remaining 3 month or so should suffice for acquainting the child, gently and 
with professional help, with the reality. Therefore, there is no need to be 
concerned about any danger to the welfare of the child through contact with 
the father, . . . “106 
 
1.1 Overview 
 Up to the 1980s 
Literature confirms the past tendency of German courts, illustrated by the 
case law introduced above (AG Kamen (1982) and LG Paderborn (1984)107 
108, but different: OLG Stuttgart (1980)), to prioritize the uninterrupted 
integration of the child into the new household, and the relationship between 
the child and the “new parent”, over contact between the external biological 
parent and the child in cases concerning contact between a biological parent 
and a child living in a household with the other parent and the new 
spouse/partner of that parent109. 
Interestingly, already in the 1970s, during the legislative debate that led to 
the 1979 Parental Rights Reform Act, the legislator referred to the problem 
scenario of contact in cases where the parent with whom the child resided, 
                                                   
105 Para. 20. 
106 Para. 21-22. 
107 Incidentally, the court of the first instance in this case had granted the father a right 
to visitation. 
108 Literature also often refers to LG Berlin DAVorm 1980, S. 936 in this context, 
however, the subject matter if the decision in fact differs considerably from the other 
cases introduced here (it does not concern contact with children living in a step-family), 
hence I have not included this case here. 
109 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 361. 
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remarried or entered into a new relationship. The legislator argued that 
allowing the exclusion of a parent`s right to contact already where this 
served the best interests of the child, “would lead to an inappropriate 
outcome in cases where a divorced parent, to whom parental custody was 
transferred, enters into a new marriage, and the undisturbed integration of a 
child [into the new family] is seen as taking precedence over the right to 
contact of the other parent. An exclusion of the right to contact in such cases 
would constitute an inadmissible hardship to the parent without parental 
custody, and would, in the long run, also not serve the interests of the child, 
especially if parental custody were, under certain circumstances, to be 
transferred to the other parent”110. Although acknowledging the inherent 
difficulties of the scenario of contact with a child living in a step-family (the 
assumed need to secure an “undisturbed integration” of a child into the new 
family, the rights and interests of the external parent, and the (possibly 
heavily influenced) wishes of the child as well as the long-term interests of 
the child in relation to contact with the other biological parent), the 
legislator by no means laid out clear guidelines to how the courts were to 
decide in such cases. 
OLG Stuttgart (1980) (introduced above) appears to have interpreted the 
above (directly quoted in the decision itself) to mean that the fact that the 
child was living in the same household with the new spouse/partner of the 
other parent was not sufficient grounds to exclude contact between the child 
and the external non-custodial parent, arguing that the intention of the 
legislator was “to preclude any arbitrary influence by the parent with 
custody on the exercise of the right to contact, and to make the exclusion of 
the right to contact dependent strictly on a concrete threat to the interests of 
the child”111. However, the majority of court decisions in the 1980s appear to 
                                                   
110 BT-Drucks. 8/2788, S. 53. 
111 OLG Stuttgart (1980) S. 405. 
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have followed a different path, and OLG Stuttgart (1980) and the approach it 
took, was frequently criticised, as introduced further below. 
The AG Kamen (1982) and LB Paderborn (1984) decisions introduced above 
represent the main-stream approach of the time, pointing out that contact 
with the non-custodial external parent was unnecessary from the point of 
view of the children in question, or even harmful, as (especially younger) 
children were said to need “consistent and unambiguous care” under the 
custodial parent and the step-parent, without interference from the external 
non-custodial parent112. Continued contact with the external parent, after a 
step-parent had entered the scene, was deemed to disturb the atmosphere of 
the new household, and to obstruct the integration of the child into the new 
family113. 
Two critics of the OLG Stuttgart (1980) approach and supporters of the 
above-mentioned main-stream were the influential German child and youth 
psychiatrist and scholar Dr. Reinhart Lempp114 and the then judge of AmtsG 
Kamen Franz Dickmeis115. On the one hand, Lempp and Dickmeis both 
agreed that a continued relationship with both parents, even after the 
parents had separated or divorced, was naturally beneficial to the child in 
cases where both parents were positively minded towards contact (Dickmeis 
specifically refers to the child`s need for identification with the parent not 
living with the child)116. They argued, however, that in cases where the 
parents could not see eye to eye on contact (and here it is important to keep 
in mind that in the step-family scenario (especially in cases that have made 
it all the way to the courts), it is usually the wish of the custodial parent to 
                                                   
112 AG Kamen (1982) S. 229. 
113 LG Paderborn (1984) S. 1032-33. 
114 Lempp, Reinhart, Braucht der sorgeberechtigte oder der nichtsorgeberechtigte 
Elternteil einen besonderen Schutz? – Kinderpsychiatrische Gedanken zu zwei Urteilen 
nach § 1634 BGB - , Zentralblatt für Jugendrecht und Jugendwohlfahrt, 1981 S. 283 ff. 
115 Dickmeis, Franz, Die Umgangsbefugnis im Spiegel elterlicher Verantwortung – 
Versuch einer interdisziplinären Betrachtung -, ZblJugR 1982 (69), S. 271 ff. 
116 Dickmeis, a. a. O. (115), S. 278 ff; Lempp, a. a. O. (114) S. 285 ff. 
45 
 
exclude the non-custodial parent from her/his new family by refusing 
contact), psychological harm to the child would arise from the emotional 
conflicts (including a loyalty conflict) that he/she would experience, and 
therefore contact should be refrained from completely117. 
In addition, Dickmeis argued that in the case scenario where a “substitute 
parent” (a step- or foster-parent) had entered the scene, there was, as a rule, 
no need for establishing contact between the child and the non-custodial 
parent, as the “(psychological or factual) substitute parent already fulfills the 
need of the child for identification”118. Lempp even referred to possible harm 
to the child from contact, pointing out that for children living in a “new 
family”, possibly with step-siblings, contact with the other biological parent 
would mean that the child would carry on a dual relationship which other 
members of the child’s current family did not share. He argued that carrying 
on such a relationship would harm the psychological development of a small 
child (possibly even a child in primary school)119. 120 
The 1990s and onward 
As is apparent from the case law introduced above, by the end of the 1990s 
the general tendency was (and continues to be) that “the exercise of the right 
to contact by the biological father takes precedence over an “undisturbed” 
integration of the child into a new family unit”121. With the courts stressing 
that for children knowledge of and contact with both (biological) parents is in 
                                                   
117 Lempp, a. a. O. (114), S. 285 ff; Dickmeis, a. a. O. (115), S. 278 ff, 281. Both Lempp 
and Dickmeis understood the best interest of the child to be closely tied to the interests 
and wishes of the custodial parent (especially clearly in Lempp, a. a. O. S. 287). 
Dickmeis viewed any contact that was ordered or carried out against the wishes of the 
custodial parent (specifically including cases where the custodial parent had remarried) 
as “forced on” the child (and therefore not acceptable from the point of view of the child) 
(Dickmeis, a. a. O. S. 281, 282). 
118 Dickmeis, a. a. O. (115),S. 278, 282. Also AG Kamen (1982) S. 229. 
119 Lempp, a. a. O. (114), S. 286. 
120 AG Kamen (1982) S. 229 also refers to the works of child-psychiatrist Michael 
Rutter (Bindung und Trennung in der frühen Kindheit, 1978, S. 33 ff), but also to the 
writing of Gisela Zenz, a jurist and psychologist. 
121 As OLG Karlsruhe (1998) S. 184 and OLG Brandenburg (1999) S. 1106. 
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the interest of the child’s “self-identification and psychologically stable 
development”122, and pointing out that keeping the child in the dark about 
its other biological parent and letting it live with the mistaken belief that the 
new spouse/partner of the parent is its “real” father/mother will only 
postpone the shock to the child into the future when it will hurt the child 
more123, it is generally accepted that “the unwillingness of the custodial 
parent to allow contact, appearing time and again, and the wish of that 
parent that the child would embrace the present partner of the parent as the 
missing parent, [and the difficulties on the side of the child to readapt after a 
separation of some length] do not suffice, according to the current law, for 
excluding the other parent from having contact to with the child”124. 
 
1.2 Why the Change in Case Law? 
a. Consensus Concerning the Significance of Contact for the Child 
The general backdrop to this shift in case law, from restricting contact 
between a child living in a step-family and the external biological parent, to 
promoting such contact, is the tendency (gradually increasing over the years) 
in case law and scholarly literature concerning contact as a whole, to 
promote contact between the child and the parent not living with the child, 
as contact with both (biological) parents is argued to be, as a rule, in the best 
interests of the child and its development. As introduced earlier, this 
principle was also introduced into the BGB in the form of a clear provision (§ 
1626 III sentence 1) in 1997. 
It should be noted that over the years there has been continuous debate 
                                                   
122 OLG Bamberg (1999) S. 46-47; OLG Köln (2002) S. 952. 
123 OLG Köln (1998) para. 7; OLG Brandenburg (2006) para. 20. 
124 OLG Bamberg (1999) S. 46; OLG Köln (2002) S. 952. The tendency to order contact 
in step-family case scenarios pointed out in literature: Weinreich / Klein, 
Fachanwalts-Kommentar Familienrecht, 5. Aufl (Köln, 2013), § 1684 Rn. 103; 
Johannsen/Henrich/Jaeger (2010), § 1684 Rn. 29; vgl auch Völker / Clausius, a. a. O. 
(26), § 2 Rn. 135. 
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concerning the merits and demerits of contact with the non-residential 
parent for the child. Over the years, various assertions have been made 
concerning the significance of contact for the child, as well as the parent125. 
In 1964, the BGH argued that contact was to enable the non-custodial parent 
to personally and directly keep abreast of the physical and mental condition 
and development of the child, to maintain a close familial relationship to the 
child and prevent estrangement, as well as to “take account of a mutual need 
for affection”126, a view that was frequently reiterated in later case law and 
literature 127 , and that stressed the importance of contact to both the 
non-residential parent and the child.  
Another argument that appears time and again in case law and literature is 
that continued contact between the external parent and the child is 
meaningful when keeping in mind that the external parent may in the future 
once again become the primary caregiver of the child if for example a court 
decision concerning parental custody is changed in favor of the formerly 
non-custodial parent (§ 1696), when the other parent is deprived of parental 
custody (§ 1680 III) or dies (§ 1680 I, II). It has been argued that in such a 
case, continued (personal) contact to the formerly non-custodial parent would 
make it easier for the child and the formerly external parent to adjust to the 
changed situation128. 
As the focus moved away from the parent and more towards the child, case 
law and scholars stressed the importance of continued contact with the 
external parent for the child, by arguing that it was important for the child 
                                                   
125 A detailed overview with copious references in Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 
BGB Rn. 29 ff, also Schultze, Natascha, Das Umgangsrecht – die deutsche Reform im 
Kontext europäischer Rechtsentwicklung, (2001), S. 34ff. 
126 BGHZ 42, S. 364, also Staudinger/Schwoerer (1966), § 1634 BGB Anm. 10. 
127 For example in BGH FamRZ 1984, S. 778, 779; BVerfG FamRZ 1995, S. 86, 87; in 
recent case law for example OLG Brandenburg FamRZ 2009, S. 1688; in literature 
Johannsen/Henrich/Jaeger (2010), § 1684 Rn. 3. 
128 As also pointed out by BVerfG FamRZ 1983, S. 872, 873; BGH FamRZ 1984, S. 778, 
779. 
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to have a continued close relationship to both parents in order to secure its 
successful emotional development, and to help the child to handle the 
separation of the parents and the loss of the continued presence of one 
parent from the household129.  
The opportunity for the child to attain a realistic image of the other parent 
through personal contact (as opposed to the negative image possibly created 
by the parent living with the child, or an idealized image that the child has 
created him/herself) has also been suggested as a positive result of contact130. 
In addition, some case law has stressed that it is important for the 
personality development of the child to know their (other) biological parent, 
even if a possible substitute “social” parent lives in the same household as 
the child131. 
Accordingly, there has been an increasing consensus among legal scholars 
and practitioners since at least as early as the 1970s that contact with both 
parents is generally beneficial to the child132. As introduced above, this basic 
understanding of the importance of contact for the child was introduced into 
the BGB in 1997 in the form of § 1626 III sentence 1. 
Nevertheless, there has never been absolute unity in Germany among legal 
scholars and also experts from other fields as to the extent to which contact 
should be promoted and exercised in specific cases. Although the Civil Code 
appears to take the stance that contact with both parents is in general in the 
best interests of the child (§ 1626 III sentence 1), there has always been 
criticism towards a general “presumption of contact”133, and it has been 
                                                   
129 Johannsen/Henrich/Jaeger (2010), § 1684 Rn. 3. 
130 From a psychological viewpoint Mackscheidt, Elisabeth, Loyalitätsproblematik bei 
Trennung und Scheidung – Überlegungen zum Kindeswohl aus familientherapeutischer 
Sicht, FamRZ 1993, S. 254, 257. But critically Schultze, a. a. O. (125) S. 45 m. w. N. 
131 OLG Karlsruhe (1998) S. 184. 
132 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 5. 
133 Noticeably throughout the years Lempp (argued that contact was only beneficial to 
the child if there was a relatively low degree of animosity between the parents and the 
parents were able to agree on contact. However, in cases where there remained a high 
degree of animosity between the parents, it was argued that contact should be restricted, 
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pointed out that the various arguments introduced above concerning the 
benefits of contact for the child, are not always necessarily based on clear 
scientific evidence134. Consequently, opinions differ somewhat as to how to 
strike a balance between promoting contact despite a deep conflict between 
the parents (based on the understanding that in the long run the importance 
of maintaining ties/contact to the other parent for the development and 
socialization of the child outweighs any temporary discomfort to the child) on 
the one hand135, and protecting the child from the negative effects caused by 
parental animosity (including a loyalty conflict)136 on the other. 
Notably, in order to clarify what the child needs and what is harmful to its 
development, various studies have been conducted and numerous academic 
articles have been published in Germany over the years, which have 
attempted to look at contact (or the lack of it) and the effects it has on the 
child from the point of view of different fields such as child psychology, 
psychiatry and medicine137. 
                                                                                                                                                     
as it would cause a loyalty conflict and other harmful effects to the child), a. a. O. (114), 
ders., Die Rechtstellung des Kindes aus geschiedener Ehe aus kinder- und 
jugendpsychiatrischer Sicht, NJW 1972, S. 315 ff; vgl. auch ders., Die Bindungen des 
Kindes und ihre Bedeutung für das Wohl des Kindes gemäß § 1671 BGB, FamRZ 1984, 
S. 741. 
134 See Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 33 for further references. 
135 From a psychology viewpoint Klenner, Wolfgang, Rituale der Umgangsvereutelung 
bei getrenntlebenden oder geschiedenen Eltern – Eine psychologische Studie zur 
elterlichen Verantwortung, FamRZ 1995, S. 1529; Mackscheidt, a. a. O. (130); Ell, Ernst, 
Psychologische Kriterien zur Umgangsregelung, DAVorm1986, S. 750. 
136 In addition to Lempp a. a. O. (114), (133), Haffter, B., Kinder aus geschiedenen Ehen, 
2. Aufl., (1960), S. 74 ff., 117 ff (the latter is even cited by (the otherwise extremely 
pro-contact) decision of the BVerfG of 15 June1971 (a. a. O. (9), S. 425) which argued as 
follows: “… the best interests of the child [must] constitute the point of reference for the 
decisions of the [court]. In this respect, it cannot be left out of consideration that 
regulation of access through decisions of the courts and the enforcement of such 
decisions not infrequently result in the multiplication of the difficulties that children 
experience as a result of the separation of the parents, so that many doctors, educators 
and adolescent psychologists express their concerns concerning [such regulation and 
enforcement of contact] in the interest of an undisturbed development of the child.” 
u.s.w. 
137 In addition to the articles already referred to above, Kölch, Michael / Fegert, Jörg, 
Die umgangsrechtliche Praxis aus Sicht der Kinder- und Jugendpsychiatrie, FamRZ 
2008, S. 1573; Röcker, D., Sorgerecht und Verkehrsrecht, Pädiatrische Praxis 1975/6, S. 
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Although it has been pointed out again in recent years that there is no 
irrefutable evidence that contact necessarily always has a positive effect on 
the child138, the current dominant stance among legal scholars is that § 1626 
III S. 1, which states that the best interests of the child as a general rule 
include contact with both parents, is, as a general rule, justified139 (therefore 
allowing for exceptions when the particulars of a case suggest that contact 
might not be beneficial, or indeed is harmful to the child). 
This general attitude is also apparent in the case law introduced above 
concerning contact with a child living in a step-family, with the judges 
pointing out that it is “of significance for the development of a child`s 
personality”140 or “usually in the interest of a child’s self-identification and 
psychologically stable development”141 to get to know both biological parents 
and maintain a relationship to each. The scenario where the child is living 
with one biological parent and one (potential) social parent (the new 
partner/spouse of the parent), is not considered an exception to this general 
rule. Indeed, as already mentioned above, the courts have stressed that a 
step-child should not be kept in the dark about their biological parentage, 
and should in fact be made aware of the external parent as early as possible, 
to minimize any possible harm to the child`s emotional development142.  
                                                                                                                                                     
557, usw. 
138 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 33, 35. Kindler, Heinz / Reinhold, 
Claudia, Umgangskontakte - Wohl und Wille des Kindes, FPR 2007, S. 291. 
139 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 33 ff; Völker / Clausius, a. a. O. (26), § 
2 Rn. 119 usw. 
140 OLG Karlsruhe (1998) S. 184. 
141 OLG Bamberg (1999) S. 46; OLG Köln (2002) S. 952. 
142 As OLG Köln (1998), introduced above, stated in a case where the child in question 
believed the step-parent to be its biological father: “It might seem to the [residential 
natural parent] that leaving the child under such a misconception would be the easier 
way out. However, by doing this, the necessity of making the growing child one day 
acquainted with the actual facts will only be postponed to the future, and will at that 
point – the later it happens – probably lead to far more serious annoyances and 
problems on the side of the child. It is known to the Senat, from expert consultations in 
numerous other cases, that it is in principle not in the child`s best interest to shift 
confronting the child with the facts of its origin into the (far) future. ..”, similarly OLG 
Karlsruhe 1998 (the mother had argued that the child, who was at the time 2 or 3 years 
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b. The Stability of the “Ideal” New Family 
As to the arguments (usually put forth by the biological parent who has 
personal custody of the child in question) that contact with the external 
biological parent would have a harmful effect on the child in question, as 
such contact would confuse the child or hinder its smooth integration into 
the new family, these arguments are no longer considered as valid by neither 
the courts nor the majority of scholars143. Indeed, nowadays scholars and 
judges alike are quick to point out that the residential custodial parent of a 
child is likely to oppose contact between the child and the external parent 
not due to actual concerns for the well-being or the best interests of the child, 
but because that parent wishes to push aside the former spouse or partner, 
as he/she wishes no (from his/her point of view) unwelcome interruptions to 
what that parent hopes will be(come) the new ideal family, where the child 
will embrace the new spouse of the parent as a substitute for the external 
parent144. 
In recent years German judges and scholars alike have become more aware 
of the fact (acknowledged by social scientists in Germany since as early as 
the 1930s145) that a step-family might not turn out to be as “ideal” as the 
                                                                                                                                                     
old, was too young to be confronted with the fact that the new partner of the mother was 
not his biological father. This argument dismissed by the court based on the above logic), 
also OLG Köln (2002) (the maternal grandmother argued that it was not yet the right 
time to tell the child (5 or 6 years old) about her biological parents. The court dismissed 
the argument by posing the question “when is it ever a really good time to inform 
children about such important things?”, ordering contact to commence after another 3 
months and stating that this transition period “should suffice for acquainting the child, 
gently and with professional help, with the reality”). 
143 But see Maurer in FamRZ 2006, S. 96 ff (commentary to BVerfG decision of 29. 11. 
2009): “the biological father is often a “trouble-spot” for the new relationship of the 
mother, which could lead to the breaking up and loss of this relationship, and to the loss 
of an opportunity for the child to grow up in a family that would offer him/her good 
chances for development” (S. 98-99). 
144 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 361. See also Staudinger/Frank (2007), 
§ 1741 BGB Rn. 42, 44; Paulitz, Harald, Wie sinnvol sind Stiefkindadoptionen?, ZfJ 
1997, S. 311, 312 ff. (In clear terms also already OLG Stuttgart (1980)). 
145 See references in Staudinger/Frank (2007), § 1741 BGB Rn. 45, also 43. 
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custodial parent initially imagines or hopes. Studies in the field of 
psychology have shown that the members of a step-family (the children as 
well as the adults) often feel overwhelmed by their new roles and often 
experience considerable stress, which could result in increased tensions 
among the family members and further complicate the relationships in the 
household146. Interestingly, there is some evidence that step-families, where 
the child maintains a relationship to the external biological parent, function 
better than families where contact between the child and the external parent 
is cut off147. 
 Furthermore, it is occasionally pointed out by scholars and judges that 
there is no guarantee that the relationship between the custodial parent and 
the step-parent will last. Statistically, the divorce rate of second and third 
marriages in Germany is higher than that of first marriages 148 . The 
decisions of OLG Karlsruhe (1998) and OLG Bamberg (1999) introduced 
above, made a point of highlighting the fact that there was no way of 
knowing how the mother`s new relationship would play out in the long run, 
this being all the more reason for the child to maintain a relationship to the 
external biological parent149. The same has been pointed out in literature. 
                                                   
146 Staudinger/Frank (2007), § 1741 BGB Rn. 45. 
147 See Staudinger/Frank (2007), § 1741 BGB Rn. 43 m. w. A. OLG Stuttgart (1980, 
introduced above) also argued that “It is precisely the successful integration of [the 
child] into the [new] family, that makes it necessary for [the child] to be able to form, 
through the exercise of the right to contact, even a child’s image of his father, and to 
keep this image alive” (S. 404). 
148 Paulitz, a. a. O. (144), S. 312. This trend is also evidenced by the number of cases 
where former step-parents, who adopted their step-child, apply to the courts to revoke 
the adoption after divorcing the biological parent, see Staudinger/Rauscher § 1741 
(2007) Rn. 44 for further references. 
149 OLG Karlsruhe (1998) S. 184; OLG Bamberg (1999) S. 47. See also the commentary 
to the OLG Karlsruhe (1998) decision by Gerhard Hohloch (Jus 1999, S. 399) S. 400. 
(Albeit, in both cases, the custodial mother was not officially married to her new partner. 
However, it goes without saying that, considering the considerable number of couples in 
Germany who cohabitate without officially registering their union, the fact that the 
mothers in these two cases were not married to their new partners does not 
automatically mean that the relationship between the adults was bound to be of a short 
duration.) 
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Rösler and Reimann argue about step-child adoption cases that rather than 
“protect” the relationship between the stepparent and the child by severing 
contact with the other biological parent through adoption, it would make 
more sense to protect the relationship between the external biological parent 
and the child, as this relationship might prove to be the “more sustainable 
and lasting” one150. 
c. Changes in Society 
Finally, it is argued that, taking into account the relatively large number of 
step-families, there could no longer be any “unbearable social strain” on the 
child from a situation where the child lives in a household with one biological 
parent and that parent`s new spouse or partner, while continuing to have 
contact with the other biological parent, as this has become a common 
phenomenon, and something viewed and accepted as “normal” in the “social 
environment of the child in kindergarten, school and the neighborhood”151. 
The case law introduced above also refers to situations where a child has, so 
to say, “three parents”, as nothing out of the ordinary152. 
Taking the above into account, the courts in the cases above also argued 
that the child should be made aware of its factual descent as early on as 
possible, as the older the child gets, the greater the shock and confusion will 
be153. 
d. Additional Catalyst -The Improved Legal Position of the Father of a 
Non-Marital Child 
It has been pointed out that an additional catalyst for the shift in case law 
was the strengthening of the position of the father, who had not been 
married to the mother of the child in question154. Until 1997, contact between 
the child and the non-marital father, was regulated by BGB § 1711 a. F., 
                                                   
150 Rösler / Reimann (anm. zu BVerfG B. v. 27. 4. 2006, FamRZ 2006, S. 1355) S. 1356. 
151 Staudinger/Rauscher § 1684 (2014) Rn. 361. 
152 Vgl. OLG Bamberg (1999) S. 47 and OLG Köln (2002) S. 953. 
153 OLG Köln (1998) para. 7; OLG Brandenburg (2006) para. 20. 
154 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 361. 
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which stated that “the person who has personal custody for a child, makes 
the decisions concerning contact between the child and the father” (§ 1711 
Abs. 1 S. 1), leaving it entirely up to the custodial parent (mother) to decide 
whether and to what extent there was to be contact between the child and 
the other parent. § 1711 Abs 2 S. 1 stipulated that “if personal contact with 
the father serves the best interests of the child, the court can rule that the 
father has a right to personal contact”. This was a much stricter condition 
than what was stipulated in § 1634 a. F. for fathers who had been married to 
the mother of the child in question (according to § 1634 II S. 2 a. F. the court 
could restrict or exclude the (non-custodial parent`s) right to contact “when 
this [was] necessary for the best interests of the child”). With the 1997 
KindRG, § 1711 a. F. was abolished and the non-marital father included in § 
1684 (formerly § 1634) on an equal footing with fathers who had been 
married to the mother of the child. Following this reform, a row of decisions 
were handed down by German courts concerning contact between a father of 
a non-marital child and the child. The courts in these decisions ordered 
contact to take place, including in cases where the father of a non-marital 
child was seeking contact with a child living in a step-family (as introduced 
above), and in these decisions, as seen above, the courts took pains to point 
out that also in cases where it was a father of a non-marital child who was 
seeking contact, contact was to be understood as in general being in the best 
interests of the child. Consequently, or so the logic seems to go, seeing as 
even(?) in the case of an non-marital father, the fact that the custodial 
mother has entered into a new relationship does not constitute a reason for 
excluding contact between the external parent and the child, the father who 
has been married to the mother should certainly not be denied contact155. 
 
                                                   
155 Staudinger/Rauscher (2014), § 1684 BGB Rn. 361. See also Hohloch, a. a. O. (149) S. 
400. 
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2 Step-Child Adoption 
Introduction 
According to German law all adoptions of minors are so-called “full 
adoptions”, meaning that also in the case of an adoption of a child by a 
step-parent, the relationship of the child to its other natural parent and the 
rights and duties arising from this relationship, including the right to 
contact, are extinguished (general rule in § 1755 Abs 1, specific rule for the 
case of stepchild adoption in § 1755 Abs 2). In view of such serious and final 
effects of an adoption by step-parent, an adoption order is made by the courts 
only if a number of strict conditions are fulfilled (more in detail below). As 
there can be no more applications for contact from the external (natural) 
parent once an adoption order has been made, the dispute between the 
natural parents concerning the maintaining of a personal relationship 
between the external natural parent and the child, is occasionally played out 
during adoption proceedings. 
Notably, in the 1990s and the 2000s, the BGH and the BVerfG were called 
upon to bring clarity into the question of the best interests of the child living 
in a step-family and the importance of contact with the external parent, in a 
number of cases concerning step-child adoption156. More specifically, these 
decisions dealt with the constitutionality of the conditions under which the 
consent of the non-marital father to the adoption of his child by the new 
spouse of the mother could be substituted. Although on the surface the courts 
were called upon to decide on the constitutionality of the seemingly 
differential treatment of fathers who had been married to the mother of the 
child in question, and those who had not, and not directly with contact 
                                                   
156 Decisions of the BVerfG from 7. 3. 1995 (FamRZ 1995, S. 789, Anm. Buhr, FamRZ 
1995, S. 1268), the BGH from 23. 3. 2005 (FamRZ 2005, S. 891), the BVerfG from 29. 11. 
2005 (FamRZ 2006, S. 94, Anm. Maurer, S. 96) and the BVerfG from 27. 4. 2006 (FamRZ 
2006, S. 1355, Anm. Rösler/Reimann, FamRZ 2006, S. 1356).連邦憲法裁判所の上記 1995
年 3 月 7 日判決を紹介する日本語文献として高橋由紀子「ドイツの婚外子の父の交流権」
帝京法学 ２５巻１号５７頁（2007 年）がある。 
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between the external parent and the child per se, the courts in these 
decisions addressed the basic underlying questions of how step-child 
adoption in general was to be regarded from the point of view of the best 
interests of the child (namely, to what extent the relationship between the 
external parent and the child (marital or non-marital), was to be protected, 
and how much importance was to be attached to the legal integration of the 
child into the step-family through official adoption). As I believe that these 
decisions give additional insight into the attitude of German courts towards 
maintaining a relationship between a child and an external parent in cases 
where a possible substitute parent has entered the scene, I will below 
introduce the decisions in a concise manner, focusing on how the courts 
addressed the above-mentioned basic questions. I will also give a short 
overview of how step-child adoption has been viewed in scholarly literature 
in Germany. 
 
2.1 Adoption in German Law with a Focus on Step-Child Adoption 
Under German law, adoption is performed by court order (§ 1752) (the mere 
consent of the parties does not suffice). Various condition must be fulfilled, 
including the consent of (among others) the child that is to be adopted (§ 
1746), and the (natural) parents of the child (§ 1747). This means that also in 
a case where the spouse of one of the natural parents wishes to adopt the 
child (the so-called step-child adoption, expressly referred to in § 1741 II S. 
3157, § 1754 I concerning the effects of step-child adoption), the consent of the 
other natural parent is required (more in detail below). After the necessary 
persons have declared their consent in the manner stipulated in § 1750, the 
court must decide whether to grant the adoption, considering the best 
interests of the child (§ 1741 I) as well as the interests of other persons 
                                                   
157 § 1741 II S. 3: A spouse may adopt a child of his spouse alone. 
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involved (§ 1745)158. § 1741 I S. 1 makes it clear that an adoption is 
admissible only if it serves the best interests of the child and it is to be 
expected that a parent-child relationship will arise between the adoptive 
parent and the child. 
Once an adoption order is granted and comes into effect, the child attains the 
legal position of a child of both spouses (§ 1754 Abs 1 in the case where a 
married couple adopts a child or a spouse adopts a child of the other spouse). 
Parental custody is held by the spouses jointly (§ 1754 Abs. 3). At the same 
time, the relationship of the child to its natural parent, or parents in the case 
where a child is adopted by third parties (as well as the relatives of the 
parent(s)) and the rights and duties arising from this relationship (including 
rights concerning maintenance and inheritance, but also the right to contact) 
are extinguished (general rule in § 1755 Abs 1, specific rule for the case of 
stepchild adoption in § 1755 Abs 2, which specifies that “if a spouse adopts 
the child of his spouse, the extinction of the relationship occurs only in 
relation to the other parent and his relatives” and not in relations to the 
spouse who is the natural parent). Furthermore, an adoption order once 
granted is irrevocable and final (the Civil Code only allows for a revocation 
under exceptional circumstances, §§ 1759 ff). 
2.1.1 The Consent of the Parent(s) in Particular 
Considering the severe consequences of an adoption (the extinguishing of the 
relationship to the natural parent(s) and the irrevocability of the adoption 
order), German law, as stated above, requires the consent of the parent(s) of 
the child for the adoption of the child (including adoption by step-parent) (§ 
1747). Although the family court can substitute the consent of a parent 
under certain conditions, these conditions are strict. They are set out in § 
                                                   
158 § 1745: The adoption may not be pronounced if overriding interests of the children of 
the adoptive parent or of the child to be adopted prevent it or if it is to be feared that 
interests of the child to be adopted are endangered by children of the adoptive parent. 
Property interests should not be decisive. 
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1748, which stipulates that the consent of a parent can be substituted where 
that parent has persistently grossly violated his duties to the child or has 
shown through his conduct that he is indifferent to the child, and where it 
would be disproportionately disadvantageous to the child if the adoption did 
not take place. The consent may also be substituted if the violation of duty, 
although not persistent, is particularly serious and it is probable that it will 
permanently not be possible to entrust the child to the care of the parent (§ 
1748 I)159. 
According to § 1748 IV the consent of a father who has never been married to 
the mother of the child and has never held (joint) custody of the child can be 
substituted under lighter conditions, if the mother of the child has sole 
custody (§ 1626a III). In this case, a persistent gross violation or indifference 
towards the child on the part of the father are not required. The consent of 
the father can be substituted “if the fact that the adoption does not take 
place would be disproportionately disadvantageous to the child”. However, 
although statutory law has set different standards for the substitution of the 
consent of fathers who have been married to the mother or have at some 
point had custody of the child, and fathers who have not, case law has raised 
the hurdle for substituting the consent of the non-marital father to the 
adoption of his child. 
 
 2.2 The Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court and Federal 
Supreme Court 
The formerly weak position of the non-marital father in the adoption 
proceedings of his child was first strengthened by the BVerfG in 1995. At the 
time, the father of a non-marital child had no means to stop an adoption of 
                                                   
159 The consent of a parent may also be substituted where he is permanently incapable 
of caring for and bringing up the child as the result of a particularly serious 
psychological illness or a particularly serious mental or psychological handicap and 
where the child, if the adoption does not take place, could not grow up in a family and 
the child’s development would as a result be seriously endangered (§ 1748 III). 
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his child by the step-father of the child (or indeed an adoption by the mother 
of the child, which was possible under the law effective at the time). His 
consent to the adoption of his child was not required, neither were his 
interests considered by the courts. The BGH in its 7 March 1995 decision160 
stated that a father of a non-marital child as well as a father of a marital 
child were granted parental rights under § 6 II GG, and that the 
corresponding regulation in the Civil Code (§ 1747 II S. 1, 2 BGB a. F.) was 
incompatible with § 6 II S. 1 of the Basic Law to the extent that it required 
neither the consent of a father of a non-marital child to the adoption of his 
child by the step-father (or the mother), nor a weighing of his interests161. 
One of the central points of deliberation for the BVerfG in the above 
decision was the necessity of an adoption by a step-parent, and its merits and 
demerits from the point of view of the interests of the child. The Court 
pointed to the fact that an adoption of a child by its step-father led to a loss of 
any rights or obligations of the (biological) father concerning his child, which 
would reversely also mean the loss of all the corresponding rights of the child, 
such as rights to maintenance and inheritance (but also a loss of the 
opportunity to have contact with the father, as the father would lose his right 
to apply for contact). The Court stated that the “overriding interests of the 
child” did not justify depriving the (biological) father of any rights concerning 
the adoption of his child, pointing out first that an adoption by step-father 
would not occasion any changes in the actual situation of the child. “It is not 
the case”, the Court stated, “that not until an adoption was granted would 
the child be given the chance to grow up in a family that would offer him or 
her good conditions for his or her development” (S. 793). It added that an 
adoption would rather serve to legally secure an already existing situation. 
                                                   
160 BVerfG FamRZ 1995, S. 789. (The decision was in turn was heavily influenced by 
Keegan v. Ireland, the 26 May 1994 decision of the European Court of Human Rights. 
161 The Court in this decision dealt with applications from three fathers concerning the 
adoption (or the application thereof) of their non-marital children by the corresponding 
step-fathers (and/or the biological mothers). 
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Such legal securing of the actual situation might be in the best interest of the 
child, however, it should be borne in mind that “step-child adoptions are 
often not unproblematic” and “therefore it cannot automatically be assumed 
that adoption by the stepfather as a rule serves the best interests of the 
child” (S. 793).162  
Taking the above into account, the Court also suggested possible changes 
to the regulations concerning step-child adoption and step-families. It stated 
that the interests of the child in the step-father exercising parental custody 
together with the mother might be protected by strengthening the legal 
standing of the step-father. The Court added that the legislator might also 
consider changing the legal regulations concerning step-child adoptions in a 
way that the relationship between the external biological parent and the 
child would not be extinguished completely through adoption. (S. 793) 
 As a result of the 1995 decision of the BVerfG, the legal regulation 
concerning the consent of an non-marital father to the adoption of his child 
was amended during the 1997 KindRG. However, the legislator did not opt 
for a complete equalization of the legal standing of the father of a 
non-marital child and the father of a marital child (as explained above, in the 
Civil Code a distinction is made in § 1748 I and § 1748 IV between 
non-marital fathers who once had custody and fathers who never had 
custody). 
In 2005, the BGH and the BVerfG decided once and for all the question of 
                                                   
162 In its decision, the BVerfG also referred to the 1976 reform of law concerning 
adoption (Das Gesetz über die Annahme als Kind und zur Änderung anderer 
Vorschriften (Adoptionsgesetz) v. 2. 7. 1976 (BGBl. I S. 1749)). It pointed out that 
adoption of a minor was to serve the following aim, namely that a child who had been 
deprived of a “healthy home” would be given a family (vgl. BT-Drucks. 7/3061, S. 1). 
Concerning the extinguishing of the relationship to the external parent in the case of a 
step-parent adoption, the legislator justified this effect of adoption by arguing that any 
disruption to the new parent-child relationship should be avoided, and claimed that the 
ties between the child and the external parent were in most cases rather loose (limited 
to the mere payment of maintenance) (BT-Drucks. 7/3061, S. 22). (referred to on page 
789 of the decision) 
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the constitutionality of such a distinction. The BVerfG in its 29 November 
decision clearly stated that § 1748 IV was open to an interpretation that 
could prevent unequal treatment of fathers who had never held custody of 
the child. The Court, quoting its own 1995 decision (introduced above) and 
the 23 March 2005 decision of the BGH, confirmed that, considering the 
constitutionally protected rights of the parties involved, a weighing of the 
interests of father and child was required, and (bearing in mind that when 
the relationship to the father is extinguished through adoption, the child will 
be deprived of all the corresponding rights, such as rights to maintenance 
and inheritance; that “moreover, as a general rule it does not serve the best 
interests of the child when any chances of the father to have contact with the 
child are completely and permanently excluded”163; considering the “often 
not unproblematic nature of step-parent adoption” and the fact that the 
adoption would occasion no changes to the actual situation of the child (again 
quoting the 1995 decision)), the adoption not taking place would constitute a 
“disproportionate disadvantage” for the child in the sense of § 1748 IV “if the 
adoption would offer the child so notable an advantage that a parent who 
cares reasonably for the child would not insist on upholding the relationship” 
(BVerfG FamRZ 2006, 94, 95; BGH FamRZ 2006, 891, 892). 
When weighing the corresponding interests, the BGH stated that it would 
be necessary to weigh whether and how far there was or had been a lived 
(gelebt) father-child relationship or what reasons had prevented the father 
from developing or maintaining such a relationship (BGH FamRZ 2006, 891, 
892). The BVerfG clarified in addition that motives and concerns of the 
father in refusing consent to the adoption were to be considered, as well as 
the conduct of the child’s mother (here the court added that it was “of 
particular significance, whether and to what extent the mother of the child 
                                                   
163 BVerfG 2005, S. 95; also BVerfG 1995 S. 793, albeit, referring here to adoption by the 
mother. 
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and her husband were attempting to prevent the father from having a 
relationship to his child”. Indeed, the BGH had stated clearly that “it should 
be borne in mind that it does not as a rule serve the best interest of the child 
when the (possibly even primary) aim of the adoption is to completely and 
permanently exclude the father`s chances to have contact with his child” (S. 
892)164. Furthermore, the BGH stated that even if there was no lived (gelebt) 
relationship between the father and the child, a substitution of the father’s 
consent under § 1748 IV would only be permissible if the father himself, 
through his own conduct, was responsible for the failure of such a 
relationship (BVerfG FamRZ 2006, 94, 95). 
The latest decision by the BVerfG concerning step-child adoption and the 
consent of the (non-marital) father (decision of 27 April 2006) reconfirmed 
the possibility of a constitutional interpretation of § 1748 IV, as well as the 
points that were to be considered when weighing the interests of the father 
and the child against each other (introduced above). In connection with the 
latter, the Court clarified once more that the integration of the child into an 
“ideal” or “normal” family through adoption was not to be prioritized above 
everything else (including in cases where external circumstances – in that 
particular case the incarceration of the father – had hindered the father from 
building up a relationship with his child), with the BVerfG criticizing the 
preceding OLG decision which described contact between the (biological) 
                                                   
164 In that particular case, according to the understanding of the court, it was precisely 
the permanent exclusion of the father`s right to contact that primarily motivated the 
application for adoption. In addition to stating that such motivations on the side of the 
mother and step-father did not justify the substitution of the consent of the father to 
adoption, the Court added that it was rather the duty of the mother to promote a 
relationship between the child and its (biological) father. ”Insofar as the [mother] has 
until the present time not come to terms with the separation from the father of her child, 
and the child – as a reaction to this – is allegedly afraid of potential visits by the father, 
it does not follow that there is a need to legally secure the integration of the child into 
the new family of the mother; rather these circumstances reveal a serious failure of the 
mother in bringing up her child (Erziehungsversagen), one that ought not to be 
redressed by means of an adoption of the child through the husband of the mother” (S. 
893). 
63 
 
father and the child as the father “forcing his way into” the family circle of 
the mother, the spouse who is willing to adopt, and the child  (BVerfG 
FamRZ 2006, 1355). The Court stated, that “… it is by no means guaranteed 
that the new relationship will develop as “ideally” (idealtypisch) as the 
[lower] courts implied it would.” Referring to the specific circumstance of the 
case, it went on to say: “Should there be any truth in the father´s claim 
(although no longer relevant as to the decisions at hand), that the mother 
and her husband (the adoptive father) have been living separately for many 
months, this would be evidence, even in the case at hand, that it can be in 
the interest of the child not to automatically allow adoption already in cases 
where external circumstances – here, incarceration - have obstructed the 
biological father from building a close relationship to his child. The 
relationship between father and child, which is feasible also during the time 
the father is incarcerated, can be more stable and lasting than the 
relationship of the child to the new partner of the mother.”165 
 
2.3 Step-child Adoption and Contact with a Child Living in a Step-Family 
in Legal Writing 
Step-child adoption has been the subject of a fair amount of academic 
writing and discussion in Germany 166 . Although step-child adoption is 
statistically a very common type of adoption (more than half of all adoptions 
of minors in Germany are reportedly step-child adoptions167), and has a 
long-standing tradition in German society168 , it has been the target of 
                                                   
165 S. 1356. Critically about this decision: Maurer, a. a. O. (156), S. 96. 
166 More recently, Staudinger/Frank (2007), § 1741 BGB Rn 41 ff (with extensive 
further references both from the field of law and other fields); ders, Brauchen wir 
Adoption? – Rechtsvergleichende Überlegungen zu Notwendigkeit oder 
Zweckmäßigkeit der Adoption, FamRZ 2007, S. 1693; Muscheler, Karlheinz, Das Recht 
der Stieffamilie, FamRZ 2004, S. 913; Enders, Wolfgang, Stiefkindadoption, FPR 2004, 
S. 60; Paulitz, a. a. O. (144). 
167 For statistics see Staudinger/Frank (2007), Vorbem. 28 zu §§ 1741 ff BGB. 
168 Muscheler, a. a. O. (166), S. 915. 
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continued criticism for the past decades. 
Scholars point out that the original aim of adoption of a minor was meant to 
be that children who had been deprived of parental care could obtain a new 
family and would be spared living in an orphanage169. As for a child who lives 
in a step-family, it is argued, there would be no threat of him or her being 
sent to an orphanage, as the child has “parents who are capable of and 
willing to raise him/her, namely (as a rule) two biological parents and one 
new “social” parent”170. Naturally, not all children who live in a step-family 
have a (caring) parent outside that family, the most straightforward example 
being cases where the other parent has passed away. As for the cases where 
the non-residential parent is still alive and well, scholars appear to agree (in 
unison with the higher court case law introduced above) that “step-child 
adoption, where ties to one biological parent are severed, serves the interests 
of the [custodial] parent, rather than the interests of the child”171. As is 
evident also from the higher court decisions above, it is increasingly 
recognized among legal scholars and practitioners, that step-child adoptions 
(adoptions of both children born to parent who are married to each other, and 
to parents who are not) are “often not unproblematic” and that step-parent 
and –child relationships should not be “set in stone” through adoption unless 
absolutely necessary172. 
The concrete reasons given in literature for why step-child adoption (and 
the consequent severing of ties between the external biological parent and 
the child) is viewed as problematic, largely overlap, on the one hand, with 
the reasoning of the higher courts introduced above, and, on the other hand, 
                                                   
169 As voiced by the legislator at the time of the 1976 reform of law concerning adoption, 
see Muscheler, a. a. O. (166), S. 915, vgl. Enders, a. a. O. (166), S. 60 ff. 
170 Muscheler, a. a. O. (166), S. 915; vgl. Frank, a. a. O. (166), S. 1693, but critical 
towards this argument BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 67. 
171 Frank, a. a. O. (166), S. 1695; vgl. Enders, a. a. O. (166), S. 64. 
172 Staudinger/Frank (2007), § 1741 BGB Rn. 45, vgl auch Paulitz, a. a. O. (144), 312 ff; 
Enders, a. a. O. (166), S. 61, 64. 
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with the reasons introduced in section II 1. 
Scholars argue that step-child adoptions should not be entered into lightly, 
as under German law step-child adoptions are, like all other adoptions, final 
and conclusive, an adoption order once granted is irrevocable and final173. 
With an adoption, the (legal) relationship between the external biological 
parent and the child is extinguished, and at the same time the step-parent 
assumes legal responsibility for the child, including all rights and obligations 
concerning the custody of the child, as well as rights and obligations 
connected with inheritance and so forth, for the rest of their lives, 
irrespective of the state of the marriage to the biological parent of the 
(former) stepchild. The number of stepparents who seek to revoke the 
adoption after divorce from the biological parent, illustrates how many 
step-parents are apparently not fully aware of the responsibilities they are 
taking on when adopting their spouse`s child174. 
Scholars and practitioners alike point out that although the motive for a 
step-child adoption should be the welfare of the child, step-child adoptions 
are often rushed into and undergone for other, often questionable 
considerations on the side of the new spouse, but especially on the side of the 
biological custodial parent. Such motives might include the wish to stabilize 
the new relationship of the adults and to document this stabilization to the 
outside world175, but also the wish to “cut off” the other natural parent from 
the “ideal” new family once and for all176. As such (adult-centered) motives 
often overshadow considerations for what is objectively in the best interest of 
the child, German Youth Offices (Jugendämter) and Adoption Placement 
                                                   
173 Only under exceptional circumstances mentioned in the BGB, is revocation allowed 
(§ 1760 ff BGB (e. g. mistake to the child’s identity or duress (1760 II) etc); divorce of 
biological parent and stepparent does not qualify as grounds for revocation. 
174 See Frank, a. a. O. (166), S. 1695; also Muscheler, a. a. O. (166), S. 915; 
Staudinger/Frank (2007), § 1741 BGB Rn. 44 for references to case law. 
175 Muscheler, a. a. O. (166), S. 915. 
176 Frank, a. a. O. (166), S. 1695; vgl Staudinger/Frank (2007), § 1741 BGB Rn. 42, 44. 
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Offices (Adoptionsvermittlunsstellen) advise against rushing into step-child 
adoptions, and their guidelines include directions for spotting inappropriate 
motives for such adoptions177. 
In addition to calling for a closer examination of the real motives of 
step-child adoption, scholars refer to the possibility of the breaking up of the 
new, supposedly “ideal” household. Frank in particular provides copious 
literature references to works in related disciplines, such as sociology and 
psychology, to argue that a step-household is wrought with challenges to its 
members178. Other authors refer to statistics that show that second and 
thirds marriages (or families that include step-children and –parents) are 
more likely to be divorced than first marriages179. 
                                                   
177Paulitz, a. a. O. (144), S. 312; see also Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Landesjugendämter, “Empfehlungen zur Adoptionsvermittlung - 6., neu bearbeitete 
Fassung 2009 –“, accessed 2014/08/14 at 
http://www.bagljae.de/downloads/109_empfehlungen-adoptionsvermittlung_2009.pdf. 
Paulitz (who was at the time the head of the Central Adoption Office of the State 
Welfare Association of Baden (state youth welfare office) in Karlsruhe), speaking from 
experience in the field, describes a typical case of step-family adoption: Adoption is 
instigated by the biological custodial parent who sees this as a means to secure a stable 
partnership with the new spouse, but also wishes for the children to grow up in a 
“complete” family. The wish to be a “normal” family is often so strong that the 
application for adoption of child by stepparent is made almost immediately after the 
marriage of stepparent and residential biological parent, although the process of 
re-orientation or adapting to the new family structure is by far not completed, and the 
new familial relationships are still to be developed. Behind such rushed adoptions is 
often the wish of the adults to solidify the new family and give its members a sense of 
belonging together. The stepparent might also want to demonstrate their sense of 
responsibility for the child(ren) of their spouse through adoption. However, Paulitz goes 
on to point out, experience shows that building a parent-child relationship between a 
stepparent and a stepchild (and stabilizing other relationships in the same household) 
in reality takes time (at least 4 years, he says). Based on the above, Paulitz argues that 
although the adults may have been driven by the abovementioned motives (the wish to 
secure the unity of the new family through adoption), the adults will have missed the 
point of adoption, which is centered around “the existing parent-child-relationship and 
the welfare of the child (not the grownups)” (Paulitz, a. a. O., S. 311, 312). Enders has 
argued that, considering the continuously large number of step-child adoptions in 
Germany, it is doubtful whether the courts and the Jugendämter are carefully 
considering whether the change in the familial relationships of the child occasioned by 
adoption is, in each individual case, wise from the point of view of the child (Enders, a. a. 
O. (166), S. 64). 
178 Staudinger/Frank (2007), § 1741 BGB Rn. 43 ff. 
179 Paulitz, a. a. O. (144), S. 312; Muscheler, a. a. O. (166), S. 915. 
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 Taking the above into account, German scholars argue that the 
extinguishing of a relationship between the external biological parent and 
the child through adoption by step-parent would in many cases appear 
unjustified, as the relationship to the external parent might prove more 
sustainable and lasting than the relationship to the step-parent180. As well 
as the biological father-child relationship possibly being the more lasting of 
the two possible parent-child relationships, knowledge of the biological 
parent and the continued care of the ties to the external biological parent is 
also argued to be beneficial, or even necessary to the development of the 
child, including in cases where the child simultaneously has a strong and 
sustainable relationship with the step-parent181. 
  
Considering the above, and taking into account the peculiarities of 
step-child adoptions compared to other adoptions (first and foremost, the 
possible existence of a caring natural parent outside the step-family), many 
scholars have called for changes in the legal regulation of step-child 
adoptions. Some call for a further strengthening of the legal position of the 
step-parent (for the current state of statutory law and recent reforms see 
below), in order to render a considerable number of step-child adoptions 
unnecessary182, others suggest providing a legal solution so that the child 
would retain the non-custodial biological parent as such even after adoption 
by step-parent (a so-called “open adoption”); the law, they argue, should offer 
flexible solutions for all modern family structures, “the answer cannot lie in 
                                                   
180 Rösler/Reimann, a. a. O. (156), S. 1356, 1357; Muscheler a. a. O. 
181 Coester refers to the loss of a “genetic parent” as an inherent problem of step-parent 
adoption (Coester, Michael, Reform des Kindschaftsrechts, JZ 1992, S. 809 (S. 816)). Vgl 
Frank, a. a. O. (166), S. 1693 and 1697 ff, (stressing the importance of knowing (of) one’s 
biological parents and referring to findings by psychologists concerning identity issues 
and other related psychological problems of adopted children); also Rösler/Reimann, a. a. 
O. (156), 1357; Enders, a. a. O. (166), S. 61 (retaining a legal parent-child relationship to 
the external parent as significant from the point of view of protecting the identity of the 
child). 
182 Enders, a. a. O. (166), S. 61, 64 u. a. 
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constantly forming new de jure nuclear families and fading out other familial 
relationships”183. 
 
2.4 The Legal Position of the Step-Parent in German Law 
 As mentioned below, some authors have called for a strengthening of the 
status of the step-parent in order to lessen the need for step-child adoptions, 
which are by some considered as potentially problematic. There have been 
calls for the strengthening of the legal position of the step-parent from 
various quarters, not necessarily motivated by a negative attitude towards 
step-child adoptions. It is argued that strengthening the legal standing of a 
step-parent in relation to the step-child, will be in the interest of the child 
concerned as it will legally strengthen the family unit, and provide legal 
protection and recognition to the factual relationship between a step-parent 
and a step-child184. Although official adoption would arguably also deliver 
such results, in view of the importance of maintaining a tie between the child 
and the non-residential biological parent (and other considerations outlined 
in the previous sections), strengthening the legal position of a step-parent 
without resorting to adoption provides a means to balance the 
(above-mentioned) interest of the new household on the one hand and the 
significance of contact between the child and the non-residential parent on 
the other hand. In addition, in light of the fact that many children nowadays 
simultaneously have more than two parent-figures ((merely) biological, legal, 
social in various combinations), it is argued that the law should take a more 
flexible attitude to such “pluralization of parenthood”185. Step-families and 
                                                   
183 Coester, a. a. O. (181), S. 816; Staudinger/Frank (2007), § 1741 BGB Rn 46; 
Muscheler, a. a. O. (166), S. 919 u.a. 
184 See for example BT-Drucks. 14/2096, S. 8 (in this instance concerning the proposed § 
1687b BGB). 
185 Concerning how German law sees (or should see) the various kinds of “parenthood“, 
see for example Schwab, Dieter / Vaskovics, Laszlo A. (Hrsg.), Pluralisierung von 
Elternschaft und Kindschaft, Zeitschrift für Familienforschung Sonderheft (8), 
Leverkusen 2011 (concerning step-families, especially the following contributions: 
69 
 
the gradual strengthening of a step-parent`s legal position as described 
below, provide a good example. 
The legal standing of a stepparent has been strengthened through a 
number of revisions of the BGB since the end of the 1990s186. The German 
legislator comprehensively considered suggestions for the improvement of 
the legal standing of a step-parent during the legislative debate preceding 
the 1997 KindRG (reforms concerning the child`s family name, as well as 
contact with a former step-child (see below) and the option of applying for an 
order by the court that the child remain with the step-parent if the custodial 
residential parent passes away or is otherwise unable to exercise parental 
custody (verbleibensanordnung, see below) were adopted, but suggestions for 
changes in the law that would allow a step-parent to participate in the 
exercise of parental custody rejected)187. Following revisions of the BGB 
further strengthened the legal position of the step-parent. The current 
situation is as follows: 
a) Parental custody powers of a step-parent  According to § 1687b BGB, 
introduced into the BGB in 2001188, the spouse of a parent with sole parental 
custody can be granted with parental custody powers (often referred to as 
“small parental custody” or kleines Sorgerecht)189. § 1687b determines the 
extent of these powers as follows: the spouse of a parent with sole parental 
custody who is not a parent of the child has the power, in agreement with the 
                                                                                                                                                     
Löhnig, Martin, Das Kind zwischen Herkunftsfamilie und neuer Familie eines 
Elternteils, S. 157 ff, Ostner, Ilona / Schumann, Eva, Steuerung der Familie durch 
Recht?, S. 289 ff; see also Heiderhoff, Bettina, Kann ein Kind mehrere Väter haben?, 
FamRZ 2008, S. 1901 ff. 
186 See for example Gernhueber, Joachim / Coester-Waltjen, Dagmar, Familienrecht, 
München 2010, § 67 Rn. 5 ff, Muscheler, a. a. O. (166), S. 916 ff. 
187 BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 66-67. 
188 Introduced with the Act on the Termination of the Discrimination of Same-Sex 
Couples: Civil Partnerships (das Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung 
gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften: Lebenspartnerschaften) of 16. Feb. 2001 ( BGBl. 
I S. 266). 
189 Corresponds with § 9 of the Act on Registered Life Partnerships (Gesetz über die 
Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft (LpartG)) for same-sex partnerships. 
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parent with parental custody, to make joint decisions in matter of everyday 
life of the child” (§ 1687b I sentence 1); “in the case of imminent danger, each 
spouse is entitled to undertake all legal acts that are necessary for the best 
interests of the child (the parent with parental custody is to be informed 
without delay) (§ 1687b II)190.191 
b) Surname of the Child  The 1997 KindRG introduced into the BGB § 1618, 
which (in its present form) stipulates that “the parent who has the parental 
custody for an unmarried child alone or jointly with the other parent, and 
his/her spouse who is not a parent of the child, may /../ give their family 
name to the child that they have taken into their joint household.192 /../ 
Giving the name /../ requires the consent of the other parent where he/she 
has parental custody jointly with the parent giving the name or the child has 
his/her name and, if the child has reached the age of five, also the consent of 
the child. The family court may substitute the consent of the other parent if 
the giving of the name /../ is necessary for the best interests of the 
child./../”193. 
c) Stepparents’ right to contact with (former) stepchild  Also since the 1997 
KindRG, stepparents can apply for contact with a (former) stepchild 
according to § 1685 II, which (in its present form) states that “persons to 
                                                   
190 § 1687b III also states that the family court may restrict or exclude the powers 
under § 1687b I “if this is necessary for the best interests of the child”. 
191 The idea of allowing a step-parent to participate in the exercise of parental custody 
(in the legal sense) was initially rejected by the legislator at the time of the 1997 
KindRG (see BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 67). It was argued that, in cases where the natural 
parents held joint custody, if a step-parent was also legally allowed to exercise (some) 
parental custody, this would lead to complications and evoke conflicts, which would first 
of all negatively affect the child, and that it was sufficient to utilize a power of attorney 
when the step-parent needed to act for the parent with parental custody (ibid). The 
suggestion was taken up again in the Proposal of the Bundesrat for an Act for the 
Improvement of Children's Rights (Vorschlag des Bundesrates für ein 
Kinderrechteverbesserungsgesetz, BT-Drucks. 14/2096 in 1999), which argued that this 
regulations was necessary in order to “legally protect and recognize” the factual care 
and responsibility that step-parents exercised over their step-children. 
192 They may also attach this name in front of or after the name of the child. 
193 The legislator stated that this would facilitate the integration of step-children into 
the new step-family (BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 66). 
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whom the child relates closely if these have or have had actual responsibility 
for the child (social and family relationship)” have a right to contact with the 
child “if this serves the best interests of the child”. 
d) Order that the child remains with persons to whom it relates  For cases 
where the child has lived for a long period of time in a household with one 
parent and the parent’s spouse, but where the parent has passed away or can 
for some other reason no longer exercise parental custody, the 1997 
KindRG 194  also introduced into the BGB § 1682 which stipulates that 
“where the child has lived for a long period in a household with one parent 
and the parent’s spouse, and where the other parent, who under §§ 1678, 
1680 and 1681 may now alone determine the abode of the child, wants to 
remove the child from the spouse, the family court may of its own motion or 
on the application of the spouse order that the child remains with the spouse, 
if and as long as the best interests of the child would be endangered by the 
removal. /../” 
 Step-children are, however, under German law not on an equal footing with 
other children of the family (that is to say children who have a legal 
parent-child relationship with the adults of the household, including through 
adoption) concerning inheritance, maintenance (§ 1601 ff), and other legal 
effects that arise from a legal parent-child relationship195. 
Summary 
1. The Significance of Contact between a Child Living in a Step-Family and 
the Non-Residential Parent in German Case Law 
As seen above, there has been a shift in German case law concerning 
contact between a child living in a step-family and the non-residential parent. 
As introduced above, the past tendency of German courts was to prioritize 
the uninterrupted integration of the child into the new household, and the 
                                                   
194 See BT-Drucks. 13/4899, S. 66. 
195 See for example Muscheler, a. a. O. (166), S. 917 ff. 
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relationship between the child and the “new parent”, over contact between 
the non-residential parent and the child. Older case law and scholarly 
opinion argued that in a scenario where the residential parent remarried, 
contact with the non-residential parent was unnecessary from the point of 
view of the child in question, as that child already had a new (substitute) 
parent-figure in the form of the new spouse/partner of the residential parent. 
It was also argued that contact with the non-residential parent might even 
prove harmful for the child concerned, as it would potentially interfere with 
the exercise of care and custody by the residential parent and the 
step-parent, disturb the atmosphere of the new household, and obstruct the 
integration of the child into the new household. 
 As introduced above, by the end of the 1990s, the general tendency in case 
law (as well as scholarly opinion) had changed considerably, with the courts 
arguing that contact took precedence over an undisturbed integration of the 
child into the new family, and stressing the importance of contact to the child 
on the one hand (namely that knowledge of and contact with the 
non-residential parent was in the interest of the child’s self-identification 
and psychologically stable development), and pointing to the possibility of 
the breaking-up of the new household (in the face of, for example, divorce 
statistics of second and third marriages, and an increasing awareness of 
problems specific to step-families) on the other. As introduced above, case 
law as well as scholars also point out that the residential parent is likely to 
oppose contact between the child and the non-residential parent not due to 
concerns for the wellbeing of the child, but for more adult-centered reasons. 
The same arguments appear in higher court case law concerning step-child 
adoption and the substitution of the consent of the non-residential 
non-marital father. As noted earlier, case law states that the reoccurring 
unwillingness of the residential parent to allow contact, and the wish of that 
parent that the child would embrace the new spouse or partner of the parent 
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as a substitute for the non-residential parent, do not suffice, according to the 
current law, for excluding the other parent from having contact with the 
child. 
 Scholars have also argued that, taking into account the new social realities 
(the fact that step-families are no longer a rare phenomenon in German 
society), contact with the non-residential parent (or having, in effect, more 
than two parents) would not occasion social strain on the child. As 
introduced above, it has also been suggested, that an additional catalyst for 
the change in case law has been the strengthening of the legal position of the 
non-marital father. 
 Although it could be argued that one of the reasons contact between the 
child and the non-residential parent was not restricted/excluded in the cases 
introduced in section II 1 was the strong legal standing of the non-residential 
parent – the right to contact of the non-residential parent being a 
constitutionally protected right – this argument alone does not really explain 
the above-mentioned shift in case law, as the understanding that a parent`s 
right to contact is derived from the parental rights stipulated in § 6 II GG 
was already generally accepted by the 1980s (from which time the earlier 
case law introduced in this paper originates) (see section I 2.1). 
2. A Balance between Stressing the Significance of Contact with the 
Non-Residential Parent and Protecting the New Household, Criticism 
towards Step-Child Adoptions 
 While stressing the importance of maintaining contact between a child 
living in a step-family and the non-residential parent, German law does not 
deny that protecting the new household and the relationship between the 
child and its step-parent is also in the interest of the child. As the case law 
concerning contact introduced in section II 1 has indicated, the significance 
of the step-parent for the child is not down-played, and the courts make it 
clear that both the relationship between the child and the non-residential 
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parent and the relationship between the child and the step-parent are to be 
protected. 
There has been some debate in Germany concerning how justified step-child 
adoptions are from the point of view of the best interests of the child. On the 
one hand, adoption is, according to current law, the only means for the 
step-parent to attain the full set of rights and obligations in relation to the 
child of a legal parent. On the other hand, as explained above, according to 
German law, adoption of a step-child (a minor) in German law is a so-called 
full-adoption, were the legal relationship to the non-residential parent is 
extinguished at the time of adoption (§ 1755 I). In addition, like other 
adoptions of a minor, step-child adoptions are final and (practically) 
irrevocable. In view of such far-reaching effects of a step-child adoption, the 
legislator has set strict conditions for a step-child adoption, including the 
consent of the non-residential parent (§ 1747) (which can be substituted only 
under special circumstances, § 1748). Nevertheless, as introduced above, 
from the point of view of the significance of maintaining a personal link 
between the child and the non-residential parent and related problems with 
step-parent adoptions, some have argued for a change in the legal regulation 
of step-child adoptions, suggesting, for instance, a legal solution where the 
child would retain a legal link to the non-residential parent also after 
adoption by step-parent. 
In addition, based on the understanding that, the relationship between a 
step-parent and step-child warrants legal protection, even if an adoption and 
consequent severing of ties to the external parent would not always be 
justified from the point of view of the child, and also to facilitate the 
integration of the child into the new household, a number of amendments 
have been made to the Civil Code, (the so-called “small parental custody” 
(kleine Sorgerecht) (§ 1687b BGB), order that the child remains with persons 
to whom it relates (§ 1682), a right to contact with the child in case of a 
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divorce or separation of the residential parent and the step-parent (§ 1685 
II); § 1618 concerning the surname of the child). 
 
Chapter Summary 
In German law, contact is construed first and foremost as the right of the 
child (§ 1684 I Hs. 1) and only then as an obligation and right of the parents 
(Hs. 2). Both the right of the child to contact as well as that of a parent is 
protected by the constitution (§ 6 II GG). § 1626 III sentence 1 BGB clarifies 
the general stance of the Civil Code towards the importance of contact to the 
child, by stating that the best interests of the child as a general rule include 
contact with both parents. A two-tier standard is applied for the restriction 
or exclusion of contact. § 1684 IV stipulates that the family court may 
restrict or exclude the right to contact to the extent that this is necessary for 
the best interests of the child (sentence 1), adding that a decision that 
restricts or excludes the right to contact or its enforcement for a long period 
or permanently may only be made if otherwise the best interests of the child 
would be endangered. The high standard for the exclusion and restriction of 
the right to contact is justified on the one hand by the fundamental 
understanding that the right to contact is protected under the Basic Law, 
and on the other the understanding that contact is in the best interests of the 
child and should therefore be carried out for the benefit of the child, except if 
there are exceptional circumstances that create a concrete threat to the 
welfare of the child. The constitutional position and interest of the parent 
residing with the child, of the other parent and of the child are to be weighed 
against each other, and the principle of proportionality is to be strictly 
followed. The best interests of the child are to be in the center, but at the 
same time, the rights and interests of the parents are to be given due 
consideration and protection. 
There has been a shift in case law concerning contact between a child living 
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in a step-family and the non-residential parent, from an earlier tendency to 
restrict contact in such cases, to a tendency to generally allow contact from 
the end of the 1990s, with the courts stressing the importance of contact to 
the development and self-identification of the child on the other hand, and 
pointing out that the new step-household might not prove to be as “ideal” and 
lasting as the members of the step-household (especially the adults) initially 
expected. While stressing the importance of maintaining a personal 
relationship via contact between the non-residential parent and the child, 
German statutory and case law also recognize the significance for the child of 
the relationship to the step-parent, and the need to protect the new family. 
While there is criticism in Germany concerning the current legal regulation 
of step-child adoption, the legal standing of the step-parent in relation to the 
step-child has been strengthened through a number of amendments to the 
Civil Code, introduced in section II 2.4. 
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Chapter 2 Contact in Japanese Law 
I Statutory Basis and (Legal) Nature of Contact 
 
1 Basis in Statutory Law 
The statutory basis of contact in Japanese law is § 766 of the Japanese Civil 
Code196, which stipulates contact between the father or the mother and the 
child as a concrete example of “matters regarding custody of a child197” (§ 766 
I sentence 1). § 766 also states that “the best interests of the child must be 
the primary consideration” when determining whether and to what extent 
contact should take place (§ 766 I sentence 2).198 
Differently from some jurisdictions, Japanese statutory law does not 
stipulate a clear right of a parent to contact with their child (or such a right 
of the child), although whether contact should be understood as a right (of 
substantive law or otherwise) has been debated in academic circles (more in 
detail further below). It should also be noted that the word “contact” did not 
appear in the Japanese Civil Code until the 2011 reform of family law199. 
Prior to the 2011 reform, contact was deduced by way of interpretation of § 
766 (in conjunction with § 9 I type Otsu No 4 of the Act on Adjudication of 
Domestic Relations (家事審判法)200) which referred to “necessary dispositions 
                                                   
196 If not indicated otherwise, references to specific articles hereafter will mean articles 
in the Civil Code. 
197 § 766 I uses the term 「子の利益」, while in earlier case law and scholarly literature 
(including post-2011-reform literature), both 「子の利益」 and 「子の福祉」 are used 
(interchangeably) in this context. I have tried to use “the best interests of the child” 
throughout this paper, as it also corresponds to § 766 and its official translation at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/, but have used “welfare of the child” where I 
have quoted sources (academic writing or case law) that have adopted the term 「子の
福祉」. 
198 § 766 is a provision concerning divorce by agreement, see § 771 for judicial divorce. 
199 Law for Amendment of a Part of the Civil Code and Related Acts (Act No. 61 of 2011), 
in force since 1 April 2012, introduced in more detail further below. 
200 Now § 39 Appended Table 2 (3) of the Domestic Relations Case Procedure Act（家事
事件手続法）. The Act on Adjudication of Domestic Relations was abolished by the 
enactment of the Domestic Relations Case Procedure Act on 19 May 2011 (Act No 52 of 
2011, in force since 1 January 2013). 
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regarding custody” after divorce201. 
1.1 Early Case Law 
The first reported court decision to allow contact between a non-residential 
parent202 and a child after the divorce of the parents, and to confirm § 766 as 
the statutory basis of contact, was a 14 December 1964 adjudication of Tokyo 
Family Court 203 . Following divorce from her husband (who exercised 
parental authority and custody in relation to the child after the divorce), the 
non-residential mother of a 5-year-old girl had applied to the family court for 
a regulation of contact with her daughter, after the residential father and his 
new wife had refused any contact between mother and child. The court 
stated that the parent who did not have parental authority and custody in 
relation to the child, had “a right to have contact with their child (面接ないし
交渉する権利), and this right is not to be restricted nor is the parent to be 
deprived of this right unless the welfare of the child is harmed”, which the 
court judged not to have been the case, despite the claims of the father that 
the child in question was well-adapted to the new household, had been told 
that the new wife of the father was her real mother, and would only be 
confused by possible contact with a “second” mother. 
Not all judges and scholars shared the rather liberal notions of the judge in 
the above Tokyo Family Court decision. As a matter of fact, in the very same 
                                                                                                                                                     
The Act on Adjudication of Domestic Relations § 9 read as follows: “The family court 
shall make rulings on the following matters.” Type Otsu No 4 “Designation of custody of 
a child and other dispositions (処分) related to custody pursuant to the provisions of § 
766, Paragraph 1 or Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code (including mutatis mutandis 
application with respect to § 749, 771 and 788)“. 
201 § 766 prior to the 2011 reform: I If parents divorce by agreement, the matter of who 
will have custody over a child and any other necessary matters regarding custody shall 
be determined by that agreement. If agreement has not been made, or cannot be made, 
this shall be determined by the family court. /../ 
202 In this chapter, “non-residential” stands for a parent not residing with the child, who 
might or might not have parental authority or custody in relation to the child. Similarly, 
the term “residential parent” includes parents who exercise parental authority (possibly 
jointly with a non-residential spouse with whom they are still legally married) in 
relation to the child, or possibly only custody. 
203 家月 17・4・55. 
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case, following an appeal by the residential father and step-mother, Tokyo 
High Court stated that it was “only natural” that contact between the parent 
who did not have parental authority or custody in relation to the child, was 
“restricted in relation to the exercise of parental authority and custody rights 
of the person who exercised parental authority and custody”204. The court 
revoked the decision of the court of the first instance, which had allowed 
contact between the non-residential mother and the child, and stated that 
once that parent has “entrusted [the father] with the custody of [the child] [..] 
at the time of their divorce, [the mother] should respect the [father`s] 
parental authority and custody, avoid contact (面接) with [the child] until 
[the child] has come of age and is able to reason for him/herself, and pray 
from the shadows for [the child`s] sound development. The court judges this 
to be the way to guarantee [the child`s] happiness. At times when [the 
child`s] well-being weighs on [the mother`s] mind, she should ask for 
information concerning [the child] from others, or endeavor to catch secret 
glimpses of [the child], and be satisfied with the intelligence concerning its 
development that she is thus able to gather. Acting on one`s emotions, even if 
those actions are motivated by motherly love, can at times have the effect of 
causing unhappiness to a child. It must be said that restraining one`s 
emotions, when they ought to be restrained, for the sake of one`s child, is an 
expression of true maternal love”205. 
As for contact being a right, as claimed by the 1964 decision of Tokyo Family 
Court introduced above, Osaka High Court in its 24 December 1968 decision 
stated flatly that “what is sometimes referred to as a right to contact (面接権), 
cannot be understood to be a legal right”, and went as far as to deny even 
that contact was a matter that could be decided by the courts in domestic 
                                                   
204 Decision of Tokyo High Court of 8 December 1965 (家月 18・7・31), 32頁. 
205 33 頁。 
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relations adjudication 206 . Thus, as seen above, during these early days 
opinions concerning whether parties could apply for a regulation of contact to 
the family courts, or whether there was such a thing as a legal right to 
contact, were split. 
1.2 The 1984 and 2000 Decisions of the Supreme Court 
From the 1970s, there was a gradually increasing trend in domestic 
relations practice to allow contact between a parent who did not have 
parental authority or custody and the child, and in 1984 the Supreme Court 
gave its seal of approval to such practice by confirming that whether contact 
was to be allowed between a parent and child after the divorce of the parents 
was a question of the interpretation and application of § 766 I and II207. A 
decade and a half later, in its 1 May 2000 decision the Supreme Court stated 
that also in cases where the parents were separated but not yet officially 
divorced, “§ 766 is to be applied by analogy, and the courts can, in accordance 
with § 9 I Type Otsu No 4 of the Act on Adjudication of Domestic Relations, 
order appropriate dispositions (処分) concerning contact (面接交渉)”208. 
 
1.3 Contact and the 2011 Amendment of the Civil Code 
As already mentioned above, the word “contact” was incorporated into the 
Civil Code with the 2011 reform of family law. What the 2011 reform did was 
insert “contact”, as well as “sharing of child support”, as concrete examples of 
“necessary matters regarding custody” into the already existing § 766 I 
(sentence 1), and put it in clear terms that “the best interests of the child 
must be the primary consideration” when determining these matters 
                                                   
206 家月 21・6・38。 
207 最決昭和 59年 7月 6日（家月 37・5・35）。The non-custodial parent had argued that by 
denying contact the lower level court had infringed upon his right to the pursuit of 
happiness arising from § 13 of the Constitution, an argument which the Supreme Court 
rejected. 
208 家月 52・12・31. 
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(sentence 2)209. 
 During the legislative debate preceding the reform, there was some 
deliberation in academic circles concerning the legal nature of contact in the 
amended Civil Code  (including whether contact should be clearly 
recognized as a right, possibly that of the child), and to which chapter of Part 
4 of the Civil Code the provision concerning contact should be inserted (§ 766 
is found in the Chapter II Section 4 which is concerned with divorce, some 
suggested that a provision concerning contact should be introduced into 
Chapter IV which is concerned with parental authority)210. But in the end 
contact was stipulated in § 766 (that is, in the section concerning divorce), 
and the word “contact” appeared as a mere example of “necessary matters 
regarding custody”, with no reference to it being (anyone`s) right. 
As far as contact is concerned, the 2011 reform was a realization of what 
had already been proposed 15 years earlier, at the time of a previous attempt 
at reform, namely the 1996 “Outlines for Amendment to a Part of the Civil 
Code” of the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice211. What effect the 
amendments will have in reality, remains to be seen. Some scholars argue 
that the amendments lead to a strengthening of the parent`s position. As one 
scholar put it, considering that during the 15 years that passed since the 
                                                   
209 § 766 after the 2011 reform reads as follows: (1) If parents divorce by agreement, the 
matter of who will have custody over a child, contact between the father or the mother 
and the child, sharing of child support and any other necessary matters regarding 
custody shall be determined by that agreement. The interests of the child must be 
considered as a first priority when determining these matters. (2) If an agreement in 
the sense of the previous paragraph has not been made, or cannot be made, the matters 
referred to in the previous paragraph shall be determined by the family court. (3) If the 
family court finds it necessary, it may change a decision made in accordance with the 
preceding two paragraphs, and order any other appropriate disposition (相当な処分) 
regarding custody of the child. (4) The rights and duties of parents beyond the scope of 
custody may not be altered by the provisions of the preceding three paragraphs. 
210 See for example the debate during a symposium of 「家族法改正研究会」（代表：岩志和
一郎）in戸籍時報 659号 43頁（第 1回シンポジウム「家族法改正を考える」の論点の整理）、戸籍
時報 673号 28頁（第 2回シンポジウム「親権法グループ中間報告会」の論点の整理））. 
211 平成4年の「婚姻及び離婚制度の見直し審議に関する中間報告（論点整理）」（判タ 807号 47
頁）、平成 6年 7月の婚姻制度等に関する民法改正要綱試案の第 4の一１。 
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1996 attempt at reform, and despite the continued debate in academic circles, 
there were no changes in legislation, this latest reform should be seen as “an 
epoch-making event” 212 . On the other hand, some argue that by not 
stipulating a right to contact in the Civil Code, the 2011 reform confirmed 
that it should indeed not be understood as a right of substantive law213.214 
Reportedly, one of the intended effects of incorporating “contact” as an 
example of “necessary matters regarding custody” into § 766 was to raise 
awareness concerning contact. Although in domestic relations adjudication 
practice ordering contact based on § 766 had become common, it was pointed 
out at the time of the 2011 reform discussion that in divorces by agreement 
(which means around 90 per cent of all divorces in Japan) a clear agreement 
concerning contact was not made in many cases. Inserting the word “contact” 
into § 766 was expected to urge divorcing couples to make clear 
arrangements concerning contact at the time of the divorce215. 
                                                   
212 Kuribayashi Kayo, Family Law in Japan in 2012 – Introduction of the Stop System 
of Parental Authority, and the Stipulation of Contact and Sharing of Child Support, in 
The International Survey of Family Law [International Society of Family Law] 2013, p. 
227 (236). 
213 For example 梶村太市「家族法の改正をめぐる諸問題」戸時 675 号 89 頁（2011 年）。 
214 A similar difference of opinions concerning whether incorporating the word “contact” 
to the Civil Code would strengthen the position or even rights of those seeking contact 
could be observed at the time of the 1996 Guidelines. See for example大村敦志『家族法』
第 2版第（有斐閣法律学叢書、2004年）173頁 (arguing that the nature of contact as a 
right strengthened), but critically once again梶村太市 in島津一郎＝阿部徹編『新版注釈民
法』（22）親族（２）離婚§§763～771（有斐閣、2008年）91頁（§766）。 
215 飛澤知行編著『一問一答・平成 23 年民法等改正 児童虐待防止に向けた親権制度の見
直し』（商事法務、2011）10-11 頁。In addition to introducing the word “contact” into the 
Civil Code, further efforts were made on the ministerial level to promote contact (as well 
as arrangements concerning child support). The Ministry of Justice sought to urge 
divorcing couples to make arrangements concerning contact by changing the format of 
the notification of divorce. A section was added to the existing form, where the divorcing 
parents could indicate whether they had reached an agreement concerning contact (the 
same about child support)（戸籍通達（平成 24・2・2 民 1 第 271 号）、戸籍 867 号 62-82
頁）. Prior to these changes, the parents were only required to determine and indicate on 
the form, who would exercise parental custody after divorce (Japanese law does not 
allow joint parental custody after divorce, § 819). Determining and indicating the 
parent who will exercise parental authority is a condition for the notification of divorce 
to be accepted by the municipal office. This is, however, not the case with agreements 
concerning contact and child support, as the notification will be accepted even if no 
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2 The Legal Nature of Contact 
2.1 A Right or Not? 
There has been continuing debate in academic circles concerning whether 
contact should (or, considering its statutory basis, could) be understood to be 
a legal right. Most scholars tend to refer to contact as a “right”, and have 
done so since as early as the 1960s (although there has been some debate as 
to whether contact is a right of the parent or the child, as introduced in more 
in detail below).  
However, there has always been a constant (if minority) view that contact 
should not, or cannot be understood to be a right. Those who argue that 
contact should not be understood as a right, especially a right of substantive 
law of the non-residential parent, base their arguments largely on the 
following. They argue that more often than not contact causes renewed 
fighting between the divorced or divorcing spouses and exercising contact 
against the wishes of the custodial parent occasions loyalty conflicts for the 
child involved, so that in a large number of cases contact is in fact harmful to 
(the well-being of) the child. Therefore, it logically follows that asserting the 
rights of a parent to contact would do more harm than good216. (This rather 
negative view of the effects of contact in general found wide support among 
family law practitioners, such as family court judges, probation officers and 
conciliation commissioners of domestic relations during the 1970s and early 
1980s, coinciding with the introduction in Japan of the influential work of 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit217218. Although no longer the main-stream view 
                                                                                                                                                     
agreement in these matters has been reached. Hence, it remains to be seen how 
effective this measure will prove to be in reality. 
216 梶村太市「子のための面接交渉」ケ研 153 号 88 頁（92-93 頁）（1976 年)、島津一郎『セ
ミナー法学全集（14）民法 V親族・相続』（日本評論社、1975年）14頁、島津一郎『親族・相続
法』103 頁（1980 年）。 
217 Goldstein, Freud, Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, New York, Free 
Press (1973) (Japanese translation: ゴールドシュタイン・フロイト・ソルニット共著、島
84 
 
among practitioners and scholars, it is still held by some219.) Closely related 
to this understanding of contact is the argument that contact, by its nature, 
must be exercised by all parties willingly, or not at all, and should not, and 
indeed cannot, be forced (meaning that contact agreements and decisions 
would not be legally enforceable)220.221 
The majority of legal scholars argue that there is no need to deny that a 
parent has a (legal) right to contact from the start, as it is possible to restrict 
contact when the best interests of the child call for such a restriction222. 
                                                                                                                                                     
津一郎監修・解説＝中沢たえ子訳『子の福祉を超えて』（岩崎学術出版社、1990 年）. Professor 
Goldstein was invited to give a seminar to legal professionals and scholars in Japan (「ゴ
ールドシュタイン・セミナーー結果報告―その１－」調研紀要 25 号 1 頁以下) （1974 年）. 
218 See 細矢郁ほか「面会交流が争点となる調停事件の実情及び審理の在り方―民法 766 条
の改正を踏まえて―」家月 64・7・1（2012 年）18 頁以下。Also 佐藤千裕「子の監護事件
における面接交渉」家月 41 巻 8 号 203 頁（1989 年）213 頁。 
219 For example 梶村太市「家族法の改正をめぐる諸問題」戸時 675号 90頁。 
220 同上。 
221 A second argument put forth by those who claim that contact should not be 
construed as a right in the legal sense, or a right of substantive law, is that § 766 of the 
Civil Code in conjunction with Domestic Relations Case Procedure Act § 39 Appended 
Table 2 (3) (or prior to 2013, Act on Adjudication of Domestic Relations § 9 I type Otsu 
No 4), the legal basis for conciliation and adjudication of contact, provides that contact 
is “a necessary matter regarding custody” (or “disposition related to custody”) and as 
such an object of adjudication. According to the current state of the law, they argue, the 
existence of a right of contact in substantive law is not a prerequisite to the adjudication 
of contact by the courts. Rather than having a statutory right to contact itself, these 
scholars argue, parents should be understood to have “a procedural right to apply for 
the adjudication of reasonable contact”, or “a right to apply for suitable measures 
regarding the custody of a child”. The latter wording reflects the way these scholars 
take pains to stress that when an arrangement about contact is to be made, the welfare 
and interests of the child are to be considered paramount, and the claims of a parent 
only secondary. See 梶村太市「『子のための面接交渉』再論」『21世紀の民法 : 小野幸二教授
還暦記念論集』（法学書院、1996年）425頁以下、杉原則彦、最高裁判所判例解説民事編平成
12年度（下）511頁以下、杉原則彦「婚姻関係が破綻して父母が別居状態にある場合に子と同居
していない親と子の面接交渉について家庭裁判所が相当な処分を命ずることの可否（最高裁平成
12年 5月 1日判例解釈）」ジュリNo. 1199、86頁。Also 横田昌紀ほか「面会交流審判例の実証
的研究」判タ 1292号 5頁（2009年）（6頁）). For counter-arguments see for example 若林昌
子「面会交流事件裁判例の動向と課題」法律論叢 85 号 2・3 合併号 387 頁（2012 年）（392
頁以下）。 
222 See for example 二宮周平「別居・離婚後の親子の交流と子の意思（２）―家事審判に
おける面接交渉実現の到達点―」戸時 579 号 4 頁（2005 年）（13 頁） (critical also towards 
understanding contact as “a right to apply for suitable measures regarding the custody 
of a child”). 
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Especially concerning the arguments that the exercise of contact in cases 
where there is a relatively high level of animosity between the parents would 
result in the child being caught in a loyalty conflict and therefore harm the 
child, many authors argue that more often than not such harm can be 
prevented through professional support and guidance during and following 
the divorce process, and hence the fact alone that there is animosity between 
the parents does not qualify as grounds to deny that contact should be 
understood as a right223. Neither, it is argued, does the fact that it is often 
difficult to enforce agreements or decisions concerning contact, automatically 
mean that contact cannot be understood as a right in the legal sense. 
Although enforceability is an important property of a legal right, the fact 
that in the case of the right to contact there are inherent difficulties with 
physical enforcement by the state, does not mean that constituting contact as 
a right will not itself have an effect on the perceptions and behavior of the 
parties concerned, as well as other persons224. It is argued that denying 
outright that a parent (or a child) has a right to contact might unjustly 
weaken the legal standing of the person seeking contact 225 , lead to 
disillusionment with the law and the judiciary, and in turn potentially to 
self-execution by the contact-seeking parent226. 
                                                   
223 棚村政行「離婚と父母による面接交渉」判タ 952 号 56 頁（1997 年）（59 頁以下）, 若
林・前掲（注 221）392 頁。 
224 棚村・前掲（注 223）60 頁、大塚正之「家事調停における面接交渉の実証的研究」司法
研修所論集創立五十周年記念特集号第２巻 301 頁（1997 年）（304 頁）、also 相原佳子「報
告（２）面会交流の理論と実務「弁護士の立場から」」（シンポジウム「面会交流の理論と
実務」（その２））戸時 690 号（2012 年）39 頁 – points out that if there is doubt about 
contact being a right, there are limits to how far the parties involved can be persuaded 
to reach an agreement about contact and cooperate towards the realization of actual 
contact. Also stresses that it is often equally important to persuade not only the 
unwilling parents, but the grandparents and other family members in the background. 
In such cases too, if contact were clearly constituted as a (legal) right, arguments 
advocating contact would carry a different weight altogether. 
225 石川稔『家族法における子どもの権利』（日本評論社、1995 年）225-228 頁、棚村・前
掲（注 223）59 頁、二宮周平「面接交渉の義務性―別居・離婚後の親子・家族の交流の保
障」立命 2004 年(6)334-335 頁。 
226 棚村・前掲（注 223）60 頁。 
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In connection with the last argument, some authors call for a 
re-examination of the concept of a legal “right” in the context of contact227. 
They stress that contact is not a fixed and absolute right, but rather a right 
characterized by relativity, fluidity and reciprocity. This is to say that, while 
being a legal right, contact can and should be restricted and excluded based 
on the best interests of the child (also keeping in mind that what is in the 
best interest of a particular child will vary according to the individual child, 
and change as the child grows older); that while for the child contact is a 
right but not an obligation, for the contact-seeking parent it is a right in 
relation to the other parent but an obligation in relation to the child, and so 
forth228. 
Scholars who argue that contact should indeed be understood as a right, 
have long debated about the legal character of this right to contact. The more 
common views will be introduced below. 
 
2.2 The Legal Nature of Contact 
The earliest clear proposition concerning the legal nature of contact was 
that contact was a natural right arising from the parent-child relationship, 
irrespective of whether a clear provision existed in statutory law229. The 
proponents of this view of the nature of contact argued that contact (面接) 
with the child was the minimal claim that could be made by a parent who 
had been deprived of the chance to exercise parental authority and custody 
in relation to the child, and “the last tie to ensure in actuality parental love 
and a parent-child relationship” between that parent and the child230. The 
                                                   
227 若林・前掲（注 221）393 頁, also already 石川稔「離婚による非監護親の面接交渉権」
別冊判タ 8 号 285 頁（1980 年）（289 頁）。See also 棚村政行『面会交流と養育費の実務と
展望―子どもの幸せのために』（日本加除出版、2013 年）14 頁。 
228 若林・前掲（注 221）393 頁。 
229 森口静一＝鈴木経夫「監護者でない親と子の面接」ジュリ 314 号 72 頁（1965 年）（75
頁）。 
230 Ibid. As discussed below, many of the earlier theories about the legal nature of (the 
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right to contact, it was argued, was a right and obligation conferred on the 
parents in order that they could ensure the favorable development of their 
child and raise him or her to be a full member of society231. Accordingly, this 
right (and obligation) pertained to a parent irrespective of whether that 
parent exercised parental authority or custody232, and could not be easily 
restricted or excluded233. It has been pointed out that in the mid-1960s, when 
this theory concerning the nature of contact first appeared, general 
awareness concerning contact after divorce was rather low, and one of the 
merits of referring to contact as the natural right of a parent was that this 
helped promote the idea of continued contact between a parent and a child 
even after divorce of the parents234. There is also a fair amount of case law 
that refers to contact as a natural right of a parent235. 
 On the other hand, the above understanding of contact as a natural right 
arising from the parent-child relationship was criticized for being too vague 
in the legal sense. It was argued that simply by claiming that a parent had a 
natural right to contact with their child did not automatically mean that 
contact could thus be adjudicated by the courts236. Case law so far had 
interpreted that the statutory law basis for contact was § 766 of the Civil 
Code (in conjunction with the Act on Adjudication of Domestic Relations § 9 I 
Type Otsu nr 4)), and legal scholars accordingly endeavored to explain the 
                                                                                                                                                     
right) to contact assumed it to be the right of the non-custodial parent. Among scholars 
who argued that contact was a natural right. 
231 久貴忠彦「面接交渉権覚書」阪法 63巻 99頁（1967年）（115頁）。 
232 同上。 
233 森口＝鈴木・前掲（注 229）76 頁。 
234 川田昇「面接交渉権」『民法の争点 I』（有斐閣、1985年）221頁、森口＝鈴木・前掲（注 229）
75頁。 
235 東京高裁昭和 42年 8月 14日決定（家月 20巻 3号 64頁）、大阪家裁昭和 43年 5月 28
日審判（家月 20巻 10号 68頁）、東京高決昭 42・8・14（家月 20・3・64）、大阪家審昭和 43・5・
28（家月 20・10・68）、東京家審昭和 44・5・22（家月 22・3・77）、大分家中津支審昭和 51・7・22
（家月29・2・108）、東京家審昭和62・3・31（家月39・6・58）、横浜家相模原支審平成18・3・9（家
月 58・11・71）等。 
236 田中實「面接交渉権―その性質と効果」現代家族法大系編集委員会編『現代家族法大系 2』
中川善之助先生追悼（有斐閣、1980年）258頁。 
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legal nature of contact taking this fact into account. Hence, it was proposed 
by different scholars that contact was 1) not quite the same as the right to 
custody but a right relevant to custody, or 2) an aspect of parental 
authority/custody (based on the understanding that the “non-custodial” 
parent had in fact not been completely deprived of his or her rights to 
exercise parental authority or custody, but that these rights had merely 
temporarily been restricted or put on hold. 
Legal scholars who supported the former interpretation, namely that 
contact was a right related to custody, again formed two distinct groups. On 
the one hand, there were those who claimed that the two ideas of contact 
being an inherent natural right and contact being a right relevant to custody 
were not conflicting ideas, that understanding contact to be an inherent 
right of any parent did not constitute an obstacle to interpreting contact to be 
an object of adjudication as “a necessary matter relevant to contact”. Rather, 
they argued, contact was on an abstract level an inherent natural right of a 
parent, and assumed a concrete form through the agreement of the divorcing 
spouses, or the conciliation or adjudication through the family court237. 
On the other hand, some scholars denied that contact should be viewed 
(even abstractly) as a natural right of a parent, as § 766 in conjunction with § 
9 I type Otsu No 4 of the Act on Adjudication of Domestic Relations, in a 
strict sense does not allow such a reading238. What most sets this view of 
contact apart from that described in the previous paragraph is that it 
(consequently?) views the legal position of the non-custodial parent as a 
relatively week one. While not denying that the non-custodial parent has a 
                                                   
237 久貴・前掲（注 231）117頁、沼辺愛一「子の監護をめぐる諸問題」家月 25巻 4号 15頁（1973
年）（18頁）、also 田中實・前掲（注 236）248頁以下、若林昌子 「離婚後の面接交渉権その１
―実務の現状と問題点―」川井健ほか編『講座現代家族法第３巻親子』島津一郎教授古稀
記念（日本評論社、1992 年）223 頁（227頁）。See also山本正憲「面接交渉権について」岡山
大学法学会雑誌 18巻 2号 185頁。  
238 明山和夫『注釈民法（23）親権（4）』（有斐閣、1969年）75頁。Examples of case law 
adopting a similar view東京家審昭和 39年 12月 14日（家月 17・4・55）、横浜家審平成 8年
4月 30日（家月 49・3・75）。 
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right to contact, the proponents of this view of contact argue that it is not 
permissible that the exercise of the right to contact interferes with the care 
and education of the child as exercised by the custodial parent. Indeed, the 
details of how contact is to be exercised should be left up to the custodial 
parent, these scholars point out239. 
The above theories concerning the legal nature of contact were based on the 
understanding that contact was not (part of) custody per se, but a right 
relevant [related to] custody, and thus a right that existed outside of (the 
right to) custody. This understanding was criticized by some scholars on the 
grounds that the content of the right to contact overlapped with the content 
of parental authority/custody, and therefore creating an individual right 
outside parental authority/custody was not justified240. In other words, these 
scholars argued that the right to contact should be understood to be part of 
(or an aspect of) parental authority/custody241. This proposition might appear 
odd at first glance, as after the spouses have divorced, one of the spouses (the 
one who will as a rule want to apply for contact) will no longer have parental 
authority (§ 819 of the Civil Code). It should be understood, however, that 
scholars who claim that the right to contact (of a non-custodial parent) 
should be understood as an aspect of parental authority/custody, base this 
understanding on a particular interpretation of parental authority and 
custody. Namely, they argue that even though according to statutory law 
only one parent may be awarded parental authority/custody after divorce, 
the other parent`s powers to exercise parental authority/custody are merely 
restricted or put on hold, and that the nominally non-custodial parent in fact 
                                                   
239 明山, ibid p. 74-75. 
240 中川淳「離婚後親権を行わない父母の一方の面接交渉権」法時 41 巻 9 号 143 頁（1969
年）など。 
241 山正憲「面接交渉権について」岡山大学法学会雑誌 18巻 2号 185頁以下、佐藤義彦「離婚
後親権を行わない親の面接交渉権」同志社法学 110号 418頁、中川淳・前掲（注 240）、北野俊
光「面接交渉」村重慶一編『現代裁判法大系10親族』（新日本法規出版、1998年）264頁、川田・
前掲（注 234）220頁。 
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retains “latent” parental authority/custody 242 . Thus, this parent is 
understood to be able to exercise their right to contact with their child as 
part of this “latent” parental authority/custody243 (the statutory basis for 
contact still being § 766 of the Civil Code). (Naturally, if one does not support 
this view of the existence of “latent” parental authority/custody, the 
non-custodial parent`s right to contact cannot be understood as being part of 
parental authority/custody either.) 
Some scholars have also argued that contact should be understood as a 
fundamental human right of the parent without parental authority or 
custody 244 . Referring to the U.S and Germany, where contact is a 
constitutionally protected right of the parent without parental authority or 
custody, these scholars argue that, especially in Japan where contact is, they 
argue, (too) easily restricted or denied on the grounds of the best interest of 
the child, the parent`s right to contact should be understood to have its 
statutory basis in the Constitution (more specifically § 13). Arguably, this 
would prevent courts from restricting contact too lightly, as such restrictions 
would amount to a breach of the parent`s constitutional rights245. 
 To summarize the above, it is clear that even though legal scholars (and 
practitioners) agree that the statutory basis of contact is § 766246, opinions 
differ as to the relationship between contact and parental authority/custody 
(whether they are two independent rights, whether one is a remnant of the 
other etc). 
                                                   
242 北野・前掲（注 241）261-262頁など。 
243 佐藤義彦・前掲（注 241）419頁、北野・前掲（注 241）261-262頁。 
244 棚瀬孝雄「離婚後の面接交渉と親の権利（上・下）」判タ 712 号 4 頁、同 713 号 4 頁（1990
年）、棚村・前掲（注 223）64 頁。 
245 Ibid. 
246 It is worth mentioning that since early on it has been pointed out that using § 766 as 
the basis for conciliation and adjudication concerning contact is an inevitability, a result 
of defective or incomplete regulation of the parent-child relationship in the Civil Code
（森口＝鈴木・前掲（注 229）76頁）、also 国府剛「面接交渉権の制限と憲法 13 条」『家族
法審判例の研究』144 頁（日本評論社、1971 年）（149-150頁）。 
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2.3 Right of the Parent? Right of the Child? 
As it is commonly the non-residential parent who seeks contact with their 
child, in earlier times scholars tended to think of contact naturally as the 
right of a parent. However, it was not long before the view surfaced among 
Japanese scholars that contact was in fact a right of the child247. At first 
opinions seem to have been divided as to whether contact should be 
understood to be a right of the child alone, or a right of a child as well as its 
(non-residential) parent. The former view, namely that contact was the right 
of the child and not a right of a parent, was justified by the fact that at the 
time (the 1970s and early 1980s) a rather “pre-modern” understanding of 
parental rights (an understanding that a parent had absolute rights over 
their children) prevailed among the general public, and it was argued that if 
such an understanding was left to be applied in case of post-separation and 
post-divorce contact, the interests of the parent would take center stage and 
those of the child would be overlooked. In order to prevent such an 
undesirable result and ensure that the interests of the child would be central 
to any arrangement or decision concerning contact, it was, therefore, 
essential to spread among the general public (as well as practitioners of law) 
the understanding that contact was indeed not a right of a parent, but a 
right of the child248. 
 Although this explanation might have been meaningful in that particular 
context, at that particular time, it was argued in later literature that there 
was no need to deny the right of the non-residential parent to contact in 
order to ensure that the best interests of the child were not overlooked249. 
                                                   
247 I have explored this further in my master`s thesis 「面接交渉と子どもの立場」, 
(unpublished) submitted in Tohoku University Graduate School of Law in January 
2012. 
248 稲子宣子「子の権利としての面接交渉権」日本福祉大学研究紀要 42号 95頁以下。 
249 See for example 石川・前掲（注 227）289頁、also棚村政行「離婚後の子の監護―面接交
渉と共同監護の検討を中心として―」石川稔ほか『家族法改正への課題』231頁（日本加除出版、
1993年）255頁以降。 
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Indeed, the interests of the child would be sufficiently protected by applying 
the rule that contact should not be allowed when it would harm the welfare 
of the child250, a point concerning which scholars and practitioners alike have 
always been in agreement. Consequently, the 
“Contact-as-the-Right-of-the-Child” doctrine found its new basis in the 
gradually spreading understanding that maintaining a personal relationship 
to both parents, even after the separation of the parents, was meaningful to 
the child and its development251252 . This coincided with the increasing 
acceptance of the understanding that parents held not only rights but also 
obligations towards their children, leading a number of scholars to argue 
that, also in the context of post-separation contact, the non-residential 
parent had the obligation to make an active contribution to the nurturing 
and socialization of the child via contact253, and that at the same time the 
residential parent was obliged not to obstruct such contact254 as much for 
the benefit of the child as the that of the non-custodial parent. 
At present, the majority of scholars appear to agree that the basic nature of 
post-separation/divorce contact includes both aspects, namely, on the one 
hand, the right and obligation of the parents to maintain a relationship to 
their child, and on the other hand the right of the child to be cared for and 
maintain a personal relationship with a parent no longer residing with them, 
and that in case of a clash between the interests of the parties concerned, the 
                                                   
250 棚村・前掲（注 249）255頁, 二宮・前掲（注 225）335頁、棚村政行「子の監護調停の実務
指針―面接交渉を中心として」早法 72巻 4号 323頁（1997年）。 
251 See for example 爪生武・真板彰子「離婚後の親子交流の実情」判夕 925 号 70 頁（1997
年）、永田秋夫ほか「子の監護に関する処分（面接交渉）事件における調査官関与の在り方」
家月 48 巻 4 号 89 頁(1996 年)。 
252 Also, an important catalysts for stressing the importance of the child as a subject of 
its own right to contact, and not as a mere subject of parental claims, was the adoption 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by the UN General Assembly of the UN 
1989 (signed by Japan in 1990 and ratified in 1994). (see for example 山田美枝子「現代
離婚法の課題としての子の権利の保障」法学政治学論究 11号 88頁、棚村・前掲（注 249）257、
259頁). 
253 棚村・前掲（注 252）239 頁、石川・前掲（注 227）286 頁。 
254 田中通裕「面接交渉権の法的性質」判タ 747 号 323 頁。 
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best interests of the children are to be considered as paramount255.256 
It is often not clear whether those who argue that contact should be 
understood as a right of the child mean this “right” as a right of 
substantive law in the strict sense of the word (including the right of 
the child to claim contact on its own behalf) 257 , or rather more 
abstractly as a “right” in the sense that the interests of the child were 
to be given due (or even central) importance in a contact dispute. It 
must be borne in mind, however, that current statutory law does not 
foresee a right of the child to contact258. It is also generally understood 
that the child him/herself may not make an application for the 
adjudication of contact to the courts259. It is, however thinkable that 
the parent residing with the child applies in the name of the child to 
the court for the regulation of contact between the child and the 
non-custodial parent. One such case was adjudicated by Saitama 
Family Court in 2007260. The parents of the child in question had 
divorced when the child was still very young, and the child had no 
                                                   
255 棚村・前掲（注 250）323頁、山田亮子「面接交渉の権利性と義務制」床谷文雄・若林昌子
編『親家族法実務体系２』（新日本法規、2008 年）318 頁、二宮周平『家族法』第 4 版（新
世社、2013 年）123 頁、若林・前掲（注 221）393 頁 etc. 
256 It has also been argued by several authors, that understanding contact to be the 
right of the child, and explaining it as such to reluctant parents (both custodial parents 
who are against contact between the child and the non-custodial parent, as well as 
non-custodial parents who show little interest in contact with their children), but also 
other persons such as grandparents and other relatives who have influence over the 
parents and the child but are reluctant towards the exercise of contact, can be an 
effective way of convincing such persons to come to an agreement and cooperate towards 
the realization of contact （棚村・前掲（注 223）64 頁, 二宮周平「子の年齢、心身の成
長状況と面接交渉の可否」判タ 940 号 95 頁（1997 年））。 
257 Clearly arguing this to be the case 石川・前掲（注 227）。 
258 See 梶村・前掲（注 221）453 頁、本山敦「面接交渉の権利性―大阪地裁平 17 年 10 月
26 日未公刊」司法書士 414 号 49 頁。 
259 From the wording of § 766 of the Civil Code, it is clear that either of the divorcing 
spouses may apply for contact. Whether any other person, such as grandparents, 
siblings or foster parents can apply, has been the object of debate, see for example 梶村
太市 in島津一郎＝阿部徹編『新版注釈民法』（22）親族（２）離婚§§763～771（有斐閣、2008
年）144 頁（§766）。 
260 さいたま家審平成 19 年 7 月 19 日（家月 60・2・149）。 
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actual memories of the father (the mother became custodian at the 
time of the divorce), but was, according to the mother, still keen to get 
to know him. The father, for various reasons, was negatively minded 
towards contact. Following an application by the mother, the Saitama 
Family Court ordered that indirect contact was to take place (the 
father was to write the child in question letters four times a year). 
Nevertheless, even if the law allows for the residential parent to apply 
for the regulation of contact, the residential parent will only make such 
an application in the name of the child if he/she him/herself is 
positively minded towards contact. If, however, this is not the case, the 
application will naturally not be made, even if the child wishes contact 
with the non-custodial parent. 
 
2.4 Relevance of the Discussion Concerning the Legal Nature of Contact 
It has been argued that scholarly debate concerning the legal nature of 
contact has little practical relevance nowadays, first of all due to the fact 
that the statutory basis of contact has been established beyond question, and 
secondly, because it is pointed out that whichever understanding of the legal 
nature of contact one adopts, when it comes to the deliberation of whether 
contact should be allowed and to what extent it should be allowed in a 
particular case, the best interests of the child will be the standard for 
deciding261. Hence, it might be said that from the point of view of domestic 
relations practice the more pressing question is, what exactly constituted the 
best interests of the child in the context of post-separation/divorce contact, 
and what constituted a threat to those interest262 (discussed in more detail 
                                                   
261 For example 善元貞彦「面接交渉とその制限―事例の分析を中心としてー」右近健男ほ
か編『家事事件の現況と課題』（判例タイムズ社、2006 年）158 頁（168-169 頁）. But 
differently for example 佐藤千裕・前掲（注 218）205 頁。 
262 Yoshimoto ibid. But see above (under subheading “A Right or Not?”) arguments 
concerning the relevance of recognizing contact as a (legal) right. During the legislative 
debate preceding the 2011 reform of family law, the question of whether contact should 
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in the following section). 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
be clearly recognized as a right, possibly that of the child, in the Civil Code, was left 
unresolved arguably because opinions concerning this point still differed considerably 
(飛澤・前掲（注 215）12 頁). 
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II Restriction and Exclusion of Contact  
Introduction 
The post-2012-reform § 766 I states that the best interests of the child must 
be the primary consideration when making any agreements or decisions 
about contact, both when parents are trying to reach an agreement amongst 
themselves and when it is the court who is called upon to decide (§ 771 for 
the case of judicial divorce). This is not a new notion. There has long been 
consensus among legal scholars and practitioners in Japan that whether 
contact should be allowed at all, or to what extent and in what form it should 
be allowed, is to be determined in the light of the best interests of the 
child(ren) concerned. That is to say, there is agreement as to the general idea, 
but considerable disagreement remains as to the finer points, such as exactly 
what effect the numerous individual factors relevant to a decision concerning 
contact (e.g. the opposition of the custodial parent, apparent refusal of the 
child, past or present behavior of the non-residential parent, remarriage of 
the residential parent etc) have on the child, and how much importance 
should be assigned to each factor (which factor might “outweigh” others). 
On a more basic level, notions of the overall significance and merits of 
post-separation/divorce contact between the child and the non-residential 
parent, especially the significance of such contact for the child and its 
development, have changed over time. This has partly been due to an almost 
continuous increase in divorces, and consequently an increase in the number 
of parents (and other persons) seeking contact, but also to the introduction of 
various related research done (mostly abroad) in other fields, such as child 
and family psychology, concerning contact and its effects on the child. 
Below I will try to outline how the best-interests-standard in contact 
disputes in Japan has evolved in scholarly debate and in case law. 
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1 The Best-Interest-Standard in Scholarly Debate and Case Law 
a. From 1964 to the Early 1990s 
As described in the previous section of this paper, following the 1964 
decision of the Tokyo Family Court (the first reported decision to allow 
contact between a non-custodial parent and a child), there was lively debate 
among family law scholars and practitioners as to the legal nature of contact. 
Indeed, this appears to have been the main focus of debate concerning 
contact, whereas initially there was not much discussion concerning a clear 
standard for restricting or denying contact, apart from a general 
acquiescence to the basic understanding that there was not to be contact 
when it was found that the welfare or best interests of the child would be 
harmed if contact was exercised. 
This apparent trend lead Ishikawa to point out in 1980 (16 years after the 
first reported decision) that there was indeed no clear standard in existence 
in Japan, and prompted him to suggest some general guidelines263. Ishikawa 
listed a number of factors that might lead to contact being denied or 
restricted in a certain case. He argued that contact should be denied ① if 
exercising contact would have a harmful effect on the child or the 
relationship between the residential custodial parent and the child (here 
Ishikawa had in mind cases where there was a threat of physical harm to the 
child by the non-custodial parent, but also for example cases where the 
non-residential parent spoke ill of the residential parent in front of the 
child)264; and ② when there was considerable risk of the non-custodial 
parent abducting the child. On the other hand, Ishikawa stated that contact 
should not automatically be denied ③ when the child appears to refuse 
contact (he pointed out that it must be borne in mind that the child`s wishes 
might be influenced by the attitude of the custodial parent towards the other 
                                                   
263 石川・前掲（注 227）288 頁。 
264 He also refers to circumstances that are equal to the grounds for a loss of parental 
authority. 
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parent, and that it was important to take time to examine the true feelings of 
the child), or ④ when there had not been contact for a considerable period of 
time after the separation of the parents. Ishikawa also felt that ⑤ an 
application for contact from a solvent parent who refused to pay child 
support should be denied (except in cases where the child expressed a wish to 
have contact and there was no direct harm to the child from the 
non-payment of child support)265. As Ishikawa himself pointed out, his 
“guidelines” were not based on any analysis of existing Japanese case law on 
contact, as there was, by 1980, no substantial body of such case law. Instead, 
he had to resort to borrowing insights from other jurisdictions (more 
particularly U.S. statutes and practice of the time). Incidentally, the 
“problem factors” he pointed out (especially harm to the child or to the 
relationship between the child and the custodial parent, risk of abduction, 
refusal of the child, non-payment of child support) remained the focus of 
subsequent scholarly debate concerning the restriction of contact. 
Ishikawa`s “guidelines” were among the first attempts towards a clearer 
standard for restricting or denying contact, and subsequently other scholars 
would often refer to these guidelines, agreeing or disagreeing with certain 
parts, or suggesting their own (enhanced or reduced) lists of factors (for 
example Wakabayashi (1992) 266 , Tanamura (1997)267 , Otsuka (1997)268 , 
Kitano (1998)269, Shimizu (2000)270, Yamada (2003)271, Ninomiya (2005)272, 
Yoshimoto (2006) 273 , Sakae/Watanuki (2008) 274 , Yokota et al (2009) 275 
                                                   
265 All the above in 石川・前掲（注 227）288 頁。 
266 若林・前掲（注 237）。 
267 棚村・前掲（注 223）。 
268 大塚・前掲（注 224）。 
269 北野・前掲（注 241）257 頁（concerning the restriction of contact, 264 頁以下）。 
270 清水節『判例先例親族法 III 親権』（日本加除出版、2000 年）316 頁以下。 
271 山田美枝子「親権の帰属と面接交渉の拒否の具体的基準―裁判例等の検討を中心として
―」調停時報 155 号 72 頁以下（2003）。 
272 二宮・前掲（注 222）。 
273 善元・前掲（注 261）。 
274 榮春彦・綿貫義昌「面接交渉の具体的形成と執行」若林昌子・床谷文雄編『新家族法実
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Hosoya et al (2012)276, Wakabayashi (2012)277 and others). 
Ten years onward, in the beginning of the 1990s, a clear standard was yet to 
emerge. In 1992 Wakabayashi stated critically that there had not been 
enough debate concerning a standard for allowing/restricting contact and 
that it was left to the discretion of the individual judges whether and to what 
extent contact was to be allowed in a particular case. This, Wakabayashi 
argued, was not a desirable state of affairs, as (due to a lack of a clear 
standard) the judges had too much discretion, and their decisions concerning 
contact were most likely influenced by the individual judges` personal values 
concerning parent-child relationships. Wakabayashi argued that not only did 
this result in legal uncertainty, but she also supposed that a lack of a clear 
standard was one reason why some practitioners steered clear of contact278. 
b. From the Latter Half of the 1990s Onward 
By the latter half of the 1990s, the body of case law concerning contact had 
expanded to the extent that various scholars attempted to analyze this 
existing case law and outline general tendencies concerning the restriction of 
contact279. After looking at the body of case law, they concluded that it was 
not possible to deduce a common standard as opinions and attitudes towards 
contact and what was in the best interests of the child appeared to vary 
widely from judge to judge, as well as among family court probation officers 
and conciliation commissioners of domestic relations 280 . There was 
agreement among judges on the most basic level, that is that when 
considering whether contact should be allowed or to what extent it should be 
                                                                                                                                                     
務大系２』335 頁以下（2008 年）。 
275 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）。  
276 細矢・前掲（注 218）。 
277 若林・前掲（注 221）。 
278 若林・前掲（注 237）232、234 頁. 
279 Especially 棚村・前掲（注 223）、北野・前掲（注 241）, and 清水・前掲（注 270）include 
copious case law references. Also, later on, 善元・前掲（注 261）(with various 
comprehensive tables of case law up to 2003). 
280 棚村・前掲（注 223）57 頁、大塚・前掲（注 224）291-292 頁。 
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restricted, various factors such as the physical and mental state and 
circumstances of the child, its age and wishes, the effect that contact with 
the non-residential parent would have on the care and upbringing of the 
child as well as the relationship between the child and the residential 
custodial parent, the wishes of each of the parents, the level of discord 
between the parents, the ability of each parent to agree upon and 
accommodate contact etc, were to be considered comprehensively, and that 
contact was not to be allowed when it was likely that the best interests of the 
child would be harmed through the exercise of contact. However, opinions 
about what exactly was to be considered harmful to the child in the context of 
contact with the non-residential parent, differed from judge to judge. 
Scholars reiterated Wakabayashi`s earlier impression that it was highly 
likely that decisions were influenced by the individual practitioners` 
personal values281, and pointed out that this resulted in unpredictability of 
the results of individual cases concerning contact and would eventually lead 
to a loss of faith in the judiciary282. Hence, many argued, there was an urgent 
need to establish clearer standards283. 
In an attempt to ensure more consistency and indicate a clearer standard 
for the restriction and exclusion of contact, various scholars and 
practitioners consequently proposed lists of relevant factors, analyzing how 
these factors should be understood to effect the welfare/best interests of a 
child and whether they could qualify as grounds for the exclusion or 
restriction of contact. 
 Below, I will introduce the different factors that might possibly lead to the 
restriction/exclusion of contact, as highlighted by scholars, practitioners and 
case law. I will outline general trends in case law (based on previous 
                                                   
281 山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）77 頁、棚村・前掲（注 223）60 頁。 
282 棚村・前掲（注 223）60 頁、山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）77 頁。 
283 In addition to the above references, also 山田美枝子「面接交渉事件における子の福祉
の判断例」民商 120-1, 154 頁（1999 年）（161 頁）。 
101 
 
analyses by Japanese authors) and refer to scholarly opinions concerning the 
assessment of the individual factors, as well as towards the trends in case 
law (and how some of these opinions have changed over time due to, among 
other things, the introduction of related legislation and changes in the 
awareness of/attitude concerning post-separation contact between parent 
and child). 
 
2 Individual Factors that Might Lead to the Restriction/Exclusion of Contact 
2.1 Problematic Behavior of the Contact-Seeking Parent 
Violence against Spouse and/or Child 
Introduction – Different Types of Violence “Violence” or “domestic violence” 
often appear in academic literature as one of the key factors for the 
restriction or exclusion of contact. It is important to note here, however, that 
it is not always clear, first of all, what kind of “violence” is meant (especially 
in older literature, the authors appear to have in mind mostly direct physical 
violence, and it is not clear whether a similar weight is assigned to other 
types of violence, such as emotional, verbal or economic violence, in contact 
cases). Secondly, it is in principle possible to differentiate between cases 
where the non-residential parent has been violent only towards the other 
parent (but not the child), and cases where that parent has been violent 
towards the child as well (or, indeed, only the child). A number of scholars do 
not appear to differentiate between violence against spouse and violence 
against the child in contact cases284. This might, of course, be intentional and 
meant to indicate that violence is violence, no matter who it is directed 
against, and that contact with a violent person is in general harmful to the 
child. Some authors, however, do make the distinction, and in fact point out a 
                                                   
284 For example 榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）336 頁、若林・前掲（注 221）397 頁, also 善
元・前掲（注 261）166 頁), (however, the latter is introducing tendencies in case law and 
case law itself does not always make a clear differentiation, hence possibly no 
differentiation by the author either). 
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possibly different outcome in contact disputes. For example Yokota et al 
argue that in cases where there has been violence against the child or child 
abuse, contact with the violent/abusive parent “is clearly contrary to the 
welfare of the child” and consequently contact should be denied “without 
further consideration of other factors”285, whereas in cases where there has 
been violence against the other spouse, Yokota et al are less absolute and 
speak of “restrictions” rather that automatic exclusion286. 
 I will try to introduce scholarly opinions and case law concerning contact 
cases involving violence against child and violence against spouse separately, 
as far as it is possible. 
1) Violence against Child by the Non-Residential Parent 
As far as scholars differentiate between violence against spouse and 
violence against child, there seems to be agreement that in cases where the 
contact-seeking parent has been (physically) violent towards the child (or 
might use violence against the child during the exercise of contact287), 
contact should be understood to be harmful to the best interests of the child 
and should thus be denied288. 
On the other hand, practitioners are cautioned to carefully assess the 
                                                   
285 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）7 頁、10 頁。 
286 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）9 頁。 (they remark, however, that in cases involving DV, in 
“most cases” contact will probably be denied, p 10). 
287 清水・前掲（注 270）316 頁、細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）78 頁。 
288 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）7、10 頁、若林・前掲（注 221）403 頁、石川・前掲（注 227）
288 頁、二宮・前掲（注 222）12 頁 (specifies that not even indirect contact should be 
allowed); 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）78 頁 – (more specific about types of violence/abuse. 
“In cases where the non-custodial parent has used violence against the child or abused 
the child in any other way in the past, and the child as a result fears the non-custodial 
parent, as well as cases where it is possible that the non-custodial parent will abuse the 
child during contact, it should be said that there is cause for excluding/restricting 
contact”. Some case law has taken a less absolute stand. For example in 東京家八王子支
審平 18・1・31（家月 58・11・79）→ before the parents separated, the currently 
contact-seeking parent occasionally spanked the children and locked them into their 
room. Contact denied with younger children due to risk of harmful effect on the children, 
but contact allowed with the older child (reasons included, among others, successful 
past contact and the child having also some positive memories of the non-custodial 
parent). 
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validity of any claims of child abuse made by the residential parent, before 
reaching a decision concerning future contact 289  (see also below under 
“Violence against Spouse”). 
 It is also important to note here that in Japan child abuse is now 
understood to include the child witnessing violence by one parent against the 
other (§ 2 No. 4 of the Act on the Prevention etc of Child Abuse (as amended 
in 2004)). This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
2) Violence against Spouse 
 Violence (including past violence) by the non-residential parent against the 
residential parent has always been considered by scholars and practitioners 
alike as a valid reason for the restriction (often even the complete exclusion) 
of contact290. Earlier case law is near unanimous in denying contact in cases 
involving spousal violence by the non-residential/ non-custodial parent291, 
but there were exceptions to this trend, for example the often cited ruling of 
Nagoya High Court of 29. Jan. 1997292, which allowed some contact between 
a child and a violent spouse. 
Several authors293 point to a change in the attitude of the courts around the 
year 2000 in cases concerning contact with a violent spouse. Increased 
awareness of the serious and lasting effects of DV on the victim, 
accompanied by the coming into force of the Act on the Prevention of 
Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims in 2001294 appears to have 
resulted in the courts adopting a more absolute stand in cases involving DV, 
with a row of court decisions denying the application for contact by a violent 
                                                   
289 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）78 頁。 
290 See 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）78 頁以下、若林・前掲（注 221）403 頁、横田ほか・前
掲（注 221）9, 10 頁、榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）336 頁、二宮・前掲（注 222）、善元・
前掲（注 261）166 頁、山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）80 頁、清水・前掲（注 270）316 頁以
下、北野・前掲（注 241）264 頁 and others. 
291 大阪高決昭 55・9・10（家月 33・6・21）and many others. 
292 家月 49・6・64. 
293 二宮・前掲（注 222）10 頁、細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）30, 78 頁 etc. 
294 Act No. 31 of April 13, 2001. 
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(former) spouse published following the enactment of the aforementioned 
Act295. 
There are varying opinions among authors as to whether (past) DV should 
automatically mean that contact between the child and the violent spouse 
should be denied, or whether a certain amount of differentiation is 
appropriate between violence between the parents and the relationship of 
parent and child. 
There are those who refer to a violent spouse as “the archetype of an unfit 
parent”296, pointing out that often the violent spouse is violent not only 
towards the other spouse but the child as well (as in the 16. Jan 2002 ruling 
of Yokohama Family Court297), and that even if the parent seeking contact 
was violent towards the other spouse but not directly physically violent 
towards the child, the harmful effects on the child from witnessing domestic 
violence should not be underestimated298. Indeed, since the beginning of the 
2000s, there is increasing awareness among family law practitioners, and on 
the side of the legislature, of the harmful effects of the child witnessing 
violence between its parents299. Since 2004, the child witnessing spousal 
                                                   
295 東京家審平 13・6・5（家月 54・1・79）、横浜家審平 14・1・16（家月 54・8・48）(non-custodial 
parent violent towards the child as well as the other parent, the court judged that the 
non-custodial parent did not exhibit sufficient remorse towards his past actions)、東京
家審平 14・5・21（家月 54・11・77）、東京家審平 14・10・31（家月 55・5・165）。 
296 二宮・前掲（注 222）10 頁。 
297 家月 54 巻 8 号 48 頁。 
298 二宮・前掲（注 222）11 頁, also 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）7 頁. Similar 細矢ほか・前
掲（注 218）78-79 頁: Hosoya et al argue that in cases where witnessing spousal violence 
has caused psychological trauma to the child and where the child has yet to recover 
from this trauma, contact should be understood to harm the welfare of the child and 
hence a restriction or exclusion of contact is justified. 
299 Literature in Japanese concerning the harmful effects of DV on children: 吉浜美恵子
ほか編『女性の健康とドメスティック・バイオレンス―WHO 国際調査／日本調査結果報告
書』（新水社、2007）13 頁 ff；西澤哲ほか「児童福祉機関における思春期児童等の心理的
アセスメントの導入に関する研究」（厚生労働科学研究平成 15年度研究報告書）- the results 
of this research were incorporated into the 「子ども虐待対応の手引き」of the Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare. Research done in the U.S concerning the harmful effect on 
children of witnessing DV has also been introduced in Japan (see for further references 
立石直子「ドメスティック・バイオレンス事例への対応」法時 85 巻 4 号 59 頁以下（2013
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violence is understood to be a form of child abuse under § 2 No. 4 of the Act 
on the Prevention etc of Child Abuse300 (as amended in 2004). It is also 
stressed that violent spouses tend to deny or underestimate the effects of 
their own past violence, justifying their acts as nothing more than discipline 
or a natural by-product of conjugal disagreement, thereby lacking 
understanding towards their victims as well as a wish to change their 
behavior301. Based on the above, a number of Japanese authors argue in 
favor of a stricter stance towards contact with a violent spouse, agreeing 
with post-2000 (published) case law302.303 
On the other hand, others argue that even if there has been spousal 
violence, contact between the violent spouse and the child might be 
conceivable in some cases. These scholars argue that contact should not 
automatically be denied in cases involving spousal violence, but that instead 
various other factors such as the type and level of violence, the concrete 
effect of the violence on the spouse and the child in question, but also 
whether the violent parent has expressed regret of their past actions should 
                                                                                                                                                     
年）。 
300 Act No. 82 of May 24, 2000. 
301 立石・前掲（注 299）60 頁、棚村政行「葛藤の高い面会交流事件の調整技法」棚村政行
＝小川富之編『家族法の理論と実務』（日本加除出版、2011 年）392 頁。 
302 Ninomiya (二宮・前掲（注 222）) argues that, as with child abuse, in cases involving 
DV even indirect contact should not be allowed, as such contact would constitute a 
threat to the other parent and child and their family life (12 頁). He remarks, however, 
that after some time has passed since the ceasing of the violence, contact might be 
conceivable, but when deciding whether contact should be allowed (possibly in the 
presence of a third party), the stage of the development of the child as well as the 
attempts of the violent spouse to reflect on and redress his or her past behavior should 
be considered. (p. 11) Also 山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）80 頁、横田ほか・前掲（注 221）
10 頁 (estimates that contact will be denied in most cases); 立石・前掲（注 299）60 頁 and 
others. 
303 Publications by organizations and bodies focused on the protection of victims of DV 
also tend to stress the harmful effects of spousal violence on the child, and argue that 
the safety of the spouse who has been victim of domestic violence, and the child should 
come first, and contact should only be allowed under strict conditions (see for example 
日本 DV 防止・情報センター編著『知っていますか？ドメスティック・バイオレンス 一
問一答〈第 4 編〉』（解放出版社、2008 年）- refers to the harm to the child from witnessing 
DV, as well as the tendency of DV recurring in the following generations and so forth (p. 
27ff), stressing that the safety of mother and child should come first (p. 75)). 
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also be duly considered, and that contact between the violent spouse and the 
child might be conceivable in some cases, especially when the level of 
violence was comparatively low304. Some authors also stress that supervised 
contact should be considered as an option before contact is completely 
excluded305. 
Finally, it is a well-known fact that in domestic relations practice domestic 
violence and child abuse claims by the residential parent against the 
contact-seeking parent are not uncommon306, and that the contact-seeking 
parent will frequently contest the validity of such claims. In much of the 
literature, both practitioners and scholars call for a close investigation of 
objective evidence such as doctor`s reports and other evidence presented by 
the parties, as well as hearing out all involved parties and involving the 
family court probation officer (ordering an independent investigation by the 
latter), and cautioning judges (as well as conciliation commissioners of 
domestic relations) against denying contact based on mere claims of DV or 
child abuse by the residential/custodial parent307.308 
                                                   
304 For example 榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）336 頁、see also 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）79
頁. 
305 For example 棚村政行『子どもと法』（日本加除出版、2012 年）84 頁, referring to 
practice in the U.S., argues that past violence should not result in the separation of 
parent and child and breaking off of any contact, but that via the potential use of 
supervised contact and other means, a future reunification of parent and child should be 
retained as a possibility. Also 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）79 頁。 
306 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）78 頁、清水・前掲（注 270）316 頁。 
307 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）79 頁, also 若林・前掲（注 221）403 頁 and 清水・前掲（注
270）316 頁。See also 棚村・前掲（注 301）392 頁以下 (lists specific points that 
practitioners should pay attention to when handling violence claims in contact 
disputes)). 
Hosoya et al refer to cases where the custodial parent claims that (s)he is suffering from 
PTSD as a result of past DV, that her symptoms worsen when contact is carried out, and 
that this as a result has a harmful effect on the child (see for example 東京家審平成 14・
5・21（家月 54・11・77）). While admitting that in some cases a complete exclusion of 
contact would be appropriate, Hosoya et al and others urge practitioners to require the 
custodial parent to submit medical certificates, or a written decision concerning a 
protection order, in order to ascertain whether there indeed was DV, to understand the 
concrete symptoms of PTSD etc, and furthermore judges and conciliation commissioners 
of domestic relations are urged to consider whether the respective families of the 
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Above, I attempted to introduce the state of academic debate and case law 
in Japan concerning contact and violence by talking about violence against 
spouse and violence against child under two different subheadings. 
Nevertheless, it is definitely true that it is not always wise to draw a line 
between the two. As discussed earlier, even if the child is not the object of 
direct (physical) violence, witnessing violence between parents can be 
equally emotionally damaging for the child, and can constitute child abuse 
according to Japanese statutory law. Also, in a practical sense, it has been 
pointed out by practitioners that violence by one parent against the other 
will in many cases affect the relationship between the child and the violent 
spouse (the child might fear the violent parent as a result of being exposed to 
spousal violence, and consequently adamantly refuse contact, which, as 
discussed further on, could possibly qualify as cause for the courts to deny 
contact). In addition, especially with smaller children, carrying out contact is 
difficult without some cooperation from the residential/custodial parent, but 
if that parent fears or distrust the non-residential parent as a result of past 
violence, exercising contact might be physically unrealistic. 
Other Types of Problematic Behavior 
In cases involving problematic behavior on the side of the contact-seeking 
parent other than spousal violence and child abuse, namely (what has been 
highlighted in scholarly literature in Japan) “unethical” and “markedly 
antisocial” behavior such as alcoholism, drug abuse, but also high possibility 
of abduction of the child by the non-residential parent, constant breaking of 
the rules agreed upon (or ordered by the court) concerning contact, 
                                                                                                                                                     
parents are willing to cooperate, or whether it is possible to enlist the cooperation of a 
third-party organization for the exercise of contact (細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）79 頁). 
308 On the other hand 立石・前掲（注 299）60 頁 – critical towards allowing contact in 
cases involving DV claims if the custodial parent is not able to prove harm to the 
welfare of the child. 
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interfering with how the residential/custodial parent is raising the child etc, 
case law appears as a rule to deny contact309. A majority of the scholars 
appear to agree in principle, although many argue that contact might be 
allowed in cases where the degree of the “problematic behavior” is judged to 
be comparatively low310. Also, many scholars point out that if direct contact 
is not deemed suitable, indirect contact (phone calls, letters, but also the 
custodial parent providing information such as pictures, videos and report 
cards to the non-residential parent) should be considered, and even 
encouraged311. 
 “Unethical” and “Markedly Antisocial” Behavior  This category, as 
proposed by Japanese scholars, is understood to include alcohol and drug 
abuse etc by the contact-seeking parent312 (in addition to violence, which 
was discussed in the previous above). It is generally agreed that contact 
should be restricted, if not completely excluded, if these factors are present, 
as exercising contact would harm the wellbeing and healthy development of 
the child as well as hamper a stable relationship between the child and the 
residential parent313. 
                                                   
309 As pointed out by 山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）78 頁、善元・前掲（注 261）166 頁、
横田ほか・前掲（注 221）10 頁。 
310 For example 山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）78 頁、善元・前掲（注 261）166 頁 (referring 
to one of the very few exceptions in case law,京都家審昭 47・9・19（家月 25・7・44）→ 
The non-custodial parent had abducted the child in the past, but regrets his behavior 
and dutifully pays child-support, the relationship between the child and the 
non-custodial parent was not a bad one to begin with, the custodial parent did not 
distrust the non-custodial parent. Contact allowed (some restriction as to the frequency 
etc). But advocating an apparently stricter approach in all cases where there are 
problems pertaining to the person and behavior of the non-residential/ non-custodial 
parent for example 若林・前掲（注 221）403 頁。 
311 棚村・前掲（注 223）61 頁、山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）80 頁。 
312 See for example 和歌山家裁昭和 55・6・13（家月 33・6・29）、浦和家審昭和 56・9・
16（家月 34・9・80）、浦和家審昭和 57・4・2（家月 35・8・108）、東京家裁平成 13・6・
5（家月 54・1・79）。 See also 大阪高平 4・7・31（家月 45・7・63）（somewhat mentally 
unstable non-custodial mother, supervised contact allowed）. 
313 北野・前掲（注 241）264 頁、榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）335 頁、清水・前掲（注 270）
316 頁 (Shimizu stresses, however, that it is not uncommon for the custodial parent to 
deny contact claiming that the contact-seeking parent has a tendency to violence or a 
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Abduction (or the Threat thereof) of the Child by the Non-Residential 
Parent  Scholars agree that contact should be restricted or completely 
excluded, if the probability of the non-residential parent abducting the child 
is high (for example in cases where abduction has occurred in the past)314. 
The need to restrict or exclude contact in such cases is deemed justified, as 
abduction would cause the child emotional distress due to being removed 
from their current environment, and therefore harm the child`s best 
interests315. It is argued by some, however, that in certain cases contact in 
the presence of a third party, or at a certain limited location could be 
possible316. 
Rule-Breaking and Interfering with the Residential/Custodial Parent`s 
Child-Raising  The parents` ability and willingness to follow the rules 
agreed upon during conciliation proceedings or set by the courts is an 
important prerequisite to the smooth exercise of contact. Japanese scholars 
point out that by breaking these rules, even the minimal amount of trust 
between the parents necessary for the exercise of contact will be lost, and the 
child will be harmed in the process317. Therefore, it is argued that if the 
contact-seeking parent is unable or unwilling to follow the set rules, contact 
should be restricted, and in cases of repeated and blatant rule-breaking, 
sometimes a complete exclusion of contact is inevitable and justified318. 
                                                                                                                                                     
character or personality disorder, and urges practitioners to assess the situation (and 
the contact-seeking parent`s suitability to have contact with the child) based on 
objective information and facts as far as possible. See also 若林・前掲（注 221）403 頁). 
314 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）77-78 頁、横田ほか・前掲（注 221）9 頁、石川・前掲（注
227）288 頁 (argued that no face-to-face contact should be allowed), 大塚・前掲（注 224）
302 頁 (argued that contact should not be denied in cases where the custodial parent 
has an abstract fear that the other parent might abduct the child). Relevant case law: 
京都家裁昭和 47・9・19（家月 25・7・44）(non-custodial parent regrets past behavior, 
contact allowed but somewhat restricted). See also 大阪高判平成 17・6・22（家月 58 巻 4
号 93 頁）、東京高判平成 15・1・20（家月 56 巻 4 号 127 頁）。 
315 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）77-78 頁。 
316 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）77-78 頁。 
317 若林・前掲（注 221）403 頁。 
318 棚村・前掲（注 305）82 頁. See for example 横浜家裁相模原支部平 18 年 3 月 9 日（家
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 In some cases, breaking the rules agreed upon in conciliation or set by the 
court is accompanied by the non-residential parent (excessively) interfering 
with how the residential parent is raising the child319 and bad-mouthing the 
residential parent in from of the child320, which is also considered harmful to 
the best interests of the child, as it inevitably results in increased conflict 
between the parents321. Case law as a rule is reported to limit or completely 
exclude contact in cases involving rule-breaking on the side of the 
non-residential parent322. 
Non-Payment of Child Support  According to case law, whether child 
support is being paid is taken into consideration by the courts, but 
non-payment of child-support alone does not appear to lead to the restriction 
or exclusion of contact323. There has been some debate among scholars 
concerning this point. Although there is legally no reciprocal relation 
between contact and child support, a number of scholars in Japan argue that 
a parent who does not fulfil his/her duties towards their child should not be 
awarded with the right to have contact with the child324. On the other hand, 
others argue that non-payment of child support should not automatically 
result in the exclusion of contact, and that contact should be allowed if it is 
                                                                                                                                                     
月 58・11・71）(non-custodial parent did not follow the rules agreed upon during 
conciliation, contact denied); See also 東京家審平 14・10・31、那覇家沖縄支審平 15・9・
29。 
319 See for example 福岡高那覇支決平 15・11・28（家月 56・8・50）(non-custodial parent 
requested contact with the sole aim of interfering with the custodial parent`s 
child-rearing policies, contact restricted but not completely excluded (contact allowed if 
the child (14 years old) wishes it)). 
320 榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）336 頁、also 石川・前掲（注 227）288 頁 (argues that contact 
should not be allowed if the non-custodial parent bad-mouths the custodial parent 
during the exercise of contact). 
321 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）9 頁、榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）336 頁。 
322 As reported by 山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）78 頁、横田ほか・前掲（注 221）9, 10 頁。 
323 See for example 大阪高平 18 年 2 月 3 日（家月 58 巻 11 号 47 頁）。 
324 石川・前掲（注 227）288 頁 (unless the child wishes contact, and there has been no 
direct harm to the child from the non-payment of child support), also 北野・前掲（注 241）
265-266 頁、清水・前掲（注 270）330 頁、榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）336 頁 (“a type of abuse 
of [the contact-seeking parent` rights”), 若林・前掲（注 221）404 頁. 
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deemed beneficial to the child325. 
It has been pointed out, however, that even if there is legally and 
theoretically no reciprocal relation between the two, in practice regular 
payment of child support by the non-custodial parent has been observed to 
encourage the custodial parent to allow (more generous) contact, and, 
reversely, if the custodial parent refuses contact between the child and the 
non-custodial parent, the non-custodial parent often as a retort refuses to 
pay child support326. 
Unfitting Motive for Contact Application   Finally, scholars and 
practitioners have pointed out that it is important to ascertain the real 
motive of the non-residential/ non-custodial parent for requesting contact. If 
the application for contact is motivated not by a wish to see the child but 
solely by unfitting or unsuitable considerations, such as attempting to 
reconcile with the residential/custodial parent or reversely in order to bully 
the residential/custodial parent, as well as aiming to use contact conciliation 
proceedings to negotiate reducing child support, it is generally agreed that 
contact should be denied, since if contact was allowed and even enforced in 
such circumstances, it would be harmful to the best interests of the child327. 
 
                                                   
325 棚村・前掲（注 223）61 頁、大塚・前掲（注 224）302 頁。 
326 棚村・前掲（注 223）61 頁、see also 大塚・前掲（注 224）275-276 頁: after analyzing 
conciliation records in Yokohama Family Court over a period of a 12 months (1996), 
found that in cases where the parties had reached an agreement concerning contact, it 
was more likely that child support was being paid, as compared to cases where no 
agreement concerning contact had been made; also Shimizu （清水・前掲（注 270）330
頁）points out that in reality there are many cases where the custodial parent refuses 
contact between the child and the non-custodial parent on the grounds that 
child-support is not being paid, and vice versa, the non-custodial parent refuses to pay 
child support because the other parent refuses to let him/her see the child. See also for 
example 京都家審判昭和 47・9・19（家月 25・7・44）。 
327 大塚・前掲（注 224）301 頁 and 清水・前掲（注 270）316 頁 (abuse of rights, 
consequently contact should be denied), Cf. 榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）335 頁, refers to
東京家裁平 14・10・31 （家月 55・5・165）。 
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2.2 High Level of Conflict between the Parents 
It is commonly accepted that in cases where there is a high level of 
animosity and conflict between the parents, the exercise of contact between 
the non-residential/ non-custodial parent and the child could reignite or 
escalate old quarrels, and potentially result in the child being caught in 
loyalty conflict. It is for this reason that especially in the past some authors 
were skeptical about post-separation parent-child contact, arguing that, 
except for amicable separations, contact in the midst of parental conflict 
would most likely be harmful to the welfare of the child328. In particular in 
the 1970s, such views were rather common among many family law 
practitioners in Japan, due partly to the introduction of the research and 
views of Goldstein et al in Japan at the time (as already introduced 
elsewhere in this paper). Majority scholarly opinion, however, has advocated 
for more contact even in cases where there is a considerable amount of 
animosity between the parents, as introduced briefly below. 
It is reported that although the tendency in case law in recent years 
appears to be to allow contact rather than exclude it (with the courts tending 
to hesitate denying contact solely on the grounds of conflict between the 
parents)329, there are also a considerable number of cases involving a high 
level of conflict between the parents where the courts have excluded contact 
                                                   
328 As also elsewhere 梶村（注 216）, but also more recently 梶村太市「子のための面接
交渉再々論」『小野幸二先生古希記念論集 21 世紀の家族と法』（法学書院 2007 年）207 頁
etc. 
329 Yokota et al point out that in cases involving intense conflict or animosity between 
the parents where there appear to be no justifiable grounds for the non-residential 
parent to refuse contact, and especially in cases where the parents have previously 
reached an agreement concerning contact and some contact has already been exercised 
in the past (with relative success), courts tend to allow contact (横田ほか・前掲（注 221）
10 頁). Some examples of cases where contact was allowed despite a high level of 
antagonism between the parents: 名古屋家審平成 2・5・31(家月 42 巻 12 号 51 頁)、名古
屋高決平 9・1・29（家月 49・6・64）、 東京家審平 18・7・31（家月 59・3・73）、大阪
高決平 21・1・16（家月 61・11・70）、京都家審平 22・4・27（家月 63・3・87）、大阪高
決平 22・7・23（家月 63・3・81）。 
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(mainly or entirely) due to such conflict330. In fact, judgments in high-conflict 
cases have always shown a considerable amount of inconsistency from judge 
to judge331. 
Although much of the literature refers to “intense conflict case law” as a 
separated category, it should be kept in mind, however, that in most of the 
case law concerning the restriction of contact there is considerable conflict 
between the parents (as these are cases that could not be agreed upon during 
the conciliation process), and that there are almost always other factors 
besides ‘intense conflict’ involved, hence it is often difficult to assess whether 
it was the intense conflict between the parents that was deemed the sole or 
main factor that could potentially harm the child, or whether it was the 
accumulative effect of various factors, of which ‘intense conflict’ was one (but 
perhaps not necessarily the deciding factor)332. 
Scholars and practitioners have observed a gradual change in the attitude 
of the courts in cases involving contact and intense conflict between the 
                                                   
330 As pointed out by 善元・前掲（注 261）166 頁、横田ほか・前掲（注 221）10 頁. Some 
more recent examples: 東京家審平 13・6・5（家月 54・1・79）、さいたま家審平 19・7・
19（家月 60・2・149）、東京高決平 19・8・22（家月 60・2・137）。 
331 See for example 山田美枝子・前掲（注 283）(introduction and analysis of 横浜家審
平 8・4・30（家月 49・3・75）and 名古屋高平 9・1・29（家月 49・6・64）, two cases involving 
a high level of animosity and conflict between the parents, where the two courts` 
standards for allowing/restricting contact in such cases appear to differ considerably. 
(Also, the above名古屋高平 9・1・29 reversed the decision of the court of the first instance 
名古屋家審平 8・9・19（家月 49・6・72）, which had denied contact). Yamada also points 
out these two cases (similar circumstances but seemingly different standard applied)：
東京高決平 2・2・19 （家月 42・8・57）and 大阪高決平 4・7・31（家月 45・7・63）(in 
both cases the residential parent is strongly against contact, in both cases the child in 
question is 3 years old. One difference is that in one case the contact-seeking parent is 
the mother, in the other case the father)（pointed out by Yamada on p. 160）. 
332 For example, in 那覇家裁沖縄支部平成 15・9・29（家月 56・8・55） and 福岡高裁那
覇支部平成 15・11・28（家月 56・8・50）(the appellate court of the former) the judge 
considered the high level of conflict between the parents as well as the constant 
rule-breaking on the side of the contact-seeking parent (contact excluded for half a 
year)；東京家裁平成 7・10・9（家月 48・3・68）→also intense conflict between parents 
was taken into account, but the strong refusal of the 13-year-old child appears to have 
had the most weight for the court, see also 大阪家裁平成 5・12・22（家月 47・4・45）(various 
factors considered). 
114 
 
parents, towards actively promoting the exercise of contact333. It has been 
pointed out that, at present, already on the conciliation level, family court 
probation officers and the results of their independent investigation are 
utilized, conciliation commissioners are making a conscious effort of 
stressing to the warring parents the importance of contact from the child`s 
point of view, while explaining that it is the best interests of the child that 
are central to contact, and carrying out tentative contact (試行的面会交流) on 
the premises of the court. Also in cases that move on to adjudication 
proceedings, instead of completely excluding contact in cases involving a 
high level of conflict, courts are consciously attempting to secure some direct 
contact by detailing the conditions of the exercise of contact (specific time, 
place, method of handing over the child, also possible supervision by a third 
person), and in cases where direct contact is deemed unsuitable or 
implausible under present circumstances, actively urging indirect contact, 
such as exchanging letters, or ordering the custodial parent to send pictures 
or videos of the child, or report cards and other information to the 
non-residential parent334. 
 As mentioned above, most scholars agree that it is inappropriate to exclude 
contact solely on the grounds that there is a high level of antagonism 
                                                   
333 In particular Wakabayashi (若林・前掲（注 221）) argues that earlier it was common 
for the courts to deduce that in cases involving intense conflict between the parents the 
best interests of the child would be harmed and therefore restrict or exclude contact, 
whereas in recent years the trend has changed to promoting the exercise of contact as 
much as possible in intense conflict cases (p. 401). 
334 山田美枝子・前掲（注 283）159, 161 頁、山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）80 頁、清水・前
掲（注 270）326 頁、二宮・前掲（注 222）12 頁、榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）337 頁以下、
棚村・前掲（注 305）79 頁, 若林・前掲（注 221）402 頁 (→ argues that intense conflict 
between the parents should be dealt with as a problem of deciding a concrete 
appropriate method for the exercise of contact in a particular case, Wakabayashi also 
stresses the importance of appropriate support for the parties. Speaking from personal 
experience with domestic dispute cases, Wakabayashi highlights the importance of the 
role of the family court probation officer in helping the (former) spouses overcome the 
negative experiences in the past and think more objectively about what is best for the 
child, and indeed argues that in most cases with the right support the conflict will be 
mitigated (若林・前掲（注 221）407 頁) 
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between the parents335. They argue that this would be unjustified when 
considering the overall importance of maintaining a personal relationship 
between a non-residential parent and the child after the separation of the 
parents336. On the other hand, scholars concede that in cases where the 
antagonism and conflict between the parents is especially intense, the 
exercise of contact could cause excessive stress and strain on the psyche of 
the child and might therefore be harmful to the best interests of the child, 
and hence an exclusion of contact would be justified337. But it is argued that 
before reaching such a conclusion, other relevant factors should be taken into 
consideration as well, and the concrete negative or harmful effect on the 
child should be carefully considered in the light of the specific circumstances 
of the case338.339 
 Finally, some scholars stress that, especially in cases involving a high level 
of conflict between the parents (but also, for example, in cases involving past 
DV, as explained in the previous section), the conflict between the adults (the 
horizontal relationship) on the one hand and the relationship between a 
parent and child (the vertical relationship) on the other should be considered 
as two separate things, and therefore past or present problems between the 
grown-ups should not influence a decision concerning the present and future 
                                                   
335 北野・前掲（注 241）265 頁、清水・前掲（注 270）326 頁、二宮・前掲（注 222）11 頁
以下、若林・前掲（注 221）407 頁。 
336 棚村・前掲（注 223）61 頁, 棚村・前掲（注 305）79 頁 etc. 
337 棚村・前掲（注 305）79 頁。 
338榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）336 頁, also already 棚村・前掲（注 223）56、60 頁。 
339 Also similarly practitioners: Yokota et al: “It is a common fact that many divorced 
spouses do not get along well, and in cases where the contact dispute has moved to 
adjudication proceedings, it is often the case that the (former) spouses are also involved 
in a heated dispute concerning matters other than contact, hence in such scenarios 
emotional confrontations tend to escalate. Even if there is dispute between the parties, 
if there is no direct harmful influence to the child, means should be employed that 
would mitigate the conflict between the custodial parent and the non-custodial parent, 
and direct contact (面接) between the non-custodial parent and the child should be 
considered”（横田ほか・前掲（注 221）9 頁）。Similar 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）80 頁. 
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relationship of a parent and child340. However (as also mentioned above 
under the subheading “Violence against spouse and/or child”), it is not 
always possible to separate the one completely from the other. For example, 
children who find themselves in the midst of intense parental conflict, might 
(in some cases rather vehemently) refuse contact with a beloved parent in 
order to escape the stress and anxiety caused by the fighting that the child 
associates with the exercise of contact, and especially in the case of an older 
child, this will make the enforcement of contact in reality near impossible 
(about such wishes of the child see below under “Refusal of the Child”). Also, 
in the case of smaller children who are more dependent on the 
residential/custodial parent, as well as more sensitive to the stress that that 
parent feels towards the non-residential parent and/or contact between the 
child and the other parent, the possible negative effects of contact with the 
non-residential parent to the child, and the difficulties related to the actual 
exercise of contact, are in fact closely connected with circumstances 
pertaining to the residential, and the relationship between the residential 
parent and the non-residential parent. 
 
2.3 Circumstances Pertaining to the Child 
Circumstances pertaining to the child, such as the child refusing contact or 
experiencing stress, emotional anxiety or physical symptoms such as 
headaches immediately preceding or following contact with the 
non-residential parent, as well as potential loyalty conflict as a result of 
contact with the non-residential parent, have been considered as potential 
grounds for restricting or excluding contact. 
Refusal of the Child 
 Whether the refusal of the child to have contact with the non-residential 
parent is grounds for the restriction or exclusion of contact, has been the 
                                                   
340 See for example 清水・前掲（注 270）326 頁、若林・前掲（注 221）392 頁。 
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subject of some debate in Japan. 
Japanese law stipulates that in adjudication cases concerning contact, the 
wishes and opinions of the child involved should be heard (Domestic 
Relations Case Procedure Act  § 152 II (the statement of a child 15 years or 
older should be heard), § 65 ((also for younger children) “… the family court 
shall endeavor to understand the intentions of the child by hearing 
statements from said child, having a family court probation officer conduct 
an examination or using any other appropriate method..”), § 258 I) and that 
his or her wishes should be taken into consideration “according to the child`s 
age or degree of development” (§ 65).  
As is often pointed out, it is not altogether uncommon for the residential 
parent to justify refusing contact by claiming that the child wishes no contact, 
and it is also not uncommon for the child to find it difficult to express his or 
her true feelings concerning contact, especially if they are caught in a loyalty 
conflict341. Therefore, it is generally agreed that when considering the wishes 
of the child, in addition to the age and development of the child, various 
factors such as the reasons the child gives for refusing contact, the intensity 
of the refusal, the background to the refusal such as the domestic situation of 
the child and the details of the dispute between the parents etc must be 
examined as far as possible and taken into account342. 
Refusal of the Child -- Age of the Child  Scholars agree that the stated 
wishes of older children have considerable (possibly even deciding) weight. 
“Older” in this case is generally understood to indicate 10 years old or 
older 343 . In addition to the fact that older children have a better 
understanding of the circumstances that they and their parents find 
                                                   
341 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）80 頁。 
342 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）80 頁、清水・前掲（注 270）329 頁、大塚・前掲（注 224）
302 頁 etc. 
343 二宮・前掲（注 222）5 頁、横田ほか・前掲（注 221）9 頁 (higher classes of elementary 
school). 
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themselves in, it is also argued that ordering or exercising contact against 
the wishes of an older child would often be against the child`s best interests 
(as well as physically problematic)344. With children younger than 10, their 
verbal statements are generally understood to not have deciding weight, and 
should be understood and assessed in the context of their specific age and 
stage in development345. 
Refusal of the Child -- Reasons for Refusal  The reasons behind a child`s 
refusal are varied and may include negative past experiences with the 
contact-seeking parent such as domestic violence or child abuse, anger 
towards the contact-seeking parent for deserting the other parent and the 
child (possibly for a new partner), disinterest or uneasiness due to having no 
memories of the non-residential parent, and so forth346. It is suggested that if 
the refusal of the child is “objectively justified”, the non-residential/ 
non-custodial parent`s application for contact will most likely be refused (as 
concrete examples of such “objectively justified” reasons, literature offers the 
following: when the child is afraid of the non-residential as a result of that 
parent`s violent behavior during cohabitation, but also when the child feels 
resentful towards the adulterous non-residential parent (in such cases, if the 
child`s feelings of fear or resentment could not be expected to be mitigated 
“through the efforts of the non-custodial parent”, contact will likely be 
excluded))347. On the other hand, if the child feels “vaguely uneasy” about 
contact because (s)he has only scant 348  or no memories 349  of the 
                                                   
344 清水・前掲（注 270）329 頁、横田ほか・前掲（注 221）10 頁 (“when the child has reached 
an age where (s)he is capable of clearly stating his/her wished, and when such a child 
has refused contact, it could probably be said that in most cases it would not be 
appropriate to allow contact”), also 榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）337 頁。 
345 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）9 頁、二宮・前掲（注 222）5 頁。See also 棚村・前掲（注
223）61 頁以下。 
346 清水・前掲（注 270）329 頁 etc. 
347 清水・前掲（注 270）329 頁、若林・前掲（注 221）403-404 頁。 
348 清水・前掲（注 270）329 頁。 
349 大塚・前掲（注 224）302 頁。 
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non-residential/ non-residential parent (e.g. in cases where the parents 
separated when the child was very young), it is argued that allowing contact 
should not automatically be expected to have a harmful effect on the child, 
but that initiating contact could lead to the building up of a parent-child 
relationship and the child acknowledging a “new” parent350. In such cases, 
literature and practitioners stress the importance of the role of professional 
support for the child, as well as for the parents (e.g. through the family court 
probation officer)351. 
Refusal of the Child – True Wishes of the Child or Not  It is also generally 
acknowledged, that a child might outwardly refuse contact, despite a 
possibly affectionate or otherwise problem-free relationship with the 
non-residential parent in the past, in order to avoid the stress associated 
with having contact with that parent against the wishes of the residential 
parent. Also, the child`s wishes and impressions of the non-residential 
parent might be influenced by those of the residential parent352. In such 
cases, it is commonly agreed that the true wishes and feelings of the child 
should be ascertained353. This is often a complicated task, and expert skills 
and knowledge are required. There are those who argue that when the 
refusal of the child is not a “true” refusal, or refusal from the heart (as 
described above), it will possibly not qualify as grounds for restricting or 
excluding contact354. Again, scholars and professionals stress the role of the 
family court probation officer not only in identifying the wishes of the child 
but also in providing necessary support for the child (and the parents), 
urging the parents to cooperate, and working on the emotions of the child355. 
                                                   
350 大塚・前掲（注 224）302 頁。 
351 清水・前掲（注 270）329 頁。 
352 石川・前掲（注 227）288 頁、北野・前掲（注 241）265 頁、二宮・前掲（注 222）5 頁。 
353 石川・前掲（注 227）288 頁、榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）337 頁、細矢ほか・前掲（注
218）80 頁。 
354 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）81 頁。 
355 清水・前掲（注 270）329 頁、see also 若林・前掲（注 221）392 頁、403 頁以下, and 佐々
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Refusal of the Child – Case Law  It has been reported that in cases where 
the child refuses contact or is otherwise negatively minded towards contact, 
the body of case law is divided into cases where contact is allowed and cases 
where contact is excluded (there being a considerable number of both)356. The 
latter group tends to include the cases involving older children357. It has been 
pointed out that in recent domestic relations practice, there is an increasing 
tendency to not automatically refuse contact when the child refuses contact, 
but instead conscious efforts are made to promote contact (direct or indirect) 
by actively utilizing the expert skills of the family court probation officer, 
carrying out tentative contact on the premises of the family courts and so 
on358. 
Circumstances Pertaining to the Child (Other) 
Emotional Unsettlement of the Child, Decline in Academic Performance 
and so forth as a Result of Contact  It has been pointed out that the 
exercise of contact could be understood to harm the child`s welfare if, as a 
result of contact, the child is emotionally unsettled, suffers from head-aches 
                                                                                                                                                     
木健「面会交流における子の意思―片親疎外（症候群）理論を巡って―」法時 85 巻 4 号 61
頁（2013 年）（62 頁）。 Research done abroad (mainly in the US) concerning the so-called 
“parental alienation” (or “Parental Alienation Syndrome”) has also been introduced and 
recognized in Japan. See for example 小澤真嗣「子どもを巡る紛争の解決に向けたアメリ
カの研究と実践」ケ研 272 号 149 頁（2002）；棚瀬一代『離婚と子ども―心理臨床家の視
点から』（創元社 2007）137 頁；佐々木健「ドイツ法における親子の交流と子の意思―PAS
（片親疎外症候群）と子の福祉の視点から」立命 327・328 号（2009）354 頁以下。More 
recently for example 佐々木健「面会交流における子の意思―片親疎外（症候群）理論を巡
って―」法時 85 巻 4 号 61 頁以下（2013 年）。 
356 See 棚村・前掲（注 223）61 頁以下、二宮・前掲（注 222）5 頁以下、横田ほか・前掲
（注 221）8 頁以下 for extensive case law references. Some examples: contact denied: 東
京高裁平 19・8・22（家月 60・2・137）→ children do not wish contact and distrust the 
father, the court argued that when contact was exercised it would consequently occasion 
considerable stress to the children, contact denied; 岡山家審平 2・12・3（家月 43・10・
38）→ contact allowed in spite of the children`s rather negative attitude towards the 
non-residential parent (and vehement opposition to contact by the residential parent) ;
東京家審判平 18・7・31（家月 59・3・73）→ contact allowed in the presence of a third 
party, etc. 
357 As pointed out by 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）8 頁。 
358 二宮・前掲（注 222）12 頁。 
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or fever, there is a decline in the child`s performance at school etc359. Some 
authors have argued that in such cases at least a temporary suspension of 
contact is justified, while the child (and the parents) receive professional 
help and support360, while others have argued that contact should not be 
easily restricted or excluded merely on the grounds of possible emotional 
unsettlement of the child or a decline in the child`s academic 
performance361. 
The term “loyalty conflict” also appears frequently in Japanese case law 
and literature concerning contact. It is widely acknowledged in Japan that 
when the parents do not see eye to eye on contact and are possibly arguing 
over other matters as well, there is a very real risk that the child will be 
caught in a loyalty conflict, and consequently its best interests will be 
harmed. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, formerly practitioners were 
rather quick to restrict or exclude contact on the grounds of potential loyalty 
conflict. However, in recent years both academics and practitioners tend to 
argue that, considering the general significance of continued contact with the 
non-residential/ non-custodial parent on the healthy development of the 
child, a potential loyalty conflict (as well as potential emotional unsettlement 
of the child, as above) is not grounds for automatic exclusion of contact, but 
that rather efforts should be made first to prevent or mitigate the effects of 
loyalty conflict, by providing professional support and education for the 
parents as well as support for the child (as well as urging supervised or 
indirect contact, when direct contact proves impracticable), and only in cases 
where such efforts have no effect and it is judged that in a specific case the 
best interests of the child will be harmed, is an exclusion of contact 
                                                   
359 清水・前掲（注 270）317 頁。 
360 清水・前掲（注 270）317 頁、but considering the importance of contact to the 
development of the child, no indeterminate exclusion of contact under these 
circumstances (p 325).  
361 棚村・前掲（注 223）61 頁. 
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justified362. 
 On the other hand, if there are serious problems with the 
psychological/mental condition of the child, contact will be restricted363. 
Young Age of the Child has occasionally been suggested as grounds for 
restricting or excluding contact364. However, the young age of the child alone 
does not appear to automatically mean an exclusion of contact. The authors 
(as well as the cases cited by those authors365) refer to cases where there is 
intense conflict and animosity between the parents, and point out that with 
very young children, carrying out direct contact between the child and the 
non-residential/ non-custodial parent would require a considerable amount 
of cooperation from the side of the residential/custodial parent (as opposed to 
older children who could be expected to exercise contact independently), and 
when such cooperation could not be expected from the residential/custodial 
parent, carrying out contact in practice would be impossible. As already 
                                                   
362 若林・前掲（注 221）392 頁、二宮・前掲（注 222）12 頁、清水・前掲（注 270）325
頁 etc。 
363 See 長野家裁上田支部平成 11・11・11（家月 52・4・30）→the child was treated in a 
psychiatric hospital in the past and was receiving psychiatric treatment at the time of 
the decision, the prolonged conflict between the parents having been one of the factors 
to worsen the child`s condition. 
364 For example 山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）78 頁、善元・前掲（注 261）337 頁、榮春=
綿貫・前掲（注 274）337 頁, also similar 清水・前掲（注 270）325 頁。 
365 For example Sakae and Watanuki (榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274）337 頁) refer to 横浜家
平 8・4・3 (a case where the custodial parent had remarried and the new spouse had 
adopted the children; contact allowed with the older child who would be able to exercise 
contact independently without the cooperation of the custodial parent, but contact 
denied with the younger child. Very critically about this decision (especially about the 
fact that contact with younger child (aged 9 at the time) was denied: 二宮・前掲（注 256）
(“it is the role of court rulings to clarify under which conditions contact should be 
allowed in cases of children [who are not old enough to exercise contact independently, 
where the residential/custodial parent is opposed to contact]. This ruling indicates a 
movement backwards in a time when family court probation officers and other related 
persons are taking pains to secure that [contact] agreements are reached as far as 
possible in the midst of complicated human relations” (p 95)). Yamada （山田美枝子・前
掲（注 271））and Yoshimoto (善元・前掲（注 261）) above refer to 千葉家裁平成 1・8・
14（家月 42・8・68）and 東京高裁平成 2・2・19（家月 42・8・56）(the latter is the decision 
of the appellate court of the former) (child (3 years old, thinks that the younger brother 
of the mother is its real father, residential mother adamantly opposed to contact 
between the child and the non-residential father). 
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pointed out under the subheading “High Level of Conflict between the 
parents” above, however, recently the trend is to urge contact as far as 
possible in such cases, by employing third parties to assist with the handing 
over of the child and/or supervising the contact, or ordering indirect contact. 
Also, there is published case law that has allowed contact with smaller 
children in spite of a high level of conflict between the parents366. 
 
2.4 Past Agreements and (Successful) Exercise of Contact in the Past 
 Yokota et al suggest that whether an agreement concerning contact was 
reached between the parents in the past, and whether any actual contact 
was carried out, is also an important factor that might influence the outcome 
of a contact dispute367. Indisputably, making a decision about future contact 
always involves a certain amount of guessing and predicting, and if there has 
been relatively successful contact between the child and the contact-seeking 
parent in the past, this is proof that future contact might go equally well. As 
Yokota et al point out, in cases where there has been contact in the past 
between the child and the contact-seeking parent, the courts tend to consider 
the outcome of such contact, as it helps, among other things, to determine 
the degree of attachment between the child and the non-custodial parent368. 
Yokota et al point out that case law tends to allow contact in cases where an 
agreement concerning contact was reached between the parents in the past, 
and actual contact has been carried out, as compared to cases where such 
                                                   
366 For example 岡山家審平 2・12・3（家月 43・10・38）(children aged 9 and 8), 名古
屋家審平２・５・３１（家月 42・12・51）(child aged 7), 大阪高決平 4・7・31（家月 45・
7・63）(child aged 3!). 
367 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）7 頁。 
368 For example in 大阪高平 18 年 2 月 3 日（家月 58 巻 11 号 47 頁） the court took into 
consideration that there had been successful contact between the non-custodial mother 
and the children in the past, and that especially the older child strongly wished for 
contact to continue in the future, and although the behavior of the mother towards the 
children during such contact might have at times not matched the ideas about raising 
children held by the custodial father and his new wife, the court judged that it could not 
be said that the welfare of the children was hurt 
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agreement has not been reached and no contact has occurred 369 . 
Nevertheless, this is not considered a deciding factor and, as Yokota et al 
argue, future contact could still be restricted or excluded, even if there was 
successful contact in the past370. 
 
2.5 Some Points of Consideration 
As already pointed out earlier (in “2.2 High Level of Conflict between the 
Parents”), it is important to keep in mind that in much of the case law 
concerning contact, more than one of the above-mentioned factors is present 
in any given case, and it is not always clear how much weight each 
individual factor carried for the court (or, indeed, in what way each 
individual factor was considered to be harmful (or not harmful) for the best 
interests of the child). 
It should also be noted that the various scholars who described tendencies 
in case law, grouped existing cases into two groups according to whether 
contact was “allowed” or “excluded”, and if in the end there were more cases 
in the “allowed” group than in the “excluded” group, the conclusion followed 
that courts tended to allow contact under such or such circumstances. It has, 
however, been pointed out, that especially in earlier years, in some cases 
where the courts deemed contact as such permissible, the frequency and 
length that was deemed permissible, was rather limited (some hours a 
couple of times a year etc)371, which is by some not considered as sufficient in 
order to maintain a close relationship between the child and the 
                                                   
369 Ibid. 
370 Ibid. Here, Yokota et al refer, among others, to case law where the circumstances the 
child is in have changed as a result of the custodial parent remarrying. 
371棚瀬孝雄「両親の離婚と子どもの最善の利益―面会交流紛争と日本の家裁実務」自由と
正義 60(12), 9 頁(2009) (Tanase points out that “even bi-weekly visits are not standard 
in Japanese family courts”, and is critical towards Japanese domestic relations practice 
that does not share he belief (with some Western countries) that “frequent, meaningful, 
and continuing contact” is in the best interest of the child (p 13)), also similar 若林・前掲
（注 221）391 頁 (especially about past case law, allowing contact only 2-3 times a year). 
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non-residential parent372. 
Concerning the most common frequency of contact as allowed/ordered by 
the courts, in some countries, such as Germany, direct contact twice a month 
(usually on the weekends, often including an overnight stay), is considered 
an unwritten rule. In Japan, the norm in cases that have reached the courts 
(but also on the conciliation level) appears to be once a month. For example 
Yokota et al point out, based on the existing body of case law, that in cases 
where there are no problems with the relationship between the non-custodial 
parents and child, where parents have agreed on contact and (relatively 
successful) contact has taken place in the past, the daily circumstances of the 
custodial parent and the child are not unstable, and the child is not 
unwilling to have contact, case law most often tends to deem contact once a 
month as appropriate (and that, in cases where there is a relatively high 
level of animosity between the parents, contact allowed tends to be of lower 
frequency)373. Yokota et al also point out that “once a month” is favored in 
conciliation374. 
 
Summary 
As seen above, the way domestic relations practice has viewed and assessed 
the above-mentioned factors, has changed over time. On the one hand, in 
recent years the courts appear to have adopted a stricter attitude towards 
allowing contact in cases where the contact-seeking parent had been violent 
towards the other parent and/or the child in the past, as a result of the 
adoption of related legislation. On the other hand, there appears to be an 
overall gradual trend from restricting or completely excluding contact in the 
                                                   
372 棚瀬・前掲（注 371）9 頁、若林・前掲（注 221）。 
373 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）10 頁。 
374 See Yokota et al ibid for references to analyses of conciliation records in family 
courts. The same (once a month as the most common frequency for contact) was pointed 
out by Otsuka in 1997 (大塚・前掲（注 224）) based on an analysis of conciliation cases in 
Yokohama Family Court at the time. 
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1970s and 1980s (especially in cases where there was intense conflict and 
animosity between the parent and a high probability of the child being 
caught in a loyalty conflict, but also in cases where the residential custodial 
parent had remarried, as introduced further below), to acknowledging the 
significance of post-separation/divorce contact for the child and consequently 
actively promoting the exercise of contact as far as possible (including, when 
necessary, supervised contact, or indirect contact), except when it was clear 
that, considering all the different circumstances of a particular case there 
was concrete harm from contact for the child. 
Below, in lieu of a summary, I will briefly attempt to provide some general 
context for the above-mentioned gradual change in case law towards 
allowing more contact375. 
Contact in Domestic Relations Practice in the Early 1970s to the Late 1980s  
As already pointed out earlier in this paper, despite a growing number of 
court rulings allowing contact between the non-custodial parent and the 
child following the divorce of the parents during this period, in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s the main-stream attitude among domestic relations 
practitioners in Japan towards allowing contact was rather cautious376. (In 
the 1970s that the work of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit was introduced in 
Japan377; the arguments of Goldstein et al were widely shared among family 
law practitioners in Japan at the time378, and many practitioners as well as 
                                                   
375 Based largely on 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）15 頁以下, who attempt to describe the 
changing attitude towards contact held by Japanese courts, as well as the general public, 
against the general background of social and economic change, and in particular 
changes in the structure of the family, gender roles inside the family etc, but also 
changing views in the field of child and family psychology and psychiatry on the effect of 
divorce on children and the significance of post-divorce contact, from the 1970s onward. 
376 See 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）20 頁以下 etc. 
377 As pointed out by 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）18 頁. Prof. Goldstein, Dr. Freud, and Dr. 
Solnit argued for the protection and prioritizing of the relationship between the child 
and the residential parent (what they called the “psychological parent”), to the extent 
that the residential parent should determine to what extent or whether at all contact 
should take place between the other parent and the child.  
378 See 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）18 頁以下、佐藤千裕・前掲（注 218）213 頁。 
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scholars agreed that the wishes of the residential parent were to be 
understood to coincide with the best interests of the child, and that when the 
non-residential parent opposed contact between the child and the non- 
residential parent, exercising contact would cause conflict between the 
parents which would in turn be harmful to the healthy development of the 
child379. 
However, from around the mid 1980s, some family court probation officers 
started to introduce the work of Wallerstein et al in Japan, which stressed 
the importance of post-separation and post-divorce contact with the 
non-residential parent for the child both in the short and in the long term380. 
Contact in Domestic Relations Practice in the 1990s  The 1990s saw a 
gradual shift away from the formerly reserved and cautious attitude towards 
contact among domestic relations practitioners in Japan. The catalysts for 
this shift are said to be, on the one hand, the 1984 Supreme Court decision 
(which left no doubt concerning the statutory basis of contact in Japanese 
law, and the fact that contact disputes could be adjudicated by family courts), 
the signing and ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(which recognized a “right of the child who is separated from one or both 
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents 
on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests” (§ 9 II), 
and drew the attention of family law practitioners to the significance of 
contact from the child`s point of view), as well as the attempts at a reform of 
Japanese family law in 1996 (introduced earlier) 381 . In addition, the 
introduction and gradual acknowledging of research from abroad, stressing 
the importance of contact with the non-residential parent for the child, 
                                                   
379 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）18 頁以下。 
380 For example 佐藤千裕・前掲（注 218）(introduction of the work of Wallerstein et al pps. 
221 ff)、牛田高文「面接交渉を進めるための指針（ガイドライン）」ケ研 209 号 131 頁（1986
年）。 
381 See 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）24 頁。 
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contributed to an increasing awareness among domestic relations 
practitioners of the potential positive effects of contact for the child382. 
 It is suggested that from the 1990s, family law practitioners were less keen 
to exclude contact simply on the grounds that contact might induce conflict 
between the parents and therefore automatically harm the child. The new 
approach was rather to consider all the various circumstances relevant to a 
specific case in order to reach an appropriate conclusion concerning 
contact383. However, notions concerning the concrete merits and demerits of 
contact varied from judge to judge and conciliation commissioner to 
conciliation commissioners, and, consequently, as pointed out earlier, 
standards for restricting or excluding contact also varied considerably, 
resulting in a rather inconsistent body of case law. 
 It is also during the 1990s that scholars were particularly critical of case 
law, not only the fact that there was no apparent uniform standard for the 
restriction or exclusion of contact and that consequently the case law was 
inconsistent, but also because many scholars criticized the judges of being 
too reserved about allowing contact384. 
                                                   
382 See for example 爪生武・真板彰子「離婚後の親子交流の実情」判夕 925 号 70 頁（1997
年）、永田秋夫ほか「子の監護に関する処分（面接交渉）事件における調査官関与の在り方」
家月 48 巻 4 号 89 頁(1996 年). 
383 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）26 頁, 若林・前掲（注 221）391 頁. Hosoya et al also report 
that it is during the 1990s that first considerable research is done concerning tentative 
contact at the Family Court as a concrete means of promoting and facilitating future 
contact (see 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）26 頁以下 for further references). 
384 See for example 棚村・前掲（注 223）61 頁: critical of an apparent tendency among 
practitioners of easily restricting or denying contact in cases where “it was foreseen that 
contact would unsettle the child emotionally”, for example when the child (as argued by 
the residential parent) did not wish a change of environment, refused contact due to 
feelings of fear or resentment towards the non-custodial parent, the child`s performance 
at school was argued to have fallen due to the emotional stress connected with contact, 
but also cases where the child was not aware of the existence of the non-residential 
biological parent. Also 山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）80 頁 – Yamada argued that for 
scenarios involving remarriage of the custodial parent, contact with very young children, 
and “in particular” sever conflict between the parents, practitioners should more 
actively promote contact. Also similar Yoshimoto about case law up to 2003 （善元・前
掲（注 261）163 頁）。 
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 Contact in Domestic Relations Practice from the 2000s onward  The basic 
approach of the courts to contact disputes continues to be to deliberate what 
is appropriate or reasonable contact in a particular case, considering all the 
specific circumstances of that case. At the same time, there is an increasing 
tendency on the side of the family courts to promote the exercise of contact as 
far as possible (including in cases that were formerly considered as 
inherently problematic from the point of view of the best interests of the 
child, such as intense conflict cases and cases involving small children). On 
the conciliation level, the conciliation commissioners, family court judges 
and family court probation officers are making conscious attempts to actively 
encourage contact by explaining the importance of contact from the child`s 
point of view to the parents, carrying out tentative contact on the premises of 
the court and so forth. When a case moves on to adjudication proceedings, 
the courts are increasingly attempting to secure direct contact by detailing 
the conditions of the exercise of contact, ordering supervised contact in more 
difficult cases, and if direct contact is deemed unsuitable or implausible 
under present circumstances, actively urging indirect contact in order to 
maintain a link between the child and the non-residential/ non-custodial 
parent385. 
One of the reasons behind this is the increasingly accepted understanding 
that contact with the non-residential parent is something inherently 
meaningful or even indispensable for the child386. Indeed, from the 2000s 
onward there are a fair number of court rulings concerning contact that 
declare their premise to be that contact is as a rule necessary for the healthy 
                                                   
385 若林・前掲（注 221）401 頁以下 etc (indirect contact in the form of phone calls, letters, 
or photos and report cards etc sent to the non-custodial parent are understood to serve, 
on the one hand, the purpose of providing the non-custodial parent with a means to 
follow up on the wellbeing and development of the child, and on the other hand, notably, 
the purpose of paving the way to possible future direct contact (see for example 京都家裁
平成 18 年 3 月 31 日審判（家月 58 巻 11 号 62 頁）). 
386 In addition to works already cited, 小田切紀子「子どもから見た面会交流」自由と正
義 60 巻 12 号（2009 年）28 頁以下など。 
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development of the child (providing the child, among other things, with the 
opportunity to experience first-hand the love of both (natural) parents), and 
that therefore contact should only be restricted in exceptional cases where it 
would clearly harm the best interests of the child387. This has led some 
authors to argue that case law is showing a growing tendency to allow 
contact as a rule, unless certain (exceptional) grounds for the 
restriction/exclusion of contact are present388, whereas others criticize such 
an apparent tendency towards a presumption of (the benefits of) contact to 
the child389. 
As further proof of a growing awareness of the importance of 
post-separation/divorce contact between the non-custodial parent and the 
child, it has also been pointed out that, when deciding which parent should 
exercise parental authority or custody, the courts increasingly consider as 
one of the factors whether a parent is positively minded towards contact 
between the child and the other parent390. 
Furthermore, in 2013, the Supreme Court confirmed that if the parents had 
reached an agreement concerning contact during conciliation proceedings (or 
contact had been allowed in an adjudication by the family court) but the 
custodial parent refused to comply with their obligations arising thereof, 
indirect compulsory execution could be ordered (Civil Execution Act § 172, 
Domestic Relations Case Procedure Act § 75 and 268)391. 
Since the 2000s, the importance of the role of organizations supporting the 
practical exercise of contact in cases where the cooperation of the parents in 
                                                   
387 See for example 大阪高判平成 21 年 1 月 16 日（家月 61・11・70）and 大阪高判平成
18 年 2 月 3 日（家月 58・11・47）。 
388 若林・前掲（注 221）401 頁, similar but slightly more moderate 細矢ほか・前掲（注
218）30 頁、75 頁以下。 
389 梶村太市『新家事調停の技法』（日本加除出版、2012 年）203 頁以下、梶村太市『裁判
例からみた面会交流調停・審判の実務』（日本加除出版、2013 年）243 頁以下など。 
390 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）30 頁, see for example 大阪高裁平成 17 年 6 月 22 日決定（家
月 58・4・93）。 
391 最判平成 25・3・28 民集 67 巻 3 号 864 頁。 
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the exercise of contact cannot be expected, is also highlighted392. While a 
number of recent court decisions refer to the option of using the services of 
such organizations 393 , especially in cases where there is considerable 
animosity between the parents which might obstruct the exercise of contact, 
it must nevertheless be borne in mind, that such services are only offered in 
a limited number of big cities394, and, due to a lack of public subsidies, are 
only available to parents who can afford the required fees395. 
 
                                                   
392 See the 2011 survey by Tanamura et al, ordered by the Ministry of Justice, titled 「親
子の面会交流を実現するための制度等に関する調査研究報告書」, accessible at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji07_00100.html (last accessed 21. Nov 2014). 
393 For example 東京家裁平成 18 年 7 月 31 日審判（家月 59 巻 3 号 73 頁）。 
394 For example FPIC in Tokyo and FLC Vi-Project in Osaka. 
395 棚村・前掲（注 392）32 頁、細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）33 頁。 
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III Remarriage of the Residential Parent and Contact between the Child and the 
Non-Residential Parent 
1 Overview 
Remarriage of the residential/ custodial parent and/or the subsequent 
adoption of the child or children by the new spouse of the residential/ 
custodial parent has been highlighted by practitioners and scholars as 
possible grounds for the restriction or complete exclusion of contact between 
the child and the non-residential (legal) parent. In such cases, the residential 
(legal) parent often refuses contact between the non-residential parent and 
the child, claiming that contact with the non-residential parent should not be 
allowed as such contact would endanger the stability of the new household 
and potentially confuse the child396. 
To date, there are few published rulings of Japanese courts concerning 
contact between the non-residential legal parent and a child living in a 
household with the residential legal parent and the new spouse (including 
common law spouse) of that parent. The relevant rulings published until now 
are ① adjudication of Tokyo Family Court of 14 Dec. 1964397, ② decision of 
Tokyo High Court of 8 Dec. 1965 (the appellate court of ① ) 398 , ③ 
adjudication of Osaka Family Court of 28 May 1968399, ④ adjudication of 
Ooita Family Court (Nakatsu branch) of 22 July 1976400 (the child was 
adopted by the older sister of the father who had parental authority, and the 
sister`s husband, the non-residential mother petitioned for contact), ⑤ 
adjudication of Tokyo Family Court of 31 March 1987401 (step-father is the 
common law spouse of the custodial mother), ⑥ adjudication of Yokohama 
                                                   
396細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）81 頁。 
397家月 17 巻 4 号 55 頁。 
398家月 18 巻 7 号 31 頁。 
399家月 20 巻 10 号 68 頁。 
400家月 29 巻 2 号 108 頁。 
401家月 39 巻 6 号 58 頁。 
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Family Court of 30 April 1996402, ⑦ adjudication of Kyoto Family Court of 
24 Aug. 2005403, ⑧ decision of Osaka High Court of 3 Feb. 2006404 (the 
appelate court of ⑦), ⑨ adjudication of Kyoto Family Court of 31 March 
2006405.406 
Of these 9 rulings, contact between the non-residential legal parent and the 
child(ren) concerned was allowed in rulings ① (subsequently overruled by 
② (contact denied)), ⑤、⑥, and ⑦ and ⑧ (decision of the appellate court 
of ⑦)407. It should, however, be noted that ⑦ was decided by the Family 
Court before the formal marriage of the custodial father (although the future 
spouse was already living in the same household as the father and his 
children from the previous marriage, and this fact was noted by the court), 
and that in the same case Osaka High Court in ⑧ subsequently restricted 
the scope of contact that had been allowed by the court of the first instance408. 
It is also noteworthy that in ⑥ the court allowed contact between the father 
and the elder of the two children (13 years old at the time of the decision), 
but denied contact with the younger child (at the time 9 years old). 
Furthermore, even though contact was allowed in rulings ⑤ and ⑥, the 
scope of such contact could be considered rather meager, namely once a year 
                                                   
402家月 49 巻 3 号 75 頁。 
403家月 58 巻 11 号 56 頁。 
404家月 58 巻 11 号 47 頁。 
405家月 58 巻 11 号 62 頁。 
406 There is also横浜家裁相模原支部平18年3月9日（家月58・11・71）, where the custodial 
parent had remarried, but this fact does not appear to have been considered as relevant 
by the parties and appears not to have been considered by the court either. 
407 The court in ruling ⑨ deemed both direct contact in the form of face-to-face 
meetings, as well as contact via phone calls and exchange of letters inappropriate, but 
ordered the residential mother and her spouse (who had adopted the child) to send the 
non-residential legal father 2 pictures of the child per years, together with copies of the 
child`s report cards. 
408 The court of the first instance had allowed monthly direct contact of the length of 
several hours in a single day as well as contact including overnight stay twice a year. 
Osaka High Court, taking into consideration that the circumstances had changed as the 
father had married his common-law spouse and the latter had adopted the children of 
the father, did not deem contact including over-night stay as appropriate. 
134 
 
in ⑥409 and twice a year in ⑤ (as noted under subheading “Some Points of 
Consideration”, the most common frequency for the exercise of contact, at 
least by the 1990s, and still during the 2000s, was once a month). Rulings ⑦ 
and ⑧ were the first published decisions to allow for more frequent contact 
in the remarriage-adoption scenario, namely (direct) contact once a month. 
As there are so few published decisions, it is difficult to outline any general 
tendencies, but based on the few published rulings, authors have deduced 
that until the mid 2000s, the courts tended to deny contact in cases where 
the custodial parent had remarried and/or the new spouse had adopted the 
children, except in cases involving older children (such as ruling ⑥ - contact 
allowed with the 13-year-old (older child of the two) on the grounds that the 
child was old enough to exercise contact independently without any 
involvement on the side of the custodial parent, but contact denied with the 
9-year-old younger sister on the grounds that, in the case of a child of such 
young age, the cooperation of the custodial parent would be necessary for the 
actual carrying out of contact, but that in the case at hand, the opposition of 
the custodial parent to contact was of such a degree that no cooperation could 
be expected), or scenarios like in the case of ruling ⑤, where the child was of 
mixed origins, leading the court to judge that contact with the non-Japanese 
parent was necessary for such a child410. 
In rulings from the 1960s and 1970s (②，③、④), the courts judged that, 
considering that the child in question was living under the care of the 
residential legal parent and the step-parent, has (potentially by this stage 
already) “adapted well to his/her present family life” or is otherwise 
contented with its present situation (②、③), or, indeed, has been led to 
                                                   
409 Indeed, in this case the non-residential contact-seeking father petitioned for contact 
once a year, consequently the court most likely did not deem it necessary to allow more 
contact than had originally been petitioned for. 
410山田美枝子・前掲（注 271）77 頁、善元・前掲（注 261）164 頁、榮春=綿貫・前掲（注
274）337 頁。 
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believe that the new spouse of the custodial/ residential parent (or parents in 
the case of ruling ④ ) is its natural parent (② , ④ ), contact with the 
non-residential legal parent would “throw the child`s peaceful family life into 
turmoil”, “wound the child`s innocent young heart” and consequently 
“hamper its healthy mental development” (②、④). Hence, the non-residential 
legal parent was instructed by the courts to respect the parental authority 
and custody of the residential legal parent (as well as, where applicable, the 
new spouse), avoid meeting the child and follow its development “from the 
shadows” (②、③、④). 
Also in ruling ⑥  (from 1996), the court stated that, following the 
remarriage of the custodial parent, it was “understandable” that the 
residential parent wanted to avoid contact between the non-residential 
parent and the child, and that considering that since the new spouse had 
adopted the children “new parent-child relationships have been formed, and 
the children appear to be leading stable lives, it cannot be affirmed that 
contact with [the non-residential legal parent] against the wishes of the 
[residential parent] because the legal father (実父) wishes to ascertain that 
the children are growing up without problems, is indispensable for the 
welfare of the children.” 
In case law until the mid 2000s, the courts appear to have put much weight 
on the fact that the remarriage/adoption cases often involved heightened 
animosity between the residential legal parent and the non-residential legal 
parent, as well as unbending unwillingness of the residential legal parent to 
allow contact (see especially ruling ⑥ 411 ). As introduced above under 
sub-heading “High Level of Conflict between the Parents”, in cases involving 
intense animosity and conflict between parents (irrespective of whether such 
conflict was potentially a result of the remarriage of the custodial parent), 
                                                   
411 評釈：二宮周平「子の年齢、心身の成長状況と面接交渉の可否(平成 8.4.30 横浜家審判)」
判タ 940 号 95 頁（1997）、山田美枝子「面接交渉事件における子の福祉の判断例（平成 8.4.30
横浜家審判，平成 9.1.29 名古屋高決）」民商 120-1, p 154 (1999)。 
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courts (especially in earlier years) tended to restrict contact. 
In addition, a lot of the case law (especially earlier rulings but also ruling 
⑨) and some authors also refer to the need to protect “the stability of the 
new household” (that from the point of view of the best interest of the child 
the stability of the new family should be prioritized over contact with the 
non-residential legal parent)412. As it became more and more widely accepted 
among family law practitioners that contact with the non-residential parent 
was beneficial for the child both in the short and the long run, it was 
increasingly argued that an appropriate balance should be sought between 
“the stability of the new household” and the maintaining of contact with the 
external legal parent413. In this sense, rulings ⑦ and ⑧ were considered as 
“clearly different” from older case law414. In ruling ⑧, Oosaka High Court 
stated that “contact between the non-custodial parent and the child is 
essentially beneficial to the healthy development of the child, and therefore 
it should, as a rule, be allowed, except in cases where there is a threat that 
the child`s welfare will be harmed through contact”415. 
At present, many scholars and practitioners agree that contact should not 
automatically be restricted or excluded simply on the grounds that the 
residential parent has remarried. Rather, it is argued, all circumstances 
relevant to a particular case (such as the age and stage of development of the 
child, to what extent the child is aware of the non-residential parent, past 
                                                   
412 For example Otsuka speaks of “the right of the child to build a new family” (as 
colliding with “the right of the biological parent to contact with the child”), and contact 
with the non-residential biological parent as something negative that will unsettle the 
new household the child is living in. He also argues that in some cases a child might 
grow up without problems in a scenario where it has more than two parents, but that in 
such circumstances it is also likely that the child`s welfare will be hurt (大塚・前掲（注
224）259 頁), also 北野・前掲（注 241）263 頁). But also more recently 岡部・三谷『実務家
族法講座』民事法研究会（2006）207 頁。 
413 善元・前掲（注 261）165 頁、棚村・前掲（注 227）16 頁、又は 83 頁以下。 
414中村恵「再婚家庭の中で暮らす子と非監護権者との面接交渉」法セ増刊（速報判例解説
Vol. 1）119 頁（2007）, 122 頁。 
415 家月 58 巻 11 号 47 頁（51 頁）。 
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contact or the lack thereof with the non-residential parent, and the 
particulars of the relationship of the child with the new spouse of the 
residential parent) should be considered, in order to determine the concrete 
effect contact would have on that particular child416. 
Interpretation(s) by the Courts as to What is Harmful to the Best Interests 
of a Child in the Remarriage/Adoption Scenario   Interestingly, although 
the majority of the Japanese case law (as well as a lot of the literature, see 
also further below) see contact between the non-residential parent and the 
child as potentially harmful to the child, there is some variation as to the 
interpretation of what constitutes concrete harm to the child in this scenario. 
Concrete harm to the child living in a step-family from contact with the 
external natural parent is argued to originate, for example, from the 
following: (1) emotional unsettling of the child (especially a small child) 
through contact in the early (fragile) stage of the establishing of the new 
(step-)family, as the new household and the new parent-child relationship 
have not stabilized yet (ruling ⑨, also ⑧) 417; (2) emotional unsettling of the 
child (especially a small child) through contact in later stages of the 
                                                   
416 細矢ほか・前掲（注 218）81 頁, similar 榮春=綿貫・前掲（注 274） (but somewhat 
cautious about contact in the remarriage/adoption cases): all relevant circumstances 
should be considered and in cases where there is “minimal effect on the custody of the 
child etc”, contact could be allowed (337 頁). 
417 Ruling ⑨: (in this particular case, official adoption had taken place just a few days 
before the adjudication of the family court concerning contact, however, the step-mother 
had lived in the same household as the child for the past year and a half) the court 
judged that “it cannot be said that the emotional bond between the child and [the 
step-mother] is yet as strong as that between a legal mother and her child (実親子). In 
such circumstances, it is inevitable that at present, in order to avoid disturbing the care 
environment of [the child], contact between [the non-residential legal mother] and the 
child should be restricted.” Consequently, the court denied any direct contact between 
the child and the non-residential legal mother, as well as contact via the phone and any 
exchange of letters. The residential father was ordered to send the non-residential legal 
mother 2 photos of the child once a year, together with copies of the child`s report cards. 
Also the court in ruling ⑧, which allowed rather generous contact in the end, argued 
that as the new household was still in the process of establishing itself, it was necessary 
to refrain from over-night visits at the non-residential parent`s house in order to avoid 
harm to the emotional and psychological stability of the children concerned. 
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establishing of the step-family, because the new household and parent-child 
relationships have already stabilized (and the child is “leading a peaceful 
life” in the new family) (rulings ②, ③、④、⑥); (3) the child is possibly not 
aware that one (or both) of the grown-ups that are living with him/her is not 
his/her biological parent (as in the case of ruling ④, but also ①／②418), and 
the sudden appearance of a “second mother” or “second father” would 
unsettle the child and “hamper its healthy mental development”. 
Concerning (1) above, this argument also appears in literature419, and is 
based on the understanding that in an early stage of the forming of the 
step-family, where sufficient stability in the new household has not yet been 
reached, contact with the non-residential legal parent could unsettle and 
possibly break up the new household and consequently harm the child420.  
Concerning (2) above, this logic appears especially in older case law, which 
tended to argue that the non-residential legal parent should not unsettle the 
child by insisting on contact, considering that the child had already 
experienced the unfortunate circumstances of the parents` divorce, but had 
been given a new opportunity to grow up in a “complete” family, had 
managed to adapt to the new family, and was now leading a peaceful life in 
this new family. 
Concerning (3) above, Japanese case law reveals varying attitudes among 
                                                   
418 These do not appear to be isolated cases. Yokota et al (2009) also point out, for 
example, that in domestic relations practice it is not rare to come across a case where 
the custodial parent has told the child that the other natural parent has passed away 
(横田ほか・前掲（注 221）8 頁). 
419 早野俊明「ステップファミリーにおける面接交渉」『家族と法の地平―三木妙子・磯野誠
一・石川稔先生献呈論文集』160 頁（2009 年）（182 頁, 184 頁以下）、横田ほか・前掲（注
221）8 頁。 
420 Hayano (ibid) consequently suggests that there should be no direct contact between 
the child and the non-residential parent for the first couple of years from the 
establishment of the new household. Hayano also suggests other indicators: whether 
both spouses have children from their previous relationships, or only one of the spouses, 
and in cases where the new spouse of the custodial parent has no previous children, 
whether it is a step-mother or a step-father (the former considered more problematic) (p. 
184). 
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judges concerning what is in the best interests of (or, reversely, what is 
harmful for) a child who would be confronted with their biological parentage 
(which he or she was previously not aware of) through contact. Rulings ①／
② are concerned with contact between a child living in a step-family and its 
non-residential legal parent, where the child had been told by its residential 
father that the new spouse of the father is in fact its “real mother” and that 
the previous spouse of the residential parent (the biological mother) was only 
taking care of the child until now due to some special circumstances. In the 
case of ruling ④ , referred to above, the non-residential legal mother 
petitioned for contact with a child who had been adopted by its paternal aunt 
and uncle (the father had been appointed as parent with parental authority 
at the time of the divorce of the parents) at a very young age and believed the 
adoptive parents to be its biological parents. In ruling ①、Tokyo Family 
Court argued as follows: (concerning the fact that the residential father had 
told the child that the new spouse of the father was the child`s “real mother”) 
“leaving aside the question of the propriety of [the father] telling [the child] 
such things, it is, for one, doubtful that [the child], who was living with [the 
non-residential mother] until (s)he was 6 years old, really believes [the 
father]`s explanations to be the truth; and even supposing that (s)he does 
believe [the father]`s story to be true and as a result feels somewhat agitated 
at the prospect of having contact with [the non-residential mother], when 
taking into consideration [among other things the fact that [the child] was 
reluctant to be handed over to [the father] and after weighing [the negative 
effects of such possible agitation] against the benefits to [the child] from 
contact with [the mother], it does not follow as a matter of course that the 
welfare of [the child] will be harmed through contact.” In ruling ② (the 
ruling of the appellate court of ①), the court did not refer to the fact that the 
child had been told that the step-mother was its biological mother, but stated 
that “despite the unfortunate circumstance of his/her parents` divorce, [the 
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child] has, as a result of the efforts made by [the father] and his wife /../, 
adapted well to his/her present family life and is leading a peaceful life. If 
under these circumstances [the child] would be faced (面会 ) with [the 
non-residential/ non-custodial mother] as his/her mother, [the child] would, 
as is rightfully feared by [the father], be dragged into the conflict between 
[the father], [the mother] and [the step-mother], and there is a very real risk 
that [the child]`s peaceful family life would be thrown into turmoil, his/her 
innocent child`s heart would be wounded, and his/her healthy mental 
development hampered.” Consequently, ruling ②  denied any contact. 
Ruling ④ is almost identical to ruling ② in its reasoning, stating that if 
the child who believed the aunt and uncle to be her biological parents and 
was understood to lead a peaceful life under their care, were to have contact 
with the contact-seeking non-residential/ non-custodial mother, the child`s 
“innocent child`s heart would not only be wounded, but there is a very high 
risk that her healthy mental development would be hampered and her 
peaceful family life with [the adoptive parents] would be thrown into 
turmoil.” On the other hand, in other instances, Japanese courts have stated 
the importance of the child knowing of and having contact with the 
non-residential parent421. 
                                                   
421 See the 14 Aug 1989 ruling of Chiba Family Court (家月 42・8・68) (the child (3 years 
old at the time of the rulings) believed that the younger brother of the residential 
mother, who sometimes visited the child and the mother, was its father, the mother was 
adamantly opposed to any contact.) Chiba Family Court stated that the child in this 
case found itself in “extremely abnormal circumstances”, and argued that although the 
mother claimed that contact with the non-residential father would unsettle the child 
emotionally, “such claims were based on [the mother`s] emotional and one-sided views, 
and, taking into consideration the fact that [the mother`s] younger brother could under 
no circumstances become [the child`s] father, as well as the age of [the child], it should 
be said that in fact the welfare of the child would be served by arranging direct contact 
(面接) between [the child] and [the non-residential father] as soon as possible and 
letting [the child] know that [the contact-seeking father] was his real father (真実の父)”. 
Consequently, the Court ordered contact twice a month of the length of at least 3 hours. 
(Tokyo High Court (ruling of 10. Feb 1990 (家月 42・8・56)) revoked the decision and sent 
it back to the first instance, arguing that considering the age of the child, the virtual 
lack of any previous contact, the mutual distrust between the parents, the adamant 
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Changes in Japanese Society and Contact with a Child Living in a 
Step-Family  It has been pointed out in literature that second and third 
marriages of people with under-age children are no longer a rarity in 
Japanese society422, and that the formerly dominant understanding that in 
such cases no contact with the non-residential non-custodial parent is 
desirable, is increasingly considered unacceptable423. It has also been argued 
in the context of the remarriage-adoption scenario, that the child is perfectly 
capable of maintaining a relationship with the non-residential parent 
alongside relationships with a residential parent or parents (biological or 
adoptive) exercising custody424. 
                                                                                                                                                     
opposition of the mother to contact, stated that although it was understandable that the 
non-residential father wished to rectify the present situation and make the child aware 
of its father, at present contact would have “a vastly harmful effect on the emotional 
stability of the child and it is highly likely that the welfare of the child would be 
harmed”.) 
422 There are no clear statistics as to the number of step-families or children being 
raised in step-families in Japan. The statistics do indicate that one in every 4 marriages 
is a remarriage for at least one of the spouses (according to the Vital Statistics (人口動態
統計) on the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare for 2013 (retrieved from 
http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001127023), out of all the marriages 
entered into in Japan in 2013 (total number: 660.613), 173.569, or 26.3 % were 
remarriages (remarriage for both husband and wife: 62.138 cases or 9.4 % of all 
marriages; remarriage for husband but first marriage for wife: 64.772 cases or 9.8 % of 
all marriages; remarriage for wife but first marriage for husband: 46.659 cases or 7.1 % 
of all marriages). Considering the large number of second or third marriage, it is 
estimated that the number of children living in a step-family is also growing (早野・前掲
（注 419）161 頁 and others). 
423山田美智子(FPIC)「父母の再婚と面会交流」戸時 685 号（2012 年）79 頁以下。 
424 二宮・前掲（注 255）127 頁、also 山田亮子「面接交渉の取り決めについて」「季刊教
育法」153 号（2007 年）72 頁、75 頁 about simultaneous “biological parent-child 
relationships”, “legal parent-child relationship etc”. In response to a growing need, in 
recent years a number of books offering information and advice to parents and children 
living in a step-family, have been published in Japan. Two examples of such book are 沢
慎司、茨城尚子、早野俊明、SAJ 編著『Q&A ステップファミリーの基礎知識―子連れ再
婚家族と支援者のために』（明石書店、2006 年） and  新川てるえ「子連れ離婚を考えた
ときに読む本」（日本実業出版社、2006 年）. The former stresses the significance of the 
relationship between the child and the non-residential parent, and advises residential 
parents and step-parents to not obstruct contact between the child and the external 
parent, but rather to support and urge such contact (p. 155-157, 206 etc). The book also 
advises the adults to make the child aware of the non-residential parent`s presence as 
early as possible (p. 178-179), and stresses that the more parents caring for a child, the 
better (p. 155-156). 
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On the other hand, some take a more cautious stand towards contact in the 
remarriage/adoption scenario. For example Yokota et al argue that although 
step-families are no longer a rarity in Japan, and although there are cases 
where contact between the non-residential legal parent and the child is 
exercised without any problems, there are still many instances where the 
emotional conflict between the residential and non-residential (legal) 
parents is intense (and hence the situation poses a viable risk to the best 
interests of the child)425. Yokota et al also point out that in recent years 
Japanese translations of picture books, mostly from the US, depicting 
step-families and contact between the child and an external parent in a 
positive light (embracing having “two homes” and “two mothers/fathers”), 
have been published, but they express doubts concerning whether such 
attitudes towards step-families can be accepted in Japanese society without 
reservation (although allowing that attitudes in Japan towards contact with 
children living in a step-family are gradually changing)426. 
Summary: The general stance of the courts towards contact in cases where 
the residential parent has remarried and/or the new spouse has adopted the 
children, should be said to be rather cautious. With the exception of rulings 
⑦ and ⑧ above, contact (especially direct contact) in such cases has either 
been excluded or limited to a couple of times a year. There appears to be 
some variation from judge to judge concerning the interpretation of what 
constitutes concrete harm to the child from contact in the 
remarriage/adoption scenario, and the significance of contact with the 
                                                   
425 横田ほか・前掲（注 221）8 頁. Yokota et al (speaking from their experience as 
practitioners) point out several factors that can heighten the conflict between the 
grown-ups in cases where the custodial parent has remarried: on the one hand, they 
point out, it is not entirely uncommon for the residential parent to tell the children that 
the other parent has passed away, and on the other hand, there are many 
non-residential/ non-custodial parents who are adamant about contact, as they want to 
ascertain the well-being of the children, partly as a result of reports in mass media 
involving child abuse by step-parents. 
426 Ibid. 
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external parent. Similarly, opinions among scholars appear to differ. 
 
2 Step-Child Adoption in Japanese Law 
Japanese case law concerning contact between a child living in a 
step-family and the non-residential legal parent includes cases where the 
new spouse of the parent who exercises parental authority has adopted the 
child of their spouse. Below I will briefly introduce the relevant statutory law, 
as well as debate among scholars concerning step-child adoption and the 
legal position of the step-parent. 
Japanese law allows step-child adoption. Japanese law knows two types of 
adoption, the so-called “regular adoption” ((普通 )養子縁組 ) and special 
adoption (特別養子縁組). In principle, in the case of a step-child adoption, 
both types of adoption are possible427, however, the requirements/conditions 
for a special adoption are stricter, and the legal consequences differ 
somewhat. Japanese case law and scholarly opinion tend to deem special 
adoption by step-parent inappropriate in most cases428, and, possibly as a 
                                                   
427 Indeed, § 817-3 II and proviso to § 817-9 specifically refer to special adoption of the 
child of the other spouse. 
428 Practitioners and legal scholars are generally unwilling to allow special adoption of 
stepchild by a step-parent (as pointed out by 栗林佳代「継親子関係をめぐる諸問題」（社
会的親子特集）法時 86 巻 6 号 40 頁（2014）（41 頁）、早野俊明「日本におけるステップフ
ァミリ （ー子連れ再婚家族）の法規制」憲法論叢 13 号 57 頁（2006 年）（65 頁）). It is argued 
that in the case of step-parent adoption the conditions stipulated in § 817-7 (“A ruling of 
special adoption shall only be made if both parent of a person to be adopted are 
incapable or unfit to care for the child or there are any other special circumstances, and 
it is found that the special adoption is especially necessary for the interests of the child”) 
are not met, as the custodial spouse of the step-parent is caring for the child (ibid). Some 
also caution against allowing special adoption by a step-parent by pointing out that 
special adoption can only be dissolved under very strict conditions (817-10) (中川良延 
in 中川善之助＝山畠正男編『新版注釈民法（24）親族（4）』（有斐閣、1994 年）352 頁). On 
the other hand, there is debate concerning the interpretation of “special circumstances” 
in § 817-7, with some arguing for a looser interpretation in the case of step-child 
adoptions (see 床谷文雄「嫡出否認をした『継子』を特別養子とする申立てを認容した事
例」判タ 949 号 78 頁、79 頁、中川高男「特別養子縁組申立人夫婦の一方の非嫡出の子と
の民法八一七条の七にいう特別の事情」リマークス 1998〈上〉78 頁など。For case law, see 
名古屋高決昭和 63 年 12 月 9 日（家月 41・1・121）(adoption not allowed), see also 東京
高裁決平成 8 年 11 月 20 日（家月 49・5・78）（嫡出否認した子, special adoption allowed, 
144 
 
consequence of this, step-families tend to opt for regular adoption. Hence, 
below I will concentrate on this type of adoption in the context of 
step-families. 
Although step-child adoptions are not uncommon in Japan429, the law 
concerning step-child adoptions has been the target of some criticism from 
scholars. The legislator has sought to simplify adoption by a step-parent by 
waiving the permission of the family court in cases where the child to be 
adopted is “a lineal descendant of either the adoptive parent or the adoptive 
parent`s spouse” (proviso to § 798); the permission of the family court is, as a 
rule, required for the (regular) adoption of a minor (§ 798)). Some authors 
argue that, in order to guarantee that the interests of the child are protected, 
the permission of the family court should be required for all adoptions of 
minors, including those by step-parents430。In addition, the consent of the 
external parent who does not have parental custody in relation to the child, 
is not required in the case of a regular adoption (§ 797 I)431. This means that 
it is relatively easy for the spouse of the parent with parental authority to 
adopt his/her step-child without the non-residential legal parent even 
knowing about the adoption432. It has been argued by some scholars that the 
consent of the non-residential (legal) parent who does not have parental 
                                                                                                                                                     
see also 原審の千葉家審判平成 8 年 3 月 5 日）); 名古屋高決平成 15 年 11 月 14 日（家月
56・5・143）(special adoption deemed permissible in a case where the step-parent wished 
to adopt a child of their spouse, in whose case there was no legal parent-child 
relationship between the child and its father). 
429 Suzuki (2008) p 471 points to the high ratio of step-child adoptions among adoptions 
of minors as a point of similarity between Japan and Germany. 
430中川良延 in 中川善之助＝山畠正男編『新版注釈民法（24）親族（4）』（有斐閣、1994）
248 頁、山本正憲『先例判例 養子法』（日本加除出版、1996 年）73 頁. 
431 In case of a special adoption: § 817-6: A ruling of special adoption shall only be made 
if both parents of the person to be adopted give his/her consent to the special adoption, 
provided that this shall not apply in cases where the parents are incapable of indicating 
their intention or the parents have abused the child, abandoned the child without 
reasonable cause, or there is any other cause of grave harm to the best interests of the 
child. 
432 And this, in fact, happens rather frequently, as pointed out by 鈴木博人「ドイツの養
子法―福祉型養子お連れ子養子を中心にー」民商 138-4・5-64（2008 年）492 頁。 
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authority should also be required in case of a regular adoption433. 
As a result of adoption (both regular adoption and special adoption), a legal 
parent-child relationship will be established between the child and the 
spouse of the parent who had sole parental authority before the adoption (§ 
809)434. Consequently the spouse of the parent with parental authority, who 
has adopted the child, will have joint parental authority over the child 
together with their spouse (§ 818 II)435. A significant difference between 
regular adoption and special adoption in Japanese law (and also step-child 
adoption in Germany and in Japan) is that, whereas in the case of special 
adoption the (legal) relationship between the child and the legal 
non-residential parent who does not have parental authority in relation to 
the child (as well as the relatives of that parent) is dissolved (§ 817-9), this is 
not the case with regular adoption, where the child retains a legal 
parent-child relationship with the non-residential parent. This means, for 
example, that that parent can still apply for contact with the child (as is 
apparent from the case-law referred to earlier). 
To summarize, on the one hand, the new spouse of the custodial parent can 
adopt the child without the consent (and, indeed, without the knowledge) of 
the non-residential legal parent, but on the other hand, the legal 
parent-child relationship between the non-residential parent and the child 
will be retained, and consequently the non-residential (legal) parent can still 
apply for contact with the child (however, as introduced above, case law 
tends to in fact restrict or exclude the actual exercise of contact in such 
cases). 
                                                   
433石川稔「監護権者または非監護権者たる父母の同意を得ない代諾養子縁組の効力」沼邊
愛一＝太田武男＝久貴忠彦編『家事審判事件の研究（１）』（一粒社、1988 年）216 頁、223
頁。 
434 § 809  An adopted child acquires the status of a child in wedlock of his/her adoptive 
parent(s) from the time of adoption. 
435 § 818 II  If a child is an adopted child, he/she shall be subject to the parental 
authority of his/her adoptive parents. 
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3 The Legal Position of the Step-Parent in Japanese Law 
From the point of view of the law, at present, adoption is the only means to 
establish a legal parent-child relationship between the child and the 
step-parent with all its legal effects, especially parental authority and 
custody, obligation to support (扶養義務 in § 877 I) and rights concerning 
inheritance. Without undergoing adoption, a step-child and step-parent are 
related by affinity in the first degree (§ 725, § 726), which means that they 
only have a mutual obligation to “help each other” as “relatives who live 
together” according to § 730, and, only under “special circumstances” a duty 
to support (§ 877 II). Although the step-parent will, in reality, care for the 
step-child much in the same way as a custodial parent, there is no legal basis 
for this exercise of care in Japanese law at present. In addition, following the 
divorce of the custodial parent and the step-parent, case law has denied 
contact between the child and step-parent (東京家審昭和 49 年 11 月 15 日（家
月 25・10・61）). 
Especially in recent years there has been increasing debate among scholars 
concerning the legal standing of a step-parent, combined with criticism 
towards the current regulation of step-child adoption436. So far, no legislative 
action has been taken. 
 
                                                   
436 大村敦志「『再構成家族』に関する一考察」民研 500 巻（1998 年）34 頁以下、早野俊
明「日本におけるステップファミリー（子連れ再婚家族）の法規制」憲法論叢 13 号（2006
年）57 頁以下、鈴木博人・前掲（注 432）470 頁以下(comparing Japanese and German law, 
pointing out similar problems concerning step-child adoption in Germany and Japan)、
栗林佳代「継親子関係をめぐる諸問題」（社会的親子特集）法時 86 巻 6 号 40 頁以下（2014）
(specifically about obligation to support and exercise of parental authority by the 
step-parent, as well as contact with step-child following divorce (comparison with 
French law), copious further references), etc. 
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Final Summary and Conclusion 
German and Japanese legal systems have answered very differently the 
questions I posed in the introduction to this thesis, concerning the general 
significance of a continued personal relationship between a child and its 
non-residential parent, concerning what is to be understood to be in best 
interests of the child, concerning the (legal) standing of a step-parent in 
relation to their step-child, and so forth. The scenario of the remarriage of 
the residential parent provides interesting insights into all these questions. 
It can be concluded that German statutory and case law stress the 
importance of a continued personal relationship via contact between a child 
and its non-residential parent for the child, while also not downplaying the 
importance of the step-parent and the new step-household for the child; 
Japanese law clearly prioritizes the new household over the relationship of 
the child with the non-residential legal parent. 
 
Contact between a Child Living in a Step-Family and the Non-Residential 
Parent 
As introduced in Chapter I, Japanese case law concerning contact between 
a child living in a step-family and its non-residential parent tends to restrict 
or completely exclude contact between the child and the non-residential 
parent in cases where the child in question is living in a step-family. 
Especially older case law has justified the exclusion of the non-residential 
parent by arguing that the non-residential parent should not upset and 
confuse a child who is living in an otherwise happy, stable and wholesome 
new household, by insisting on contact. 
In German case law, on the other hand, (as introduced in Chapter II) since 
at least the end of the 1990s, contact between the child and the external 
parent is generally allowed in cases where the child lives in a step-family. It 
is noteworthy that as recently as the 1980s, there was a tendency to restrict 
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contact in such a scenario, prioritizing the uninterrupted integration of the 
child into the new household and the relationship between the child and the 
“new” parent. 
The change in German case law, and the current tendency of German courts 
to allow contact in the step-family scenario, is possibly due to the following: 
(a) The strong position of the non-residential parent seeking contact. In 
Germany, a parent`s right to contact is a constitutional right based on § 6 II 
GG. In addition, it is noteworthy that a row of higher court decisions and 
reforms of statutory law have strengthened the rights of the non-marital 
father in relation to their child, which has in turn been argued by some to 
have contributed to the tendency of the courts allowing more contact for 
non-residential parents in general. However, as already noted earlier, the 
fact alone that the parent`s right to contact is a constitutionally protected 
strong right, does not convincingly explain the change in case law concerning 
contact between a non-residential parent and a child living in a step-family, 
as the understanding that a parent`s right to contact is derived from the 
parental rights stipulated in § 6 II GG was already generally accepted by the 
1980s (the period where the earlier case law introduced in this thesis 
originates from). In conjunction with the strong position of the 
contact-seeking parent, it is also important to note that the residential 
parent has an obligation to, not only not obstruct contact, but to actively 
promote it (§ 1684 II). 
(b) As introduced in Chapter 1 of this paper, the general backdrop to the 
change in case law concerning contact between a child living in a step-family 
and the non-residential parent, from restricting contact to promoting contact, 
is a gradually increasing tendency in case law and scholarly literature, 
concerning contact as a whole, to promote contact, based on the 
understanding that contact is generally in the best interests of the child and 
its development. This understanding was also introduced into statutory law 
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in the form of § 1626 III S.1., and paved the way to the recognition of a 
child`s own statutory right to contact in Art 1684 I Hs. 1. Although there has 
never been absolute unity in Germany among legal scholars, as well as 
experts from other fields, as to the extent to which contact should be 
promoted by the courts, it is currently generally accepted among scholars 
and practitioners that § 1626 III S.1 (which states that the best interests of 
the child as a general rule include contact with both parents) is, as a general 
rule, justified. Hence, there is a common starting point for any deliberation 
of contact, in the form of a common assumption concerning its basic 
significance for the child. As is apparent from the case law introduced in this 
paper, the step-family scenario is not considered to be an exception to this 
general rule. 
 Indeed, although the standard for the restriction or exclusion of contact in a 
particular case is the elusive “best interests of the child”, a notoriously vague 
standard, German statutory law provides a concrete hint, in the form of § 
1626 III S. 1, for the interpretation of what is to be understood to be in the 
best interests of the child in the context of contact between a child and its 
non-residential parent. 
While (a) and (b) above are not restricted to the remarriage-scenario, but 
apply in the case of contact in general, the following could additionally be 
argued to be the reasons behind the tendency of German case law to allow 
contact in particular in cases where the child lives in a step-family. 
(c) Changing perceptions concerning step-families and “parents”. As 
introduced in Chapter 1, older case law in Germany was quick to agree to the 
claims of residential parents that contact with the non-residential parent 
would confuse the child and hinder its smooth integration into the new 
family, arguments, which are no longer considered valid by German courts. 
Both judges and scholars have become increasingly aware that step families 
are “often not unproblematic” (an understanding backed by findings in social 
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sciences as well as statistics concerning divorce rates of second and third 
marriages), as in the process of forming a step-family, the members of a 
step-family face a myriad of problems specific to this particular type of family, 
with both the adults and the children often finding themselves overwhelmed. 
Taking the above into account, German judges and scholars recognize that in 
reality, a step-family might not turn out to be as “ideal”, or as close to a 
(harmonious) first-marriage nuclear family, as the parties had initially 
hoped, meaning that the bond between the non-residential parent and the 
child might possibly turn out more lasting than that between the child and a 
step-parent, consequently rendering the exclusion of contact between the 
non-residential parent and the child “in favor of” an undisturbed integration 
of the child into the new household and the stabilizing of the relationship 
between the child and the step-parent considerably less justified. 
The case law introduced in Chapter 1 II also illustrates a change in the 
perception of the functions and roles of the various parent-figures in the 
child`s life. In cases concerning a child living in a step-family and that child 
maintaining personal contact to an external parent, German courts do not 
insist on “one-father-and-one-mother-per-child”. It is understood that both 
the step-parent and the non-residential parent, in their different roles and 
functions, are significant for the child, and that consequently both merit 
protection by the law and the courts. 
(d) Changes in society, more particularly the increasing number of 
step-families, are taken into consideration as it is argued that there can be 
no social strain on a child from having three or more “parents”. 
 
Japanese law (a) does not stipulate a statutory right to contact, of either a 
parent or a child. As introduced in Chapter 2, there has been a fair amount of 
debate in Japan concerning whether contact should be constituted as a legal 
right, or indeed, whether it could be understood to be a right of substantive 
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law considering the current statutory basis of contact, and, if contact was to 
be construed as a legal right, then whose right. I have introduced (in Chapter 
2 I 2.1) the arguments that have been brought for and against construing 
contact as a legal right in Japan. 
The question is, how relevant the discussion concerning whether contact 
should be construed as a statutory right or not is to the actual deliberation 
and outcomes of contact disputes. Ater all, a parent`s right to contact, even if 
it is recognized as a formal legal right, is not absolute and will be restricted 
when the best interests of the child call for a restriction. Does the recognition 
of contact as a legal right (of a parent) in fact lead to the courts granting 
contact more liberally in individual disputes? Does a statutory right to 
contact somehow restrict/modify the “best interests of the child” standard, or 
does the “best interests” standard simply overrule any rights? Indeed, this 
raises the bigger question of how the concept or nature of “rights” (and 
“obligations”) should be construed in the context of contact (or indeed family 
relationships and family law in general)? These are complicated questions to 
which this thesis does not provide a clear answer. 
(b) Although both practitioners and scholars in Japan agree as to the 
general idea that contact should be restricted or excluded if it is harmful to 
the best intersts of the child, it is clear that there is no consensus concerning 
the finer points in Japan. For one, opinions differ greatly among 
practitioners and scholars as to the general merits or demerits of contact for 
the child, whether the possible long-term benefits outweigh the possible 
immediate negative effects of contact to the child, or whether contact should 
only be understood to be beneficial for the child when the parents have a 
voluntary agreement concerning contact, but in principle harmful for the 
child when there is dispute between the parents. Hence, there is not even a 
common starting point for the deliberation of contact. As I have attempted to 
illustrate also in the case of case law concerning contact with a child living in 
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a step-family, there are differing interpretations among practitioners 
concerning the concrete effect the various individual factors relevant to a 
particular case have on the child and its best interests. Such differing 
interpretations of the significance of contact to the child, and what might 
constitute harm from contact to the child, are one of the possible causes for a 
lack of a clearer standard for the restriction or exclusion of contact, and 
consequently a rather inconsistent body of case law, with individual judges 
possibly basing their decisions on personal values. 
(c-d) In general, Japanese courts appear to argue that in the context of 
contact with a child living in a step-family, from the point of view of the best 
interests of the child, the “new household” and its stability, and the wishes of 
the residential parent (and step-parent) should be prioritized over contact 
with the non-residential parent. Although in the literature in recent years 
some scholars and practitioners have argued that the child is capable of 
maintaining a relationship with the non-residential parent as well as a 
step-parent, and that with the increasing number of step-families in 
Japanese society the formerly dominant understanding that contact with the 
non-residential parent should be excluded is becoming increasingly 
unacceptable, the courts in principle still appear to be guided by a basic 
notion that the law should prioritize and protect the “typical” or “ideal” 
closed nuclear family consisting of (up to) two parent and their child(ren). 
 
Importance of the Step-Parent for the Child, Protecting the “New Family” 
Japanese case law in the remarriage scenario clearly appears to prioritize 
the relationship between the step-parent and the child, or the stability of the 
new household, over the relationship between the non-residential legal 
parent and the child (arguing that the child`s best interests call for this). 
German courts appear to stress that both relationships are important for 
the child. The fact that German law does not downplay the importance of the 
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step-parent, is also evident in the legal regulation of the position of a 
step-parent in relation to a step-child (the so-called “small parental custody” 
(kleine Sorgerecht) (§ 1687b BGB), order that the child remains with persons 
to whom it relates (§ 1682), a right to contact with the child in case of a 
divorce or separation of the residential parent and the step-parent (§ 1685 II). 
Also, the legislator designed § 1618, concerning the surname of the child, to 
facilitate the integration of a step-child into the new family. 
Interestingly, in Japan, the legal standing of a step-parent, unless that 
parent adopts their step-child, is very week. As noted earlier, especially in 
recent years there has been increasing debate among scholars concerning the 
legal standing of a step-parent (combined with criticism towards the current 
regulation of step-child adoption), but so far, no legislative action has been 
taken. 
 
Post-Separation/-Divorce Parent-Child Relationship through the Prism of 
Step-Child Adoption 
Both in Japan and Germany, adoption is the only means to establish a legal 
parent-child relationship between the child and the step-parent with all its 
legal effects. As introduced in the same sections, statutory law concerning 
the adoption of a minor, including adoption by step-parent, differs 
considerably in Japan and Germany. 
German law stipulates that all adoptions of minors are so-called “full 
adoptions”. In the case of a step-child adoption, this means that as a result of 
an adoption by step-parent, the legal parent-child relationship between the 
external parent and the child will be extinguished (§ 1755 I), which also 
means that that parent can no longer apply to the courts for contact with the 
child. As explained above, considering the severe consequences of an 
adoption, an adoption order for a step-child adoption is only issued by the 
courts, if a number of strict conditions are fulfilled. Importantly, the consent 
154 
 
of the external parent is always required (§ 1747). 
The regulation of step-child adoption in German law has received a fair 
amount of criticism, with critics arguing, on the one hand, that, considering 
the significance of the relationship between the external parent and the child 
living in a step-family, the consequences of step-child adoption for the 
non-residential parent and for the child (a complete extinguishing of the 
legal parent-child relationship) are too severe, and that the near 
all-or-nothing approach as concerns the legal standing of the step-parent in 
relation to the step-child is not justified. Some have suggested amending the 
regulation of step-child adoption so that the relationship to the 
non-residential parent would not be extinguished, while other have argued 
for the strengthening of the legal position of the step-parent in relation to the 
child, in order to render step-parent adoptions largely unnecessary. As 
already mentioned above, partly due to such criticism towards step-child 
adoptions, the above-mentioned reforms strengthening the legal standing of 
a step-parent have been undergone, and although adoption is still the only 
way for a step-parent to attain the same legal standing as their custodial 
spouse in relation to the child, the necessity of undergoing adoption has been 
somewhat lessened by these recent amendments. 
Japanese law (including case law) concerning step-families presents 
somewhat of a puzzle. On the one hand, a non-residential parent (who does 
not exercise parental authority or custody in relation to the child) cannot 
object to or stop a (regular) adoption of the child by the new spouse of the 
other parent (§ 797), and step-child adoption is further simplified by the fact 
that the permission of the court, otherwise required for a (regular) adoption 
of a minor, is not necessary in the case of a step-child adoption (proviso to § 
798). In addition, the legal standing of the step-parent in relation to the child 
(if the step-parent does not adopt the child) is very week. Hence it appears as 
if Japanese law is pushing the step-parent to adopt their step-child.  
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On the other hand, on the surface, Japanese statutory law appears flexible 
and open to allow some participation of the non-residential legal parent in 
the life of the child concerned, since in the case of a regular adoption, the 
legal parent-child relationship between the non-residential parent and the 
child will not be extinguished, leaving the door open for the non-residential 
parent to apply for contact. However, as seen above, the courts will in fact 
restrict or exclude contact in most cases, prioritizing the “new family” over 
the relationship between the child and the non-residential parent. 
 
Final Conclusion 
As seen above, Japanese and German statutory and case law have adopted 
very different approaches as to the significance of contact with the external 
parent for a child living in a step-family, and how to strike a balance between 
the different interests concerned (including the stability of and the smooth 
integration of the child into the new household). 
In Germany, the statutory law and the courts (as well as the scholars) 
stress the importance for the child of, on the one hand, a continued 
relationship with the non-residential parent, and on the other hand the 
relationship with the step-parent and the integration of the child into the 
new family (the importance of the new family is highlighted, while not 
excluding the external parent from the life of the child). In connection with 
step-child adoption and the legal standing of the step-parent in relation to 
the child, in recent years, German law appears to have moved towards more 
legal flexibility for a more open definition of a family. 
Japanese law, on the other hand, clearly considers the relationship between 
the child and the non-residential parent to be less significant than the 
relationship between the child and the step-parent, the “smooth integration” 
of the child into the new family, and, indeed, the wishes of the residential 
legal parent, with the courts often viewing contact between the external 
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parent and the child in a remarriage scenario as an in principle unwelcome 
interference by the external parent with the “new family” of the child. 
When considering the case law concerning contact between a child living in 
a step-family and the non-residential parent in context with the statutory 
law concerning step-child adoption in Japan, and the week position of the 
step-parent if that parent does not adopt the step-child, it becomes apparent 
that the basic approach of the Civil Code and of the courts is still to prioritize 
and protect the “ideal” or “typical”, complete (legal) nuclear family, with 
deep-set notions in the back-ground that (contact with) the non-residential 
parent is, after all, not that significant for the child, and that contact can 
therefore be relatively easily restricted. 
